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Gil. S. Rubin 
 
 
This dissertation examines a key transformation in the history of Jewish nationalism in the 1940s 
- the decline of autonomist visions in Jewish national thought oriented toward Jewish life as a 
minority community in Eastern Europe, and the emergence of a Jewish ethnic-nation state in 
Palestine as the dominant mode of Jewish national expression. The main argument advanced in 
this dissertation is that this shift cannot be explained exclusively as a Jewish response to the 
Holocaust, but ought to situated as part of the larger process of the homogenization of the nation-
state in East Central Europe during the war and in its immediate aftermath through genocide and 
ethnic cleansing, population transfers and the rejection of international norms regarding the 
protection of minorities. Drawing on a variety of archival and published sources in Hebrew, 
Yiddish and English, this study reconstructs the vibrant Jewish postwar planning scene in New-
York, Palestine and London. From the start of the war tens of Jewish leaders and scholars, many 
whom had bee recent refugees from Europe, turned to plan for the Jewish future after the war. 
This dissertation examines how these Jewish leaders and thinkers grappled with the question of 
the future of the Jews as they debated whether Jews would be able reintegrate into Eastern 
Europe after the war, learned about the extermination of European Jewry and observed the ethnic 
transformation of the multiethnic East Central European landscape through wartime and postwar 
population transfers and ethnic cleansing.   
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The opening sentence of Isaac Beshevis Singer’s novel Shosha reads: “I was brought up on three 
dead languages – Hebrew, Aramaic and Yiddish (some consider the last not a language at all.)” I 
dedicate this dissertation to my paternal grandmother, Tsipora Rubin Z”L, and to my maternal 
grandmother, Rivka Lifhsitz, TB”LA. When Tsipora passed away, we found a notebook in her 
attic in which she wrote down memories from her childhood in Poland in beautiful Hebrew 
prose. It always seemed to me that Rivka, on the other hand, had no language to call her own. 
When the war broke out, Rivka was eleven and lived in Botosani. I am told she spoke Romanian, 
but she left Romania at twenty. She also spoke Yiddish, but her older sister, the last person with 
whom she spoke Yiddish, passed away six years ago. Later in the same page Singer writes: 
“Although my ancestors had settled in Poland some six or seven hundred years before I was 
born, I knew only a few words of the Polish language.” Though she has lived in Israel for almost 
7 decades now, Rivka’s Hebrew vocabulary remains limited. As a child I always noticed how 
she would never get gender pronouns right. With love to these women who built the Jewish 







In July 1939 Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini signed an agreement that called for the transfer 
of over 250,000 ethnic Germans from the Alto Adige region in the Italian Alps, also known in 
German as South Tyrol (Südtirol), to Germany. Within months, thousands of ethnic Germans 
crossed the Italian border into German-annexed Austria. While the South Tyrol agreement had 
not been the subject of major international attention at its time, one Jewish observer nonetheless 
described it as a development that would have profound consequences for the future of Europe 
and its Jews. “A precedent had been set that the world will feel and never forget,” he observed, 
“and perhaps this precedent had been set in order to fulfill, in the future, an important role in our 
own Jewish history.”  
The author of these lines was the fifty-nine year old Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder 
and leader of the right-wing Zionist Revisionist movement. For Jabotinsky, the South Tyrol 
agreement was an event of enormous historical significance because it augured what he believed 
was an entirely new vision for solving the European minority problem. The League of Nations 
system of minority protection, established by the Great Powers after the First World War, sought 
to deal with the problem of minorities in Eastern Europe by granting them a limited form of 
collective rights in the new states established in the region after the war. The South Tyrol 
agreement offered a radically different approach – getting rid of minority groups altogether by 
removing them to their purported ethnic ‘homelands’. Writing in the Palestine-based Revisionist 
Zionist daily Hamashkif, Jabotinsky reminded his readers that Hitler was not the first to promote 
the method of population transfers. In 1923 the League of Nations had brokered an agreement 
between Greece and Turkey that sanctioned the transfer of some 1.5 million Orthodox Greeks 
	 2 
from Turkey and about half a million Muslims from Greece, many of whom had already been 
displaced during the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922). Yet Jabotinsky insisted that there was an 
aspect entirely unique to the South Tyrol case. For the first time the transfer of populations was 
not to take place as a result of war but as part of a pre-planned and peaceful agreement. As such, 
he predicted, it would be far more influential than the Greek-Turkish precedent, and would be 
soon employed by various other states to solve their own minority problems and reshape the 
ethnic order in Eastern Europe. 
Was this new precedent, Jabotinsky contemplated in the essay, ultimately good or bad for 
the Jews? Jabotinsky acknowledged that the rise of support in Europe for the transfer of 
populations could help promote the goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1936 
Jabotinsky began to advocate for the so-called ‘Evacuation plan’ that envisaged the transfer of 
some 1.5 million Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine over the course of ten years. Such a 
political vision, he believed, could be greatly buttressed in an international order in which the 
transfer of populations is widely practiced. Yet at the same time as he acknowledged the 
potential benefits of population transfers for the cause of a Jewish Palestine, Jabotinsky feared its 
implications for the future of Jewish rights in Europe. Though Jabotinsky was a right-wing 
Zionist, he shared the consensus view among Jewish nationalist leaders of his day - that Jewish 
nationalism will develop in two centers, as a minority community in Eastern Europe and as a 
territorial center in Palestine. International support for the transfer of populations, Jabotinsky 
warned, could serve as a pretext by Eastern European states to strip Jews of their rights and 
ultimately expel them. The very same solution that might serve the interests of Jews in Palestine, 
he concluded, could end up haunting them in Europe.1  
																																																								
1 Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, “A Conversation with Zangwill,” Hamashkif, July 21 1939, 3 [in Hebrew]. 
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Jabotinsky’s historical assessment was off the mark. When he wrote this essay he was 
convinced that the chatter in European policy circles over an imminent war in the continent was 
greatly overblown. But the new political order Jabotinsky anticipated on the eve of the war 
nonetheless soon came into being, even if not through a series of peaceful agreements as he 
initially predicated, but far more violently under the guise of war and the chaotic years of 
European reconstruction. Indeed, after the outbreak of war the Nazis and other Axis powers 
radically transformed the ethnic landscape of Europe through large-scale population transfers, 
ethnic cleansing and the Holocaust of European Jewry. At the end of the war, East European 
governments, primarily Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the support of the Soviet Union, 
Britain, and the United States, carried out large-scale population transfers of some 15 million 
members of minority groups, predominately Germans, to their ethnic ‘homelands’. The 
cumulative result of these processes of population transfers, ethnic cleansing and genocide was 
what will be termed here the ‘ethnic revolution’ in Europe - the emergence of new, ethnically 
homogenous nation-states throughout the formerly multiethnic landscape of East Central Europe, 
the heart of the historic center of European Jewish life.  
This study takes off from Jabotinsky’s essay to examine how Jewish leaders and thinkers 
grappled with this ethnic revolution in Europe during the Second World War and in its 
immediate aftermath. How did the collapse of the multiethnic order in Eastern Europe with 
international protections for minority rights, and the emergence of new, ethnically homogenous 
nation-states throughout the region, reshape the way Jewish nationalist leaders and thinkers 
envisioned the future of Jews in Europe and Palestine? Jabotinsky’s essay hinted at a major 
moral and political dilemma – the new ethnically homogenous order in Europe could benefit 
Zionism but endanger the future of Jewish rights in Europe. As we shall in the following pages, 
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it is only by examining the encounter of Jewish leaders with this ethnic revolution that we can 
explain a key transformation in the history of Jewish nationalism – the decline of visions of 
Jewish national autonomy in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a Jewish ethnic nation-state in 
Palestine as the dominant, almost exclusive, form of Jewish national expression.  
 
Jews and the Ethnic Revolution in Europe  
In the past decade scholars have carefully studied the radical changes to the ethnic landscape of 
Europe during the Second World War and in its immediate aftermath. Historians have argued 
that the extermination of European Jewry ought to be examined alongside other projects of 
wartime ethnic cleansing and efforts to create racially homogenous societies by the Nazis and 
other Axis powers, such as in Nazi-allied Romania and Croatia.2 Scholars have also analyzed the 
growth of wartime support among Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European Governments in Exile for the expulsion of Germans and other minorities after the war 
as a way to solve European minority problems once and for all.3 And historians have explored 
																																																								
2 For recent accounts of ethnic cleansing and genocide across Nazi occupied Europe see Donald Bloxham, The Final 
Solution: A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis 
Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2009). See also specific case studies such as Holly Case, Between States: The 
Transylvanian Question and the European Idea During World War II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); 
Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchanges and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Alexander Korb, Im Schatten des Weltkriegs. Massengewalt der 
Ustaša gegen Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien, 1941-45 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013); Emily Greble, 
Sarajevo, 1941–1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler's Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); 
Raz Segal, Genocide in the Carpathians: War, Social Breakdown, and Mass Violence, 1914-1945 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2016).  
 
3 See R. M Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2013); Matthew Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population 
Transfers in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jessica Reinisch, Elisabeth White (eds.) The 
Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Postwar Europe, 1944-1949 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Eric Weitz; “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the 
Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations and Civilizing Missions,” American Historical Review 
Vol. 113 5 (2008), pp. 1313-1343; Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,” The 
Historical Journal Vol. 47 2 (2004), pp. 379-398; Dirk Moses, “Partitions, Population “Transfers” and the Question 
of Human Rights and Genocide in the 1930s and the 1940s”, paper presented at the University of Chicago, 
November 3 2013; Phillip Ther, The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe (New York: 
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the political and legal transformation of Poland and Czechoslovakia following the expulsion of 
German and Hungarian minorities and the violent process of ethnic cleansing in the Polish-
Ukrainian borderland.4 Overall, we have an increasingly rich historical understanding of what 
Tony Judt observed was a central innovation that separated the the aftermath of the Second 
World War from that of the First World War – the shifting of populations more so than borders.5 
The history of the Jews and of Jewish nationalism however is largely missing from this 
growing scholarship on the transformation of Eastern European nationalism during the 1940s. 
The absence of Jews from this history is surprising, for historians of the Jews have traditionally 
situated the history of Jewish nationalism in its East Central European context. This absence 
could be explained as product of what David Engel recently observed is a prevalent but 
methodologically unjustified disciplinary divide in the study of European Jewish history between 
historians of the Jews who study the period up until 1939 and historians of the Holocaust years.6 
Historians of European nationalism have also largely overlooked the Jews in their studies of the 
period, either because they relegated the Jews to a separate history focused exclusively on the 
Holocaust, or because they argued that - given the eventual emergence of a Jewish state in 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Berghan Books, 2016). 
 
4 See Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–
1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011) as well as Zahra, “The ‘Minority Question’ and National 
Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands,” Contemporary European History Vol. 17 2 (2008), 
137-165; Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar 
Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Hugo Service, Germans to Poles: Communism, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569-1999 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 2003); Tarik Cyril Amar, The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv: A Borderland City between Stalinists, 
Nazis, and Nationalists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).  
 
5 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 27. 
 
6 See David Engel, Historian of the Jews and the Holocaust (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). Another 
important reason for this divide is the ethical and emotional complexity involved in writing about the Holocaust 
which contrasts with historians’ commitment to write history, as much as possible, out of a commitment to a clinical 
detachment from their subjects. For reflections on the limits of writing a history of the Holocaust see Yehuda Bauer, 
Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 14-38.  
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Palestine at the end of that decade - the history Jewish nationalism no longer fitted the Eastern 
Europe context. In his study of the emergence of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus out of 
the territories of the former multiethnic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Timothy Snyder 
explained the exclusion of the Jews from his study – another national group that lived in the 
same territory - by arguing that the history of the Jewish nation “would draw us away from the 
Eastern Europe territorial focus,” that is, to Palestine.7 
This dissertation seeks to place the Jews and the history of Jewish nationalism in the 
story of the ethnic revolution in Europe. The Jews, this dissertation argues, lay at the center of 
the history of the transformation of nation-state in Eastern Europe in the 1940s. As Jabotinsky’s 
essay indicates, Jewish leaders were some of the first to observe that such a significant ethnic 
transformation was taking place and to contemplate its meaning for the future of Europe and the 
Jews. During the war, as we shall see, Jewish leaders and thinkers wrote some the first studies on 
the ethnic revolution in Europe, such as Raphael Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.8 And 
Jewish leaders and thinkers emerged as both some of the most vocal opponents and staunch 
proponents of the vision of large-scale population transfers in postwar Europe. The vigorous 
engagement of Jewish leaders and thinkers with the ethnic revolution in Europe, and their 
recognition of the enormous influence of these changes on their future political status, stemmed 
from the unique position of Jews in Europe – a minority group without a nation-state. Writing 
from Paris in the summer of 1940, German-Jewish thinker Hannah Arendt gave voice to this 
view, observing that “[a]s for the Jews, these newest methods [of population transfers] are 
																																																								
7 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 9. 
 
8 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for 
Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). 
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especially dangerous for them because they cannot be reimported to any motherland, to a state 
where they are a majority. For them it can only be a matter of deportation.”9  
Once the Jews are placed in the history of Eastern European nationalism in the 1940s, the 
story of the ethnic revolution in Europe appears radically different. Indeed, the first large-scale 
plans by Eastern European states for the expulsion of minorities were not a product of the war, 
but originated in the 1930s with regard to the Jews. After Hitler rose to power in 1933, Germany 
stripped Jews of their rights, sponsored pogroms and pushed for their emigration. The Polish 
government adopted a policy in favor of Jewish ‘evacuation’, advocating for the emigration of 
about 90% of its ‘excess’ Jewish population, which numbered around three million on the eve of 
the war. At the same time, the governments of Romania and Hungary also advocated for the 
removal of a large segment of its Jewish population, passing a series of anti-Jewish laws that 
rolled back the gains of Jewish equality. And while Eastern European governments sought to get 
rid of their Jews, Zionists, Jewish territorialists organizations and various governments proposed 
plans for Jewish resettlement on humanitarians grounds, exemplified by Jabotinsky’s 
‘Evacuation plan’, the French-sponsored exploratory mission on Jewish colonization in 
Madagascar and the abortive 1938 Evian Conference convened to find immigration avenues for 
Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. As Tara Zahra recently observed, during the 1930s the 
‘Jewish question’ had become a site around which visions of ethnic cleansing and humanitarian 
agendas of refugee resettlement repeatedly intersected.10 
Eastern European plans to expel its ‘excess’ Jewish population did not disappear after the 																																																								
9 Hannah Arendt, ‘On the Minority Question’ (copied from a letter to Erich Cohn-Bendit) in Jerome Kohn and Ron 
Feldman, eds., The Jewish Writings (New York: Schoken, 2007), 129. 
 
10 Tara Zahra’s recent book examines the Jews in the context of visions of ethnic homogeneity in the 1930s, but does 
not engage with Jewish sources and the Jewish perspective. I discuss Zahra’s work in more detail in chapter I. See 
Tara Zahra, The Great Departure: Emigration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World (New York: 
W.W Norton, Forthcoming), chapters 3 and 4. 
	 8 
outbreak of war. As this dissertation shows, from late 1939 the Polish and Czech Governments in 
Exile laid out plans for the ‘evacuation’ of a large segment of their Jewish population after the 
war. These Jewish expulsion plans were born in first years of the war, at a time in which both 
Jewish and Eastern European leaders expected that the majority of Jews would survive the war 
and seek to rebuild their lives in their former homes. In December 1941 Edward Beneš, president 
of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, told Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist 
Organization, that the country’s Jewish population would have to be “diluted” by about a third 
after the war. Similarly, leading members of the Polish Government in Exile advocated reviving 
the anti-Jewish ‘evacuation’ policy of the 1930s. By early 1942 Jewish leaders concluded that 
the war would end with a Jewish refugee problem in the scale of some two to three million. From 
late 1942, as news of the extermination of Jews had begun to reach the Allied capitols, Jewish 
and Eastern European leaders increasingly recognized that millions of Jews would perish in the 
war, and the discussions on Jewish postwar ‘evacuation’ soon petered out. 
 The history of plans to ‘evacuate’ Jews should encourage historians of Eastern European 
nationalism to more carefully examine the 1930s origins of Eastern European vision of ethnic 
homogeneity. Moreover, the history of these Jewish ‘evacuation’ visions underscores how 
Eastern European plans to expel Germans and other ‘disloyal’ minorities after the war did not 
emerge singularly out of desire for retribution, or for curbing irredentist nationalism, but 
included the Jews and were from the start part of a broader vision of creating states free of all 
minorities.  
 
From Minority Rights to a Jewish Ethnic Nation-State  
By studying the history of the Jews in the context of the transformation of the nation-state in 
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Eastern Europe in the 1940s, this dissertation seeks to offer a new history of Jewish nationalism 
in the crucial decade that saw the emergence of a Jewish nation-state. In recent years scholars 
revised our understanding of Jewish nationalism by carefully recovering the rich history of 
Jewish diaspora nationalism. Scholars have emphasized that from the late 19th and throughout 
the interwar years, Jewish nationalism was not aimed primarily at the establishment of a Jewish 
nation-state. Indeed, from the turn of the twentieth century and until the Second World War, 
Jewish nationalist leaders and thinkers were committed to fighting for national autonomy and 
minority rights for Jews as a minority community in Eastern Europe. Jewish nationalist parties – 
Zionists, Bundists, Autonomists – joined the struggle of various nationalities in the Habsburg 
and Tsarist Empires to reform those empires into more inclusive federations with extensive 
rights to their minorities. In the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Jewish delegations advocated for 
and significantly shaped the League’s system of minority protection. Between the wars, Jewish 
nationalist leaders in Eastern Europe fought for the realization of the vision of minority rights in 
both their national parliaments and in international forums. Zionist leaders in Palestine also 
supported the struggle of Jews for minority rights in Eastern Europe. Though Zionist leaders 
hoped to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine, they believed the Jewish population in Eastern 
Europe was large enough to support two national centers, in Eastern Europe and in Palestine. 
The most radical Zionist emigration plan of the 1930s - Jabotinsky’s ‘Evacuation plan’ discussed 
above, envisaged the transfer of 1.5 million Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine. Had the plan 
been realized to the letter, there would have still remained over two million Jews in Poland 
alone. The demographic reality of Jewish life between the wars thus implied that regardless of 
the success of Zionism or any other large-scale Jewish resettlement vision, Eastern Europe would 
remain a major center of Jewish existence for the foreseeable future.11  																																																								
11 Historians have been studying the history of Jewish diaspora nationalism for decades now, but the past few years 
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Yet while historians have successfully displaced the vision of a Jewish nation-state from 
the center of the story of Jewish nationalism, they have nonetheless failed to explain how and 
why the nation-state ultimately emerged as the predominant vision of Jewish nationalism by the 
end of the Second World War. When and why did Jewish leaders abandon their support for 
autonomy and minority rights in Eastern Europe, and of Jewish nationalism as developing in 
both Eastern Europe and Palestine, and begin to imagine the future of the Jews as based centrally 
in a Jewish nation-state in Palestine? This dissertation investigates this question by studying the 
transformation of Jewish nationalism alongside the ethnic revolution in Europe.  
 
The Future of the Jews  
As this study shows, the collapse of the vision of Jewish minority rights was by no means an 
inevitable outcome of the war. During the first years of the war Jewish diaspora nationalist 
leaders advocated for a return to minority in postwar Europe. From the start of the war tens of 
Jewish political leaders and scholars, many of whom had been recent refugees from Europe, set-
up several postwar planning institute in New York, London and Palestine, and turned to plan for 
the Jewish future. With the memory of Jewish achievements at the 1919 Paris Peace conference 																																																																																																																																																																																		
saw a proliferation of works on the topic, which emerged, at least in part, out of a desire to recover Jewish diaspora 
nationalism as moral alternative to nation-state Zionism. For some of the main recent works on the history of Jewish 
diaspora nationalism and visions of autonomy and minority rights see Simon Rabinovitch, Jewish Rights, National 
Rites: Nationalism and Autonomy in Late Imperial and Revolutionary Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2014); Rabinovitch, Jews and Diaspora Nationalism: Writings on Jewish Peoplehood in Europe and the United 
States (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2012); David N. Myers, Between Jew and Arab: The Lost Voice of 
Simon Rawidowicz (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2008); Noam Pianko, Zionism and the Roads Not Taken: 
Rawidowicz, Kaplan, Kohn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); James Loeffler, “Between Zionism and 
Liberalism: Oscar Janowsky and Diaspora Nationalism in America,” AJS Review No. 34 Vol. 2 (November 2010), 
289-308; Loeffler, “Nationalism without a Nation? On the Invisibility of American Jewish Politics,” Jewish 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 105 No. 3 (2015), p. 367-398; Joshua Shanes, Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in 
Habsburg Galicia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Joshua Karlip, The Tragedy of a Generation: 
The Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2013); Arie Dubnov, 
“Zionism on the Diasporic Front,” Journal of Israeli History Vol. 30, No. 2 (2011), 211-224; Dimitry Schumsky, 
Between Prague and Jerusalem: Prague Zionism and the Idea of Binational Palestine (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar 
Institute, 2010) [in Hebrew]; Jess Olson, Nathan Birnbaum and Jewish Modernity: Architect of Zionism, Yiddishism, 
and Orthodoxy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).  
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in mind, they prepared for an opportunity to shape the Jewish future in the postwar peace 
conference. Speaking from Vilna in March 1940, Simon Dubnow, the dean of Jewish historians, 
captured this sense of excitement about the future when he urged Jewish leaders to bear the 
experience of the 1919 Peace Conference in mind as they prepare to fight for Jewish rights in the 
postwar world.12 Diaspora nationalist leaders remained committed to Jewish minority rights even 
as they learned about the plans of the Polish and Czech governments in Exile to ‘evacuate’ Jews 
after the war. Successful Jewish diplomacy and pressure through Britain and the United States, 
they argued, could force these states to abandon their Jewish evacuation visions.  
From late 1942, however, Jewish leaders had begun to reevaluate their position on the 
Jewish future in Europe. Growing knowledge of the extent of the Nazi extermination of Jews, 
and of the radical population movements already carried out in Axis-occupied Europe, led them 
to envision a postwar Europe radically different from the one they expected in the first years of 
the war: a Europe with far fewer minorities and a significantly diminished Jewish population. 
Several diaspora nationalist leaders argued it was now implausible to expect a return for minority 
rights after the war. Others insisted on fighting for minority rights long after news on the 
extermination of Jews had reached the Allied capitols. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, 
diaspora nationalist leaders still laid out demands for a renewed system of minority protection. 
Yet unlike in 1919, in 1946 Jewish demands were entirely ignored by the Allies. As Jewish 
leaders watched the massive flight of Jewish refugees from Poland to Displaced Persons camps 
in Germany, alongside the expulsion of minorities across Eastern Europe, many concluded that a 
Jewish nation-state remained the only political alternative for the Jews in an increasingly 
ethnically homogenous order in postwar Eastern Europe.  																																																								
12 “Dubnow Urges Jews to Learn from Last War in Fighting for Rights,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, May 5 1940. 
See also “The Future of European Jewry: Professor Dubnow’s Views, Lessons from 1920,” The Jewish Chronicle, 
May 24, 1940.  
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While this dissertation recovers how the idea of a nation-state came to dominate Jewish 
national politics after the war as the vision of Jewish minority rights in Eastern Europe collapsed, 
it also seeks to offer a new and more complex history of the ways in which the concept of a 
Jewish state was re-imagined from the 1920s and throughout the early postwar years. Indeed, 
though scholars have repeatedly observed that Zionism emerged as the dominant political 
program in the Jewish world after the war, they have nonetheless overlooked the significant 
ways in which the meaning of Zionism transformed during the war and in its immediate 
aftermath in the face of the transformation of the nation-state in Eastern Europe and the new 
demographic realities of the postwar Jewish world. 
Between the wars Zionist leaders envisioned Palestine as a future state based on separate 
Jewish and Arab autonomies and extensive power sharing arrangements. This vision was based 
in part on Zionist leaders’ ideological rejection of the idea of a Jewish ethnic nation-state. During 
the interwar period Zionist leaders publicly stated their desire to establish in Palestine the dream 
state of nationalities and minority rights Jews were clamoring for in Eastern Europe.13 But more 
centrally, these visions of Jewish-Arab power sharing emerged out of Zionist leaders’ analysis of 
the demographic reality in Palestine and direction of British mandatory policy. Zionist 
demographic forecasts of the 1920s estimated it would take Jews some thirty years of a favorable 
immigration rate to only equal the number of Arabs in Palestine, let alone establish a significant 
Jewish majority. Under such conditions mainstream Zionist leaders regarded the idea of a Jewish 
nation-state as preposterous. Moreover, following the 1929 Arab riots and throughout much of 
the 1930s, Zionist leaders became convinced that the British were reneging on the mandate 
promise of establishing a ‘Jewish national home’ in Palestine and were increasingly committed 																																																								
13 On Zionist leaders’ ideological rejection of the ethnic-nation state model between the wars see Dimitri Schumsky, 
“Zionism and the Nation-State: A Reconsideration” Zion 77 (2012), p. 223-254 and Yosef Gorny, From Binational 
Society to Jewish State: Federal Concepts in Zionist, 1920-1990 (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
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to turning Palestine into state in which Arabs will remain a majority and Jews be protected as a 
minority. To counter these plans, prominent Zionist leaders such Weizmann and David Ben-
Gurion laid out visions of Jewish-Arab power-sharing based on the idea of equal share in 
government administration. Zionist leaders’ fears as to the direction of British policy were not 
unfounded. The 1939 White Paper famously capped Jewish immigration to Palestine, but it is 
largely forgotten that it also stipulated that within ten years Palestine would be declared an 
independent Palestinian state with an Arab majority in which Jews would remain a minority. 
Zionism had become a road not taken. The current discussions on the one-state solution foster a 
new historical imagination that allows us to reexamine the history of the Yishuv in the interwar 
period from the perspective that seemed most plausible to its contemporaries. During the 1930s a 
Jewish nation-state appeared as a far off dream, and Zionist leaders recognized that Palestine was 
either to become a shared Jewish-Arab state or an Arab nation-state.  
The outbreak of war radically changed the Zionist demographic calculus. Early in the war 
Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky learned about the plans of the Polish and Czech 
governments in exile to prevent the reintegration of masses of Jews after the war, and expected a 
Jewish refugee problem in the millions in postwar Europe. Deeply aware of growing support in 
Allied circles for population transfers as a solution for the ‘minority problem’ in Europe, 
Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky laid out plans for the transfer of millions of stateless 
Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine after the war. This postwar Jewish transfer, they argued, 
would set the stage for the creation of a Jewish nation-state in Palestine with a Jewish majority 
larger than they had ever before imagined was possible. The prospects of an overwhelming 
Jewish majority also reshaped their visions of Jewish-Arab relations. Jabotinsky and Weizmann 
advocated for the large-scale transfer of the Arab population from Palestine as a necessary 
	 14 
corollary to successful postwar Jewish resettlement, and Ben-Gurion disavowed his interwar 
commitment to Jewish-Arab power sharing arrangements. Scholars such as Benny Morris have 
carefully surveyed the views of prominent Zionist leaders on the issue of population transfers, 
yet it is remarkable that scholars have generally overlooked the critical wartime Eastern 
European context that gave rise to a new vision of a Jewish ethnic nation-state.14 
 The vision of the transfer of millions of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe to Palestine 
was however short-lived. As news of the extermination of European Jewry had reached the 
Yishuv from late 1942, Zionist leaders begun to grapple with a terrifying question - will enough 
Jews survive the war to enable the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine? As Zionist 
leaders increasingly recognized that the Jewish centers in Eastern Europe – the demographic 
reservoir of Zionism - had been destroyed, they begun to search for new Jewish candidates for 
postwar mass immigration. Weizmann insisted that the future of Zionism lay in the large-scale 
immigration of American Jews to Palestine, while Ben-Gurion looked eastwards and for the first 
time envisioned the immigration to Palestine of Jewish communities from North Africa and the 
Middle East. At the same time, Zionist leaders recognized that the only way to establish a 
majority in the territory of mandatory Palestine is by partitioning the land – thus reducing the 
number of Jewish immigrants required to ‘offset’ the Arab demographic majority. In an August 
1946 meeting in Paris, the executive of the Jewish Agency officially endorsed partition as its 
proposal to the British and American governments that were deliberating the future of Palestine. 
By the end of the war Zionist leaders thus embraced a new, post-Holocaust vision of Jewish 																																																								
14 See, for example Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) In her analysis of Joseph Schechtman Yfaat Weiss underscored the link between 
Schechtman’s scholarship on population transfers in Eastern Europe and support for the expulsion of Arabs from 
Palestine. But this analytical approach has not yet shaped the way scholars approach the study of prominent Zionist 
leaders such as Ben-Gurion, Weizmann and Jabotinsky. See Yfaat Weiss, A Confiscated Memory: Wadi Salib and 
Haifa's Lost Heritage (Columbia University Press: 2011) as well as Weiss, “Ethnic Cleansing, Memory and 
Property – Europe, Israel/Palestine 1944- 1948,” Juedische Geschichte als Allgemeine Geschichte (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), p. 158-188.  
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statehood: a small state in a partitioned Palestine that was to be established through the 
immigration of just enough Jews, Zionist leaders hoped, to establish a majority. 
 
1946 as the Jewish Postwar  
The chapters in this dissertation focus for the most part on the years 1939-1946. The choice of 
the period from 1939 to 1945 is rather self-explanatory, and corresponds to the standard 
periodization of the Second World War. This periodization reflects this dissertation’s goal of 
extending the study of Jewish nationalism into the war years, and examining the history of Jews 
during the Holocaust not only as victims but also as active agents shaping the postwar order. Yet 
the choice of the year 1946 seems like an outlier. 1945-1946 is too short a period to carefully 
examine the history of Jews in Eastern Europe after the war. And as a history of Jewish 
nationalism in the 1940s, this dissertation oddly stops two years before the actual establishment 
of a Jewish state. 1946 is chosen as the end point of this study however because it marks the 
origins of what would be termed here the ‘Jewish postwar’. In his seminal study Postwar, Tony 
Judt portrayed the European postwar not so much as a chronological time-frame but as a state of 
mind, defined by the way European societies grappled with the moral and political ramifications 
of the war and by a visceral sense of living in a decidedly post-1945 world.15 Norman Naimark 
has recently examined the diversity of the concept of the postwar in European history, noting 
how the fighting ended and new political orders emerged in vastly different moment across 
Europe during the 1940s.16 As the following chapters show, 1946 marked a moment in which 
Jewish leaders and thinkers openly recognized that they inhabit a new postwar order – a world in 																																																								
15 Judt, Postwar.  
 
16 Norman Naimark, “The Persistence of the Postwar, Germany and Poland” in Frank Biess and Robert G. Moller 
(eds.) Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2010), 13-29.  
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which Europe was no longer to be the center of Jewish life. In August 1946 Jewish organizations 
from across Europe and the United States flocked to the Paris Conference, in a failed effort to 
secure new guarantees for Jewish rights in Europe. Jewish delegates at the conference contrasted 
their failure in 1946 with Jewish successes at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and described 
1946 as the end point of a century and a half long struggle to secure Jewish rights in international 
conferences.17 At the same time, the Zionist executive endorsed partition as its vision for a future 
Jewish state in Palestine. The Zionist leadership’s embrace of partition reflected the realization 
that Eastern European Jewry, the demographic reservoir of Zionism, was now gone. The Zionist 
movement still insisted it could find a solution to the ‘Jewish question,’ but by 1946 the ‘Jewish 
question’ was no longer that of millions of ‘excess’ Jews in Eastern Europe as it had been in the 
1930s, but became tantamount in the international imagination to the fate of some 250,000 Jews 
who lingered in Displaced Camps in in Germany, Austria and Italy. 1946 was also the year that 
saw the Kielce pogrom and height of Jewish flight from Poland – these events were heavily 
reported on in the Jewish press, and symbolically marked the failure of attempts to rebuild 
Jewish life in Eastern Europe after the war. Historian Jacob Talmon, who attended the 1946 Paris 
Conference as a young delegate of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, thus observed after the 
																																																								
17 In analyzing 1946 as an end point of long tradition of Jewish attempts to secure their rights through the 
international system, this dissertation seeks to add to an expanding scholarship on Jewish internationalism. For some 
of the main works on the topic see Abigail Green, Moses Montefiore: Jewish Liberator, Imperial Hero (Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Lisa Moses Leff, Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in 
Ninteenth-Century France (Stanford University Press, 2006); Mark Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe: The 
Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914-1919 (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2009); Carole Fink, Defending the 
Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Philipp Graf, Die Bernheim-Petition 1933: jüdische Politik in der Zwischenkriegszeit 
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008);  Aron Rodrigue, French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle 
and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860-1925 (Indiana University Press, 1990); Jonathan Frankel, 
Damascus Affair: “Ritual Murder”, Politics and the Jews in 1840 (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Nathan 
Kurz, “A Sphere above the Nations?”: The Rise and Fall of International Jewish Human Rights Politics, 1945-1975 
(Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Yale University, 2015); Samuel Moyn, “Rene Cassin, Human Rights 
and Jewish Internationalism,” in: Jacques Picard, Jacques Revel, Michael P. Steinberg, Idith Zertal (eds.) Makers of 
Jewish Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 278-291. 
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conference that “the morality of the world had greatly decline from 1919 to 1946,” and argued 
that the Jewish future now lay exclusively in national regeneration in Palestine.18 Salo W. Baron, 
who also passed through Paris during that fateful summer, envisioned the Jewish future as 
centered in the United States where the success of Jewish emancipation will serve as model for 
Jewish communities across the world.19 Yet regardless of where Jewish observers envisioned the 
Jewish future, in 1946 they all recognized that they live in radically new period marked by the 
destruction of the European centers of Jewish life.  
Chapter Outline 
The story of this dissertation unfolds across five chapters. Chapter 1 explores the wartime debate 
among diaspora nationalist leaders over the future of Jewish minority rights. The chapter focuses 
on Jacob Robinson, a prominent diaspora nationalist leader in Lithuania between the wars. In late 
1940 Robinson founded the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the postwar planning institute of the 
World Jewish Congress. Based in New-York, Robinson led the effort to plan for new guarantees 
for Jewish rights in postwar Europe and opposed the plans of the Polish and Czech governments 
in Exile for postwar Jewish ‘evacuation’. By late 1943 however, facing growing news on Jewish 
extermination and reports on massive population shifts across Nazi-occupied Europe, Robinson 
radically changed his views and concluded there was no future for minority rights in postwar 
Europe. The chapter surveys Robinson’s transformation as an anchor to recover the vigorous 
debate that emerged in Jewish postwar planning circles over the future of minority rights.  
																																																								
18 Jacob Flaiszer (Talmon), “The Jewish Question in the 1946 Paris Peace Conference,” Metzuda 5 6 1947-1948, 
166 [in Hebrew].  
 
19 Salo. W. Baron, “Final Stages of Jewish Emancipation,” Unpublished essay written in late 1946/early 1947, Salo 
W. Baron Papers, Stanford University Libraries, Department of Special Collections and University Archives, 
M0580, Box 386. 
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Chapter 2 focuses on Jabotinsky as a lens to examine how Zionist leaders came to envision 
Palestine as a Jewish ethnic nation-state as they observed the ethnic transformation in Europe. 
Between the wars Jabotinsky consistently advocated for a future Palestine based on extensive 
Jewish and Arab autonomies and political equality and repeatedly rejected the idea of the transfer 
of the Arab population from Palestine. Shortly after the outbreak of war, however, Jabotinsky 
began to advocate for the expulsion of the Arab population from Palestine. This chapter analyzes 
Jabotinsky’s transformation as a product of the war. Jabotinsky believed that millions of Jewish 
refugees would be prevented from returning to their prewar homes in Eastern Europe and would 
seek to immigrate en masse to Palestine; to resettle these refugees, he argued, the Arab 
population ‘would have to make room’. Keenly aware of growing support among the Allies for 
population transfers as a solution to the minority problem in postwar Europe, Jabotinsky 
envisioned an increasingly ethno-national Jewish state in Palestine that mirrored the new forms 
of nationalism emerging across Eastern Europe.  
 Chapter 3 goes back in time and examines Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s interwar thought 
on the future of Palestine. The chapter shows that by the mid-1930s both became convinced that 
the establishment of a Jewish majority and thus a Jewish state in Palestine was not a political 
goal realizable in the foreseeable future. Both advocated for the establishment of a form of bi-
national Arab-Jewish state in Palestine based on different forms power sharing arrangements, 
fearing the alternative would be worse – the emergence of an Arab majority state with Jews 
remaining a minority.   
 The history explored in chapter 3 sets the stage for understanding how radical was Ben-
Gurion and Weizmann’s wartime political shift. Learning about the plans of the Polish and 
Czech governments in exile for the Jews, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann expected a Jewish refugee 
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problem in the millions after the war and laid out a plan for the large scale transfer of millions of 
Jews to Palestine and the establishment of a ‘Jewish commonwealth.’ Chapter 4 explores the 
origins of this new vision of a Jewish nation-state in Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s early wartime 
thought, and shows how it emerged out of Zionist demographic predictions regarding a mass 
Jewish statelessness problem in a new, ethnically homogenous postwar order in Europe. The 
chapter also recovers how the expectation for a future state with an overwhelming Jewish 
majority transformed Zionist visions of Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine.  
Chapter 5 examines how growing knowledge of the Holocaust transformed the Zionist 
vision of a Jewish state. As Zionist leaders learned about the scale of Jewish extermination in 
Europe, they grappled with the question of whether Zionism has a future without the Eastern 
European demographic centers.  
 Overall, the five chapters in this dissertation challenge the narrative that the outbreak of 
war and the Holocaust simply brought an end to Jewish life in Eastern Europe and prompted the 
inevitable rise of nation-state Zionism. By ‘slowing the clock’ on the war, this study recovers 
how various political visions emerged and disappeared – a future for Jewish minority rights in 
Eastern Europe, a Jewish state with millions of Jewish immigrants - as the postwar Jewish world 





The End of Minority Right: Jacob Robinson and the Fate of Jewish Diaspora 
Nationalism 
 
In June 1943 Jacob Robinson, a Jewish nationalist leader from Lithuania, submitted a 
confidential memo to the peace planning committee of the World Jewish Congress, ‘Minority 
Rights as Part of Our Peace Program’. In March 1940 Robinson fled Lithuania through France 
and settled in New York where he established and directed the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the 
World Jewish Congress’ research institute on postwar problems. In his memo Robinson laid out 
a radical recommendation - Jews should not demand minority rights guarantees in the postwar 
peace conference. “The suggestion is hereby made than an expression [minority rights] which 
has been so compromised in the past and provokes so much confusion in the present be omitted 
and allowed to fall in disuse.” In the place of minority rights, Robinson argued in a subsequent 
memo, “our single demand should be the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine” 
which will absorb the remaining Jewish refugees in Europe after the war.20  
Robinson’s recommendations came as a shock to the members of the peace planning 
committee. From the start of the war the leaders of the World Jewish Congress had hoped they 
could convince the Allies to establish a new system of minority protection in Europe after the 
war. While they recognized the many failures of the League of Nation’s interwar system of 
minority rights, they could not envision any alternative for the millions of Jews they believed 
would survive the war seek to rebuild their lives in Eastern Europe in its aftermath. Indeed, 
during the first years of the war Jewish leaders assumed that the war will conclude with a Jewish 
																																																								
20 Jacob Robinson, Minority Rights as Part of our Peace Program. Notes Submitted to the Peace Aims Planning 
Committee, 29 June 1943, World Jewish Congress Records, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio C118 8 
(hereafter WJC papers. Papers accessed as copies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archive.)  
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refugee problem of unprecedented proportions – some three to five million “floating Jews” in 
Eastern Europe after the war, as Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, 
described them.21 As Europe would emerge from the rubbles, declared the authors of a wartime 
study The Jewish Refugee, Jewish leaders would be faced with an enormous task - turning these 
floating Jews “from refugees to builders of a Jewish future.”22 Nahum Goldman, president of the 
World Jewish Congress, thus summarily dismissed Robinson’s call for rejecting minority rights 
as a fringe right-wing Zionist argument.23  
The members of the committee were shocked however not only by the contents of 
Robinson’s memos but also by the identity of the author. Robinson was a staunch supporter of 
minority rights between the wars: he belonged to a milieu of Jewish political activists and 
intellectuals who dedicated their careers to promoting the cause of Jewish nationalism in Eastern 
Europe. Robinson fought for minority rights in the Lithuanian parliament – serving as a 
prominent delegate of the Zionist party and for a time as the speaker of the country’s minority 
bloc, and in various international forums – petitioning the League of Nations in cases of 
																																																								
21 Cham Weizmann, “Speech at Extraordinary Zionist Conference of the American Emergency Committee for 
Zionist Affairs”, May 9th, 1942, Biltmore Conference Stenographic Protocol, the Central Zionist Archive, 
Jerusalem. 
 
22 Arieh Tartakower, Kurt Grossman, The Jewish Refugee (New York: The Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944) (the 
book was originally written in 1942). “World leaders have all recognized,” observed Zionist leader Yitzhak 
Gruenbaum in January 1942, “that the Jewish question has become the question of the refugee.” Central Zionist 
Archive, Jerusalem, Zionist Executive Meeting, Protocol, 5.1.1942. For other wartime studies on the Jewish 
refugees problem see Eugene M. Kulischer, Jewish Migrations: Past Experiences and Postwar Prospects (American 
Jewish Committee, 1943); Jacob Lestchinsky, Where Should We Go? Jewish Migration in the Past and Today 
(Jewish National Workers Union, New York, 1944) [in Yiddish]. The wartime experience – and public fascination – 
with the image of the Jewish refugee was captured in Hannah Arendt’s famous wartime essay ‘We Refugees’. See 
Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees” The Menorah Journal 31 (1943), 66-77. The Jewish refugee crisis was part of a 
general international preoccupation with the problem of refugees after the war. In October 1939 US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt famously declared that “when this ghastly war ends there many not be one million but ten 
million or twenty million” who would become part of the problem of the human refugee.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
“Address to Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees”, October 17, 1939, reprinted in Postwar 
Migrations (New York: The American Jewish Committee Research Institute on Peace and Postwar Problems, 1943), 
p. 19. 
 
23 Minutes of World Jewish Congress Peace Planning Committee Meeting, 1943. WJC Papers, C118 8.  
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violations of Jewish rights and representing Jews in the organization of European minorities, the 
European Nationalities Congress. Indeed, Robinson was one of the most characteristic 
representatives of Jewish diaspora nationalism between the wars and that was a main reason why 
the World Jewish Congress entrusted him with heading the organization’s postwar planning 
institute.24  
This chapter reconstructs Robinson’s wartime political transformation – from a supporter 
of minority rights to an advocate of a Jewish national agenda focused exclusively on state-
building in Palestine - as a lens to examine more broadly the decline of the vision of minority 
rights in Jewish national thought during the war. This inquiry forms one part of the broader 
interpretative task of this dissertation: explaining how the central vision of Jewish nationalism in 
the interwar years, based on a dual commitment to the promotion of national rights for Jews in 
Eastern Europe and the development of a Jewish center in Palestine, transformed by the end of 
the war into a new, and exclusive focus on the establishment a Jewish ethnic nation-state in 
Palestine. The main argument advanced in this chapter is that to understand why Robinson – and, 
as we shall see, many other prominent Jewish nationalist leaders - abandoned their commitment 
to Jewish national rights in Eastern Europe, we ought to examine how they thought about and 
																																																								
24 The literature on Robinson and primarily on his prominent role as a diaspora nationalist leader is greatly 
expanding. This chapter is based on, but significantly expands on, an article on Robinson I published in 2012 in the 
Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook. For more on Robinson see Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, “Geschichtserfahrung und 
Völkerrecht. Jacob Robinson und die Gründung des Institute of Jewish Affairs,” Leipziger Beiträge zur jüdischen 
Geschichte und Kultur 2 (2004), 307–330 as well as “At the Service of the Jewish Nation. Jacob Robinson and 
International Law,“ Osteuropa (2008), 157-170, (2008). For Robinson’s prominent role in the Bernheim petition 
affair, see Phillip Graf. Die Bernheim Petition 1933. Juedische Politic in Der Zweischenkriegszeit (Leipzig: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2008). See also the following compilation of essays on Robinson by Eglė Bendikaitė 
and Dirk Roland Haupt (eds.). The Life, Times and Work of Jokūbas Robinzonas –Jacob Robinson (Sankt Augustin: 
Academia Verlag, 2015), particularly relevant for the discussion in this chapter are the following essays in the 
volume. Saulius Kaubrys, “Jokubas Robinzonas – A Member of the Second and Third Seimas: Anatomy of Action 
and Experience,” 19-38 as well as . Eglė Bendikaitė,, “Politician Without Political Party: A Zionist Appraisal of 
Jacob Robinson’s Activities in the Public Life of Lithuania,” 39-66. For a recent reappraisal of Robinson that takes 
stock of the expanding literature on the subject see James Loeffler “’The Famous Trinity of 1917’: Jacob Robinson 
and the Lost Tradition of Zionist Internationalism,” Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook 15 2016 (forthcoming, 
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responded to the process of the homogenization of the nation-state in the region during the war 
and in its immediate aftermath.  
In the past decade scholars have underscored how the postwar expulsion of minorities - 
primarily ethnic Germans - from Poland, Czechoslovakia and several other Eastern European 
states, should be understood in the context of changing international norms regarding minorities 
in that decade. Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and East Central European states all 
viewed the ‘minority question’ as one of the root causes of interwar instability, and from the start 
of the war promoted population transfers as a ‘necessary evil’ that would solve minorities 
conflicts in the region once and for all.25 Missing from this expanding literature, however, is a 
consideration of the significant place of Jews in the development of European thinking on 
population transfers. Indeed, the history of Jews in the 1930s and 1940s has been studied almost 
exclusively as part of a separate story about antisemitism and the Holocaust. Yet Jews have been 
central to European visions of ethnic homogeneity in this period. The first large-scale plans by 
Eastern European states for the expulsion of minorities were not a product of the war, but 
originated in the 1930s with regard to the Jews. After Hitler rose to power in 1933, Germany 																																																								
25 The literature on population transfers during and after the Second World War is voluminous. For recent literature 
that emphasizes the link between expulsions of minorities from Eastern Europe and support among the Allies for 
population transfers see, for example Jessica Reinisch, Elisabeth White (eds.) The Disentanglement of Populations: 
Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Postwar Europe, 1944-1949 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); 
Matthew Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfers in Context (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); R. M Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the 
Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: 
Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchanges and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied 
Romania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Hugo Service, Germans to Poles: Communism, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Eric Weitz; “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human 
Rights, Forced Deportations and Civilizing Missions,” American Historical Review Vol. 113 5 (2008), pp. 1313-
1343; Tara Zahra, “The ‘Minority Question’ and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak 
Borderlands,” Contemporary European History Vol. 17 2 (2008) pp. 137-165; Mark Mazower, “The Strange 
Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,” The Historical Journal Vol. 47 2 (2004), pp. 379-398; Dirk Moses, 
“Partitions, Population “Transfers” and the Question of Human Rights and Genocide in the 1930s and the 1940s”, 
paper presented at the University of Chicago, November 3 2013 and Phillip Ther, The Dark Side of Nation-States: 
Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe (New York: Berghan Books, 2016). 
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stripped Jews of their rights, sponsored pogroms and pushed for their emigration. The Polish 
government adopted a policy in favor of Jewish ‘evacuation’, advocating for the emigration of 
about 90% of its ‘excess’ Jewish population. At the same time, the governments of Romania and 
Hungary also advocated for the removal of a large segment of its Jewish population, passing a 
series of anti-Jewish laws that rolled back the gains of Jewish equality.26  
Eastern European plans to expel its ‘excess’ Jewish population did not disappear after the 
outbreak of war. In fact, as we shall see in this chapter, the Polish and Czech Governments in 
Exile had also planned for the ‘evacuation’ of a large segment of its prewar Jewish population 
after the war. These visions were born in first years of the war, at a time in which both Jewish 
and Eastern European leaders expected that the majority of Jews would survive the war and seek 
to rebuild their lives in their former homes. As Edward Beneš, president of the Czechoslovak 
Government in Exile, told Chaim Weizmann in December 1941, the country’s Jewish population 
would have to be “diluted” by about a third after the war. Under Nazi rule Jews in 
Czechoslovakia had already been removed from their homes and professions, and many Czech 
citizens have in the meanwhile taken possession of their property. Simply dispossessing Czechs 
after the war, Beneš told Weizmann, “in order to restore the property to its original owners was 																																																								
26 In viewing interwar Eastern European fantasies of Jewish expulsion as an important precursor for postwar 
population transfers this chapter makes an argument similar to that advanced recently by Tara Zahra in her book The 
Great Departure. As Zahra writes in the introduction, the ethnic cleansings of the Second World War and its 
aftermath should be traced to the postwar World War I molding of nationally homogenous populations … of which 
“Eastern European Jews were the most tragic victims …” (p. 17-18). Chapter three and four of her book explore the 
confluence between Eastern European plans for the expulsion of Jews in the 1930s and humanitarian visions, 
primarily by Zionist and territorialist, for resettling Jews outside Europe. While sharing Zahra’s approach, this study 
expands on her analysis in several ways. First, as we shall see, this study shows how central visions of expelling 
Jews remained in Eastern European thinking throughout the war years; Second, this study highlights the internal 
Jewish perspective –and shows how the encounter of Jewish leaders and thinkers with the process of the 
homogenization of the nation state in Eastern Europe reshaped they way they understood the meaning and goals of 
Jewish politics; And lastly, this study seeks to emphasize the historical and moral distinctions between anti-Jewish 
evacuation and expulsion plans and the efforts of Jewish leaders to resettle masses of Jews outside Europe. See 
Zahra, The Great Departure: Emigration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World (New York: W.W 
Norton & Company, 2016). For another recent prominent study that explores the themes of the confluence between 
visions of Jewish expulsion and humanitarian visions of saving the Jews see Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The 
Holocaust as History and Warning (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015) primarily chapter three.  
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scarcely a solution.” Similarly, leading members of the Polish Government in Exile advocated 
reviving the anti-Jewish ‘evacuation’ policy of the 1930s and hoped to gain the support of 
Zionist leaders for their plans to drastically reduce the size of the country’s postwar Jewish 
population.27 
During the first years of the war Robinson and many other Jewish leaders believed they 
could fight these plans and restore minority rights for Jews by applying diplomatic pressure on 
Britain and the United States. At the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 Jewish diplomacy 
succeeded in imposing international guarantees for such rights against the will of Eastern 
European governments. Over the course of late 1942 and 1943, however, Robinson had begun to 
re-evaluate his position. Growing knowledge of the extent of the Nazi extermination of Jews and 
of the radical population movements the Nazis had already carried out in Axis-occupied Europe, 
led him to envision a postwar Europe radically different from the one he, and other Jewish 
leaders, had expected in the first years of the war: a Europe with far fewer minorities and a 
significantly diminished Jewish population. Under such circumstances, he argued, it would be 
implausible to expect a return to minority rights after the war. As European nation-states were 
becoming increasingly ethnically homogenous, Jews too, Robinson argued, should center their 
political agenda exclusively on the creation of a nation-state. Robinson’s memos and subsequent 
publications prompted a debate in Jewish postwar planning circles over the future of minority 																																																								
27 Though details of these visions have been discussed in the literature on Jews and the Polish and Czech 
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primarily as a means to understanding how those leaders later responded to news of the Holocaust. In his study of 
the Czechoslovak government in Exile and the Jews, Jan Lanicek analyzes Beneš’ rejection of Jewish demands for 
minority rights, but does not draw the conclusion – which, as we shall see, Jewish leaders shared - that Beneš was in 
fact advocating for the expulsion of a large segment of the country’s prewar Jewish population. These issues will be 
explored in the length in the section of this chapter entitled “Jews and Population Transfers”. See David Engel, In 
the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government in Exile and the Jews (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993) as well as Jan Lanicek, Czechs, Slovaks and the Jews, 1938-1948 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
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rights. Several Jewish leaders insisted on fighting for minority rights long after news on the 
extermination of Jews had reached the Allied capitols and knowledge of plans by Eastern 
European states for the future of their minorities became widespread. At the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1946, Jewish leaders – Robinson among them – still laid out demands for a 
renewed system of minority protection after the war. Yet unlike in 1919, in 1946 Jewish 
demands were entirely ignored by the Allies. As Jewish leaders watched the massive flight of 
Jewish refugees from Poland to Displaced Persons camps in Germany, alongside the expulsion 
of minorities from Eastern Europe, they lamented the end of a decades long struggle for Jewish 
rights as a national minority in the region. 
 
Planning for the Jewish Future  
Robinson’s 1943 call to abandon minority rights demands explanation not only because he 
staunchly supported this political vision before the war, but also because during the first years of 
the war Robinson had vigorously advocated for a return to a system of minority protection in 
postwar Europe. To understand Robinson’s early wartime advocacy for minority rights, it is 
essential to situate his thought in the context of the vibrant Jewish postwar planning scene in the 
Allied capitols.  
From the start of the Second World War Jewish leaders and intellectuals in New York, 
London and Palestine – many of whom had been recent refugees from Europe – turned to plan 
for the Jewish future. The assumption of practically all Jewish leaders engaged in postwar 
planning was that the war, much like the Great War, would end with a major international peace 
conference that would offer new opportunities to guarantee Jewish rights. Indeed, it was the 
memory of Jewish achievements in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that captured the 
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imagination of Jewish leaders. Speaking from Vilna in March 1940, Simon Dubnow, the dean of 
Jewish historians, urged Jewish leaders to bear the experience of the Versailles Paris Peace 
Conference in mind as they prepare to fight for Jewish rights in the future.28 “The main problem 
of European Jewry,” declared Goldman in November 1941, “… is the problem of its future, after 
Hitlerism had been destroyed and the democratic victory will have opened the way to the 
establishment of a new world.”29 “Rarely in the history of the last two thousand years,” observed 
Joseph Tentenbaum, president of the American Federation of Polish Jews, “did we have such an 
urgent call to participate in the dynamic forces molding our own future.”30 One Ha’aretz 
commentator was baffled by the obsession of Jewish leaders with the future. Everyone these 
days has assumed the ungrateful role of a prophet, he noted, attempting to predict the shape of 
the postwar order and peak behind the “the veil of the future.”31 
During the first year of the war the discussions on the future were scattered and took 
place mainly in the Jewish press and in various public speeches. In March 1940 Max Laserson, a 																																																								
28 “Dubnow Urges Jews to Learn from Last War in Fighting for Rights,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, May 5 1940. 
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leader of the Jewish minority in Latvia, drafted the first Jewish postwar program on behalf of the 
Jewish National Workers Alliance. As Laserson put it, it was by no means too early to start 
planning for the future – in fact, in publishing this pamphlet he was merely continuing the work 
begun by the organization ahead of the last peace conference.32 The renowned historian Salo 
Baron was invited to deliver several speeches on the future to Jewish audiences in the spring and 
summer of 1940. Baron was generally optimistic about the prospect for Jews in postwar Europe, 
and sought to reassure an audience terrified by the prospect of a Germany victory in the war that 
even a Nazi triumph would not imply the end of European Jewry. Like all multiethnic empires in 
history, Baron argued, the Nazis too would inevitably become more tolerant of nationalities as 
they attempt to establish their rule over diverse populations.33 
After the fall of France in the summer of 1940 the discussions on the Jewish future were 
organized into institutional frameworks. The realization that Hitler now had come to dominate 																																																								
32 Max M. Laserson, The Status of the Jews After the War. A Proposal for Jewish Demands at the Forthcoming 
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Western and Eastern Europe had convinced Jewish leaders that the interwar order had been 
irrecoverably shattered and that a radically new order would have to be established in the region 
after the war. In September 1940 the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews drafted its first memorandum on the ‘Jewish Question in the Future Peace 
Conference’, renewing the work it begun for planning for peace during the First World War.34 In 
November 1940 the American Jewish Committee established the Institute on Peace and Postwar 
problems, the first Jewish research institute dedicated exclusively to planning for the coming 
peace.35 The American Jewish Congress and World Jewish Congress followed suit in February 
1941, establishing the Institute of Jewish Affairs.36 Several months later the Jewish Labor 
Committee set up its own postwar research institute.37 Other Jewish postwar planning activities 
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took place on a smaller scale within several other organizations such as YIVO, the Bund and 
among various national committees organized by Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe.38  
The emergence of Jewish postwar planning institutes was a major wartime innovation. 
Employing tens of Jewish scholars, many of whom were recent refugees form Europe, these 
institutes gave rise to what had been at the time the largest enterprise of the study of Jewish 
society and history. Jewish postwar planning institutes had three major preoccupations. They 
undertook to study the recent past in order to understand, as Morris Perlzweig, head of the 
British section of the World Jewish Congress put it, “the reasons for the collapse of Jewish rights 
in Europe”.39 Numerous studies were written during the war on the political, economic, legal and 
demographic position of Jews in various European countries and on the history of Jewish 
attempts to internationally guarantee their rights. At the same time, these institutes sought to 
gather up-to date information on the condition of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. Collecting 
information from contacts across Europe, they aimed to provide the most accurate assessment of 
the impact of the war on European Jewry. Most centrally, these institutes drew on this vast 
scholarship to devise plans for the future. Such plans dealt with the immediate tasks of postwar 																																																								
38 Leading members of YIVO such as Max Weinreich took part in the postwar planning activities of the Jewish 
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relief and economic reconstruction as well as with question of Jewish immigration after the war 
and international guarantees for Jewish rights in Europe.  
 The emergence Jewish postwar planning institutes also signified the rise of New York as 
the wartime capital of Jewish politics. The historian Lucy Dawidowicz, who worked during the 
war in the YIVO research department, recalled how in 1940 New York became “a haven for 
Jewish talent in flight,” a place where “scholars, writers, lawyers and communal leaders and 
intellectuals from Eastern Europe” congregated.40 New York was a center of Jewish political 
activity from the turn of the century: it was home to a large Jewish socialist movement in the first 
decades of the twentieth century and during the First World War became a major site of activity 
for relief and reconstruction of European Jewry.41 The outbreak of war, however, turned New 
York into the primary center of Jewish political activism. With the Jewish centers on the 
continent under Nazi and Soviet occupations, hundreds of Jewish refugee scholars and political 
activists relocated to Manhattan. New and old and Jewish organizations, often located a short 
distance from each other, emerged as sites of bustling debate on the war and the future. Jewish 
organizations such as the World Jewish Congress, the Bund and the YIVO Institute for Jewish 
Research moved their headquarters from Europe to New York in the first years of the war.42 
Zionist leaders such as Chaim Weizmann and Ben-Gurion repeatedly visited the city and 																																																								
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Revisionist Zionist leader Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky relocated to New York in early 1940. In 
1943, reflecting the growing political mobilization of American Jewry, representatives of sixty-
four Jewish organizations established the American Jewish Conference with the goal of serving 
as a unified representative body of American Jews in matters relating to postwar 
reconstruction.43 Several locations in the city emerged as sites of sustained conversation on the 
Jewish future.  Jewish refugee scholars from Eastern Europe met regularly at the New-York 
public library reading room, where they picked up the papers from their home countries and 
discussed the war.44 Penniless Zionist Revisionist activists, many of whom arrived in New York 
shortly after the outbreak of war, spoke “broken English” and regularly met at a midtown cafe to 
plan how to gain American support for their agenda.45 The Jewish postwar planning scene took 
root within a broader postwar planning frenzy in the Allied capitals. Indeed, in 1942 the Council 
of Foreign Relations listed more than 300 groups engaged in postwar planning which laid out 
plans on issues as diverse as reforming the international monetary system, rebuilding a more 
robust international organization and eradicating hunger and unemployment.46 
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 Arriving from Lithuania to New York through Vichy France in November 1940, 
Robinson quickly became a central figure in the Jewish postwar planning scene. Two months 
after his arrival in the city he officially founded the Institute of Jewish Affairs.47 In Robinson’s 
view the institute was designed to represent the diaspora nationalist political agenda that 
organizations such as the Comité des Délégations Juives, and later the World Jewish Congress, 
had promoted between the wars. Robinson staffed the organization primarily with Eastern 
European Jewish scholars, parliamentary leaders and international lawyers who had had either 
taken part in shaping the Jewish agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference or had become 
active in in promoting the vision of Jewish minority rights following the emergence of the post-
World War I order in Europe. These included figures such as Arieh Tartakower, a Zionist activist 
in Poland and sociologist by training; Jacob Lestchinsky, a Jewish demographer who was one of 
the founding members of YIVO; Leon Kubowitzki, a diaspora nationalist leader in Lithuania and 
one of the founders of the World Jewish Congress; Max Laserson, a member of the Latvian 
parliament and an expert on minority rights in the Baltics and Mark Vishniak, a Paris based 
scholar of international law and advocate for minority rights. Robinson came to know most of his 
associates at the Institute before the war. Both Laserson and Robinson, for example, served as 
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delegates to the European Nationalities Congress.48 And Robinson and Vishniak first met in 
Vichy France, as they both searched for a way out of Nazi Europe to New York.49 
 From the start of the war Robinson and the Institute of Jewish Affairs were committed to 
promoting a return to a system of minority rights in Eastern Europe after the war. As Robinson 
reminisced in an interview he gave in 1960, “[o]ur focus [early in the war] was on minority 
protection in a new world order that would basically follow the same pattern – but with greater 
preparation – that emerged in Versailles.”50 In 1942 Robinson dedicated an issue of Jewish 
Affairs, the institute’s monthly publication, to the topic of minority rights. Gathering statements 
from notable intellectuals and groups in favor of a postwar return to minority rights - from the 
British League of Nations Union to international lawyer Hans Kelsen - Robinson sought to 
demonstrate the degree of support that remained among many intellectuals and politicians for the 
idea of international minority protection. As Robinson put it in the issue’s introductory essay, 
minority rights will remain an element of the postwar order because national minorities will 
inevitably remain part of the political order in East Central Europe after the war. “For this much 
is certain,” he asserted, “no boundaries after this war can eliminate all minorities”.51 Later that 
year, Robinson had begun to work on a collaborative study with the institute’s staff on the 
operation of system of minority protection in the interwar years Were the Minorities Treaties a 
Failure? Drawing on the knowledge of leading Jewish experts on minority protection, the study 
sought to position itself as the conclusive scholarly overview of the operation of the Minorities 																																																								
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Treaties aimed at policy experts and intellectuals in the Allied capitols. While the study 
recognized the many limitations of the Minorities Treaties, it refrained from condemning the 
system as a failure. “Despite all the faults and shortcomings, … the experience of twenty years 
does not justify the condemnation of a most remarkable experiment;” the study concluded, “an 
experiment that could not but share the fate of the political organism in which it lived – the 
League of Nations itself.”52 And at the same time as Robinson was completing this study he had 
began work on a second study on minority protection. This study, as Robinson wrote in a letter 
to a colleague, was to “prove that for the last 350 years almost scarcely a treaty can be found 
which ... does not make special provisions to protect individuals differing form the majority in 
religion first, and later on, in language and race.” The research will serve as “a very important 
weapon in our arguments with regard to the future of minority rights, the idea being that it was 
just one experiment in this field and that this experiment failed.” The study will prove that 
interwar minority protection was “not just a fancy solution for the last World War,” but “a 
prominent element in the attempt to re-shape the map of Europe” for centuries.53 
While the Institute of Jewish Affairs was most vocal in its commitment to minority rights 
it was by no means alone among Jewish groups in its advocacy for new guarantees for minority 
protection after the war. The Jewish Labor Committee organized a major conference on the 
postwar order in 1942 in which its leaders advocated for more robust international guarantees for 
minorities after the war.54  The Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
commissioned C.A Macartney, a leading British scholar and expert on minority rights, to draft a 																																																								
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memorandum outlining an improved system of minority rights.55 In a May 1942 speech Joseph 
Brodetsky, director of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, also emphasized the importance of 
resurrecting new minority rights guarantees for Jews in Eastern Europe after the war.56 “The 21 
years elapsed between 1918 and 1939 belong to the most troubled years of history,” Kubowitzki 
captured the general sentiment among diaspora nationalist leaders, “it is not a normal epoch on 
the basis of which we may conclude that we should relinquish important principles of our 
doctrine.”57 “After this war,” Tenenbaum declared in a 1942 speech on the future of Polish 
Jewry, “the checks and guarantees for the protection of minorities will have to be made more 
universal and more obligatory and more forceful, with plenty of teeth in them.”58 
The commitment of Jewish groups to minority rights was based on their belief that there 
was no alternative for the millions of Jews they expected would survive the war and seek to 
rebuild their lives in Eastern Europe. Yet Jewish groups remained committed to minority rights 
also because they believed that within the framework of a new, postwar order minority 
protection could succeed. Indeed, the war years saw the emergence of a major internationalist 
current in the Allied capitols.59 The outbreak of two world wars in Europe in the course of a 
single generation, many intellectuals and policy makers argued, was a result of excessive 
nationalism. A stable postwar order, they posited, could only be secured by quelling nationalist 																																																								
55 C.A Macartney, “Suggestions for an Improved Procedure to Secure Execution of the Treaties of Minorities,” 
YIVO Archives, Lucien Wolf and David Mowshowitch Papers, series VI Folder 99. 
 
56 See Brodetsky’s remarks on the postwar order in a May 1942 speech. Joseph Brodetsky, The Jews in the Postwar 
Settlement (London: Jewish Historical Society of Engalnd, 1942) 19-20. 
 
57 Leon Kubowitzki, “Comments on the Preparation for a Program of Action for United American Jewry,” January 
13, 1942 WJC Papers, C95 16.  
 
58 Joseph Tenenbaum, “Polish Jews in War and Peace,” YIVO, Joseph L. Tenenbaum Papers, box 7 39. 
 
59 The most famous example of this sentiment were Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech with its emphasis on social 
welfare and the Atlantic Charter that was widely interpreted as vouching for self-determination for those under 
colonial rule. 
	 37 
sentiments in the continent and limiting the sovereignty of states after the war. During the first 
years of the war British and American intellectuals thus repeatedly spoke about the ‘crisis,’ 
‘problem’ and ‘paradox’ of the nation-state. “Somehow, somewhere in the past” British political 
theorist Leonard Woolf summarized the general intellectual mood in 1943, “the political status of 
the small state in the international system … had become a problem which menaces peace and 
jeopardizes civilization.” 60 Against the excess of ethnic nationalism critics of the nation-states 
embraced federalism, the idea that a federation or several federations should be established in 
Europe and around the world after the war. Visions for federalism in Europe were advocated 
from late nineteenth century throughout the interwar years. But the wars years saw an explosion 
of federative ideas for European reconstruction. In June 1940, to bolster the moral of the 
disintegrating French army, the British government issued a declaration on the establishment of a 
postwar Franco-British Union.61 Resistance movements across Europe embraced the cause of 
federalism as an assertion of a newfound pan-European identity based on the rejection of the 
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Nazi New Order.62 Federalist ideas were also widespread in planning for the future of the United 
States and Britain, and intersected with broader debates over a reformed British Empire after the 
war and Anglo-American leadership in the postwar world. Clarence Streit’s Union Now, 
advocating for a federation of democracies, became a major wartime bestseller and the source of 
a grassroots movement across the United States and Britain.63 
The most elaborate wartime discussions and planning on federalism however centered on 
the future of east central Europe. In numerous pamphlets and émigré newspapers, such as New 
Europe and Austria’s Voice and in newly founded organization such as the London-based 
Danubian Club, exiled eastern European intellectuals and politicians agitated for a postwar 
federation in the region.64 Beginning in 1941, federalist plans for the region had begun to receive 
British political backing. In 1942 the governments in exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia had 
reached an agreement on a postwar confederation that entailed the creation of some form of 
economic and defense union between the two countries. That same year, the governments in 																																																								
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exile of Greece and Yugoslavia signed a plan for a postwar Balkan Union. Prompted by these 
developments, an East Central European Planning Board was established in New York by the 
delegates of the four governments with the goal of studying the prospects for federalism in the 
region. 65 “To the question, what is the most essential issue in postwar planning for Central and 
Eastern Europe,” observed East Central European Planning Board director Felix Gross in 1943, 
“the only correct answer is, the problem of federation.”66 
Many Jewish diaspora nationalist intellectuals embraced the prospects of a federation in 
East Central Europe with excitement. From the late 19th century and until the end of the first 
World War, federalism formed a central part of the Jewish national agenda in the region. Jewish 
leaders, joining other national minorities, had advocated for reforming the empires in the region 
into multiethnic federations with extensive rights for their minorities. “Federalism”, declared 
Baron in May 1940, is the most “desirable solution – as far as Jews are concerned” for the 
postwar period. “If a state of multiple nationality had always proved to be the most hospitable of 
states for Jewry-in-Exile,” Baron argued, “a confederation of free and equal states and 
nationalities would be the very epitome of a tolerant and multifarious entity.”67 Similarly, the 
German Jewish intellectual Hannah Arendt repeatedly wrote in favor of a postwar European 
federation and highlighted its importance for the future of Jewish nationalism after the war. “Our 																																																								
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only chance,” Arendt wrote in the summer of 1940, “indeed, the only chance of all small peoples 
– lies in a new European federal system.”68 International lawyer Nathan Feinberg argued in 1941 
that “it is clear that within a federative framework ... it is easier to realize self-determination and 
the nationalities problem” and advocated for federalism as a way to promote Jewish nationalism 
in Eastern Europe.69 Historian and expert on minority rights Oscar Janowsky worked during the 
war on a proposal for a postwar federation in Eastern Europe with extensive guarantees for 
minorities.70 Nationalism scholar and Zionist activist Hans Kohn also wrote extensively during 
the war in favor a postwar federation in Europe.71 Diaspora nationalist leaders viewed federalism 
not only as a prescription for the future but as an emerging reality across the world. The Soviet 
Union and the United States were already federal entities, some of them argued, and thus the war 
should be seen as struggle between the principles of the racial state and the multiethnic 
federation.72 “Of one thing we may be certain,” declared one Jewish proponent of federalism in 
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1941, “the secular Jewish problem in Europe will never be solved save within the framework of 
a democratic United States of Europe.”73  
Despite the enthusiasm of many Jewish thinkers for federalism, Jewish groups were not 
at the forefront of the wartime discussions on the topic. The significance of federalism for 
understanding the thought of diaspora nationalist leaders does not stem from the fact that they 
had specifically embraced or rejected such a program, but rather from the type political and 
intellectual climate the ‘federalist moment’ fostered. For even if federalist ideas were a mere 
political fantasy, as some of its critics charged, their widespread wartime percolation attested to 
the salience of internationalist ideas in British and American official thinking on the postwar 
order, and in particular about the reconstruction of East Central Europe.74 It convinced Jewish 
leaders that the project of international protection of Jewish rights could be resurrected on a 
firmer footing after the war. Within this intellectual climate Goldman had thus declared in 
November 1941 that the coming peace “would have to be a revolutionary peace”. “The period of 
sovereign states,” he argued, “has to come definitely to an end.” “I cannot see any higher or 
nobler task for the Jewish people… than to become the vanguard of a movement … [for] the 
abolition of the sovereign state.” 75 
 
Population Transfers and the Jews  
Robinson and other Jewish leaders remained committed to minority rights because they hoped a 
new international order could vouch for its success and because they could not imagine any other 																																																								
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alternative for the masses of Jews they believed would attempt to rebuild their lives in Eastern 
Europe after the war. Yet their commitment to minority rights was also based on genuine fear 
over how a radically new order in Europe could look like. For at the same time as some 
intellectuals and policy makers advocated for limiting the sovereignty of nation-states after the 
war and for new federal structures, others called for the creation of a far more nationalist postwar 
order in Europe through a series of large-scale population transfers of minorities. While Hitler 
had been seeking to craft a racially organized New Order in Europe, leaders of exiled Eastern 
European governments and policy makers in Britain and in the United States envisioned a 
postwar Europe without minorities following the defeat of Nazism. In their view, large-scale 
transfers of minorities would be a ‘necessary evil’ that could solve national conflicts in Europe 
once and for all. 
Indeed, after the Nazi invasion of Poland and the collapse of the interwar order in Eastern 
Europe, many intellectuals and policy makers in Britain, France and the United States had begun 
to embrace population transfers as a solution for creating a more stable European order after the 
war. The idea of population transfers was not a wartime invention. It first emerged as a form of 
policy and topic of public debate in Europe beginning in the 1910s, as a series of wars in the 
Balkans concluded with several bilateral agreements that provided for the exchange of 
populations between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. In 1923, the first international agreement 
sanctioning population transfers was signed between Greece and Turkey under the auspices of 
the League of Nations. Yet from the late 1930s, and particularly after the outbreak of war, the 
once dominant critical attitude toward this solution in liberal quarters had significantly waned. 
“Public opinion is more favorably inclined toward this solution than twenty years ago …” 
observed Nikolas Politis, Greek ambassador to the League of Nations and one of the architects of 
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the 1923 Lausanne agreement, shortly after the outbreak of war, “the criticisms leveled at it at 
the time of the [peace] conference have vanished.”76 “Everything leads us to believe,” noted a 
French scholar as early as November 1939, “that the [transfer of populations] would be one of 
the major innovations of the peace treaties of the future.”77 C.A Macartney lamented in the 
summer of 1940 how population transfers has become “the present fashionable panacea for all 
difficulties connected with national minorities”.78 These sentiments were also echoed in 
government quarters. President Roosevelt spoke about the specter of millions of refugees in 
postwar Europe and enlisted scholars to plan for the large scale reshuffling of minorities after the 
war.79 As geographer and prominent Roosevelt advisor Isaiah Bowman put it in a 1942 State 
Department meeting, “people were getting used to the idea of moving minorities because Hitler 
had carried the process so far.”80 At the same time, the British government sponsored studies and 
laid out plans for postwar population transfers.81 
Within this intellectual climate, Polish and Czech diplomats in exile had begun to plan 
for the expulsion of German and other minorities after the war. Eastern European exiled 
governments were planning for the postwar expulsion of minorities at the same time as they were 																																																								
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discussing the creation of a postwar confederation in the region. Already in November 1939 
exiled Polish officials had discussed plans for the annexation of east Prussia and German Upper 
Silesia after the war and for the expulsion of Germans from those territories. In a February 1940 
memorandum August Zaleski, Foreign Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, listed the 
‘liquidation of German settlements’ in east Prussia as a major Polish postwar aim. Edvard Beneš, 
president of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile, had begun to harbor hopes for the 
expulsion of Germans from a future Czechoslovakia already following the 1938 Munich diktat. 
In November 1940 he laid out in detail his vision for postwar Czechoslovakia in a dispatch to the 
Czech resistance. Germans who ‘betrayed’ the nation, Beneš argued, would be expelled after the 
war and the remaining German population would have to forgo any claims for minority rights.82 
While exiled Polish and Czech leaders were directing their plans at the Germans, they were 
hoping to get rid of other minority groups after the war. Beneš at times mentioned the Hungarian 
minority, and both exiled governments, as shall see, were committed to encourage the expulsion 
of Jews after the war.  
Despite the commitment of Polish and Czech leaders to the postwar expulsion of 
minorities in the first years of the war, population transfers had by no means become yet either 
their explicit policy or official Allied policy. Polish leaders, for one, remained deliberately 
reticent on their plans for population transfers in their conversations with British and American 
officials. The primary postwar goal of exiled Polish leaders was to regain the territories of 
eastern Poland the Soviet Union had annexed as part of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet division of Poland, 
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and they feared that any call for the postwar expansion of Poland into east Prussia and German 
Upper Silesia would be interpreted in the West as constituting ‘compensation’ for the territories 
Poland had ‘lost’ in the east. Czechoslovak leaders were simply in no position to make demands 
for the expulsion of Germans after the war. Beneš was still struggling to have the British 
officially repudiate the Munich agreement and recognize his government as the direct legal 
successor of the Czechoslovak Republic as of 1938. The question of population transfers thus 
took a secondary place in Beneš postwar policy in the first years of the war, an attitude 
compounded by the fact that the British were sympathetic at the time to demands voiced by 
exiled Sudeten German Social Democratic leaders for autonomy in postwar Czechoslovakia.83 
The growth of support for population transfers in discussion in Britain and the United 
States on the postwar order deeply alarmed Jewish leaders and intellectuals engaged in planning 
for the future of Jewish life in Europe after the war. If minorities are to be transferred en masse 
to their homelands after the war, where would Jews, a minority without a homeland, go? Writing 
from exile in France in the summer of 1940, Arendt underscored this point. “As for the Jews, 
these newest methods are especially dangerous for them because they cannot be reimported to 
any motherland … for them it can only be a matter of deportation.”84 The alarm of Jewish 
leaders over the rise of support among Eastern European governments and Allied policy makers 
for population transfers stemmed from their experiences in the 1930s. During the 1930s Jews 
were subject to concentrated state efforts aimed at promoting their emigration and resettlement: 
the German government forced the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews through the 
adoption of racial laws and economic marginalization; the Polish government adopted an official 																																																								
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policy committed to the ‘evacuation’ of its Jewish citizens – a special department was 
established within the Polish Foreign Office dedicated to planning large-scale Jewish 
resettlement schemes; and Hungary and Romania sought to curtail and ultimately revoke the 
citizenship of Jews though anti-Jewish legislation. The aftermath of the war, many Jewish 
leaders feared, might serve as an opportunity for East European government to realize their anti-
Jewish expulsion fantasies of the 1930s. 
From the start of the war Jewish leaders were thus committed to fighting the rise of 
population transfers and sought to gather information on the postwar plans of East European 
governments regarding their Jewish populations. The question that preoccupied Jewish leaders 
the most was the future of Poland – home to the largest Jewish population in interwar Europe 
and to a government that had vocally advocated for the evacuation of its Jewish population in the 
late 1930s. After the outbreak of war, some Jewish observers had hoped that the Polish 
Government-in-Exile, formed in France in October 1939, would reject the anti-Jewish policies of 
the prewar Polish regime.85 The Polish Government-in-Exile had publicly sought to distance 
itself from the authoritarian policies of its predecessor and did not include in its ranks members 
of the ruling circles of the prewar regime. In its public statement the new government had 
promised the establishment of a liberal democratic order in postwar Poland. Prime Minister 
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Władysław Sikorski had vouched for a future Poland “equal and just for all its citizens,” in 
which minorities would enjoy “free national and cultural development.”86 
Yet the initial hopes of Jewish leaders over the commitment of the new Polish regime to 
Jewish equality quickly waned as they learned that leading members of the government had been 
advocating for the ‘evacuation’ of the majority of Polish Jews after the war and sought the 
support of Zionist leaders for their plans. In a February 1940 meeting between Edward 
Raczyński, the Polish ambassador in London and Brodetsky, Racinsky told Brodetsky that 
Poland would oppose protecting Jews as a national minority after the war and argued that the 
Jewish problem in Poland should be solved through some form of large-scale postwar 
emigration.87 In a subsequent meeting between Brodetsky and Stanisław Kot, internal minister of 
the Polish Government-in-Exile, Kot insisted that only about a third of Polish Jews would be 
allowed to remain in Poland after the war and sought Brodetsky’s support for the resettlement of 
the remainder of the Jews outside Poland.88 Later that year Jozef Rettinger, Sikorski’s personal 
secretary, published a book that advocated reviving the anti-Jewish evacuation policy of the 
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1930s. “The only solution to the burning [Jewish] question,” Rettinger concluded in his study, 
“is that offered by emigration.”89 Similarly, Janusz Głuchowski, Secretary of the Polish National 
Council in America, published a booklet in early 1940 in which he argued that “at least one 
million Jews should emigrate from Poland” after the war, and that only when “the percentage of 
Jews in Poland is reduced to at least one-third of the present number will the Jewish problem in 
Poland be solved or rather cease to exist.”90  
Brodetsky’s meetings, together with these public statements and actions by Polish 
officials in the early months of 1940, convinced Jewish leaders that the policy of the Polish-
Government-in-Exile on the future of Jews in Poland was in line with – if not more radical than - 
that of the prewar Polish regime.91 By early May, the Jewish press in London, New York and 
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Palestine had run numerous reports claiming that the Polish government had in fact revived the 
anti-Jewish evacuation policy of the 1930s.92 
While Jewish leaders were alarmed by the positions of Polish officials, they believed they 
could rely on diplomatic pressure to fight for Jewish equality after the war. At the Peace 
Conference of 1919 it was Jewish international advocacy that secured equality and minority 
rights for Polish Jews against the stated will of the Polish government. Jewish leaders hoped the 
present war would offer similar opportunities. The Polish government was heavily dependent on 
the support of the French and British governments for the realization of its primary postwar goal 
- the restoration of the territories of eastern Poland annexed by the Soviet Union. Fostering a 
liberal-democratic public image in the West was thus a high priority for the Polish government. 
Under such circumstances, Jewish groups sought to press the Polish government to issue a 
deceleration that would vouch for Jewish equality and for the annulment of all prewar anti-
Jewish legislation in the future Poland. The campaign for a deceleration began almost 
immediately after the start of the war and was carried out in the Jewish press – primarily on the 
pages of the London based Jewish Chronicle, and in private meetings between Jewish leaders 
and Polish officials. Polish officials were initially opposed to the demand of Jewish groups for a 																																																								
92 In early May 1940 Jewish groups in Western Europe sent official letters of protestation against the revival of the 
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deceleration, mainly because they feared the ramifications such a declaration could have after the 
war. Like the minorities treaties of 1919, such a deceleration could serve as a precedent that 
would tie Poland again to international oversight over the treatment of its minorities. During the 
first years of the war of the Polish Government-in-Exile thus resisted the demand for a 
declaration, relying on what was at the time the opposition of several Bundist leaders from 
Poland to it. Yet as the campaign for a declaration began to attract increasing public attention in 
Britain and the United States, the Polish government eventually resolved in favor of issuing a 
deceleration. In a symposium convened in London in April 1940 by the Board of Deputies of 
British on the future of Polish Jewry, Jan Stariczyk, labor minister of the Polish government in 
Exile, delivered a statement promising equality for Jews in Poland after the war both as 
individuals and as a national group. 93 
Jewish leaders considered the Stariczyk deceleration as a first achievement in the long 
struggle over Jewish equality after the war – even as some Jewish observers immediately 
dismissed it as an empty statement that sought to conceal the Polish government’s continued 
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commitment to the policy of Jewish ‘evacuation’.94 Yet even this limited sense of achievement 
was short-lived, for just several months after the deceleration had been issued Jewish leaders had 
begun to receive news on plans of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile to encourage the 
emigration of its Jewish population after the war. Such news were first communicated to Jewish 
leaders in a September 1940 meeting between Beneš and two Jewish national leaders from 
Czechoslovakia, Lev Zalmanovitch and Imirch Rosenberg. In the meeting Beneš had told the 
two that the Jewish question in postwar Czechoslovakia “has to be brought to a definite 
solution.” As Beneš explained, this meant that Jews in Czechoslovakia would no longer be 
regarded as a national minority but ought to make a clear political decision – either become 
citizens of the future Jewish state or assimilate to the Czechoslovak nation. “I think that the Jews 
… will have to decide after the war,” Beneš told Zalmanovitch, “either for citizenship of the 
Jewish State or for the assimilation to the Czechoslovak nation.”95   
Beneš’ statements soon became a topic of incessant debate among Jewish leaders in 
London and New York. What did Beneš’ proposed alternative for the Jews after the war – 
between assimilation and Zionism – actually mean, at a time in which a Jewish state still seemed 
like a remote possibility? Zalmanovitch believed that Beneš intended for national Jews - those 
who declared themselves as members of the Jewish nationality during the interwar years - to 
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emigrate immediately after the war to a transit country until a Jewish state is created.96 Indeed, 
Zalmanovitch was convinced Beneš had been planning to entirely deny Jews rights as a group in 
postwar Czechoslovakia: at the same time as Beneš expressed his views on the postwar Jewish 
question to Jewish leaders, the Czech Governments in Exile actively prevented the appointment 
of a Jewish national member to its national council in order to avoid creating a precedent for 
Jewish national representation in a future Czechoslovakia.97 Louis Namier, a British historian 
and Zionist activists, shared Zalmanovitch’s assessment. In a December 1941 meeting with 
Beneš, Namier explained to Beneš that while he was in agreement that ultimately all national 
Jews should live in Palestine, “this was a question of generations, and no such decisive action 
could be taken in the meantime.”98 Beneš elaborated on his position in a meeting with Weizmann 
in December 1941. The Jewish population in postwar Czechoslovakia, Beneš told Weizmann, 
would have to be diluted by about a third after the war. Under Nazi rule Jews in Czechoslovakia 
had already been removed from their homes and professions, and many Czech citizens have in 
the meanwhile taken possession of their property. Simply dispossessing Czechs after the war “in 
order to restore the property to its original owners was scarcely a solution.” By the end of 1941 
Jewish leaders had thus received confirmation that behind Beneš’ euphemistic rhetoric on a 
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postwar choice Jews would face between ‘assimilation and Zionism’ lay a plan to expel a third of 
the pre-war Jewish population of Czechoslovakia, which Weizmann estimated at 120,000.99 
The specter of the expulsion of Jews from Czechoslovakia was deeply alarming to Jewish 
leaders not only because it endangered the fate of Jews in the country, but also because Jewish 
leaders believed Beneš’ views could have wide-ranging implications for the future of Jews 
throughout east central Europe. As Namier noted in his report on his meeting, Beneš’ had been 
the Eastern European leader most committed to minority rights in the interwar period – his call 
for the end of minority rights and the evacuation of Jews from Czechoslovakia could thus serve 
as dangerous precedent for states with a far less liberal record on Jewish rights. For that reason 
Namier had asked Beneš to keep his views secret for as long as possible.100 
In the first years of the war, Beneš’ views on the postwar ‘Jewish question’ were indeed 
kept a secret among Zionist and Czechoslovak leaders. Jewish leaders had hoped they could use 
discreet diplomatic means to change Beneš’ position. In April 1941 Tartakower drafted an 
official letter of protestation to Beneš on behalf of the American and World Jewish Congress that 
summarized and reflected the attitude of Jewish leaders. “A Czechoslovakia national council had 
been established in which the Jewish population as such is not represented,” Tartakower wrote, 
“we are informed by our friends that this strange decision which was made by you was motivated 
by your conviction that the Jewish problem would have to be solved by establishing a Jewish 
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commonwealth in Palestine.” All nationalistic Jews, Tartakower repeated Beneš’ position, 
“should concentrate themselves in this commonwealth and all Jews in other countries must be 
assimilated. There is no place according to this theory for national minority rights for the Jewish 
people.” Tartakower rejected Beneš’ position. “May we, with all due respect, emphasize that we 
regard this conception as a grave danger for the Jewish people, against which we feel it our duty 
to raise our warning voice.” “It would be against the laws of justice,” Tartakower declared, “if 
the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine should result in depriving the Jews of 
their rights to live as one people in other countries of the world.” Tartakower’s memo also 
highlighted the fear that the denial of minority rights to Jews was nothing short of a cover for the 
expulsion of masses of Jews from Eastern European states after the war – and underscored the 
strong connections he saw between the Czech and Polish plans:  
 
“We feel it our duty to point out, in the last sentence of our memorandum, the great 
danger inherent in your plan to the Jewish population not only of Czechoslovakia, but of 
other European countries as well … By depriving the Jewish population in your country 
of its national minority rights on the grounds given by you, you will certainly endanger 
not only its minority rights but even its civic position and the its possibilities for future 
development. There might be some countries, not so eager to assimilate their Jewish 
citizens, which might accept the slogan of enforcing their emigration from the respective 
countries on the basis of the principles formulated by you.”101 
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As Tartakower’s memo indicates, Jewish leaders saw the Polish and Czech plans as 
deeply connected. Indeed, reflecting the idea that the Polish and Czech positions were part of the 
same postwar policy, Perlzweig had argued in a response letter to Tartakower’s memo that the 
position of the Czech government was part of the price of its new alliance with Poland. If a 
Polish-Czech federal arrangement is to emerge, Perlzweig argued, “the Poles will be free from 
the liberal traditions of Masaryk.” The Czechs, Perlzweig lamented in his letter, have now joined 
the camp of the interwar antisemitic powers.102 Several months later Tartakower convened a 
committee of Polish and Czech Jewish leaders in the Untied States to take joint action against 
what they regarded were the two countries’ strikingly similar visions for Jews after war. 
Tartakower opened the meeting by noting how history has reversed itself. “In the past the 
situation of the Czech Jews was much better than that of Polish Jews because they enjoyed both 
equal civil rights and a considerable measure of national autonomy.” “Now, however,” he 
argued, “it seems that the situation has changed somewhat.” “The attitude of the Polish 
Government toward its Jewish citizens … is quite correct [referring to the Stariczyk declaration] 
whereas difficulties have arisen unexpectedly in Czech government circles ...”. The participants 
in the meeting agreed that unified action is required to counter Polish and Czech plans.103 
Only at the beginning of 1942 did Jewish leaders and intellectuals outside Zionist circles 
begin to discuss Beneš’ position on the ‘Jewish question’, after Beneš publicly advocated for his 
vision for a postwar Czechoslovakia without minorities. In January 1942 Beneš published a 
controversial article, “The Organization of Postwar Europe,” in the influential magazine Foreign 
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Affairs.104 In this article, Beneš publicly laid out his vision for postwar Czechoslovakia: national 
minorities that proved to be disloyal to the republic will have to be expelled, and minorities in 
general will no longer enjoy groups rights. “After this war,” Beneš wrote, “it will be necessary to 
carry out a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war”, and added 
that “the absurd state of affairs” created by the system of minority protection, “cannot be 
renewed”.105 Though Beneš did not specify the Jews in his article and directed his comments on 
population transfers primarily to those Germans and Hungarians who cooperated with the Nazis, 
Jewish leaders were alarmed by the implications of such views on their position in 
Czechoslovakia after the war.  
Shortly after the publication of Beneš’ piece, Max Weinreich, director of YIVO, sent a 
letter to Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile, asking for 
clarifications on Beneš’ position.106 Weinreich’s letter emphasized that the fear that Beneš’ plans 
might include the Jews were not unfounded. “The question of transfers is for us the Jews not 
merely an academic matter” he wrote, “as you know, the ‘evacuation’ of Jews from some east 
central European states was forcefully advocated … in the eve of the present war.”107 Masaryk’s 
concise reply arrived a few weeks later. “I can understand that under the unprecedentedly tragic 
circumstances that the heroic and sorely tried Jewish people find themselves in to-day, Dr. Beneš 
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mentioning the possibility of exchanging populations could give rise to worry.”108 Referring to 
Beneš’ plan, Masaryk contended that “I know that when he speaks of ‘exchange of population’ 
he means that, within the realms of possibilities we must – after this war – try to get rid of some 
of the Germans around the frontiers of Germany who have never been much good to us” and he 
then added that “I would like to go on record … in stating that Jews are certainly not included in 
these as yet very hazy plans. And I have Dr. Beneš’ authority in emphasizing this point.”109 
Masaryk’s reply did little to quell Weinreich’s fears. Shortly after this letter exchange he 
commissioned Vishniak to write the first wartime study on the history of population transfers, a 
small Yiddish booklet entitled The Transfer of Populations as a Means of Solving the Problem of 
Minorities.110 Vishniak was deeply involved in the Jewish postwar planning scene: he was one of 
the co-authors of Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure? with Jacob Robinson and wrote a 
study on statelessness for the American Jewish Committee as well as a proposal for an 
international ban on antisemitism for the Jewish Labor Committee.111 Vishniak’s booklet 
surveyed the history of population transfers and heavily criticized this political solution, calling 
instead for the restoration of the system of minority protection after the war. “Democracy must 
revise and abandon many things in its theory and its practice…” Vishniak wrote, “but giving up 
on international protection of minorities will not constitute any step forward. It would mean a 
blind return to the pre-Versailles order. It would mean resigning from a just principle only 
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because the first attempt to enforce it failed owing to the timidity of some and the incapacity and 
dishonesty of others”.112 
By 1942 Jewish leaders thus had a clear idea of plans of the Polish and Czechoslovak 
governments in exile to expel a significant segment of the Jewish population after the war. 
Though these plans were communicated to Jewish leaders separately by Polish and 
Czechoslovak leaders, Jewish leaders viewed them as part of a general effort to reduce the size 
of the Jewish minority across Eastern Europe after the war and prevent the restoration of 
minority rights. They also recognized that these visions fit within a broader commitment among 
the Allies and Eastern European states to promote population transfers after the war as a means 
of solving the ‘minority problem’ in Eastern Europe once and for all. During the first years of the 
war Jewish leaders believed they could counter the Polish and Czech plans and use diplomatic 
pressure to guarantee Jewish national rights in Eastern Europe. Indeed, in April 1941, under 
pressure from the World Jewish Congress, Sikorski issued a second declaration by the Polish 
government promising equality for Jews in postwar Poland and the annulment of all prewar anti-
Jewish legislation.113 In November that year the Czechoslovak government finally agreed to 
appoint a Jewish national member to it state council after a protracted struggle by Jewish 
groups.114 These developments convinced Jewish leaders committed to a Jewish national future 
in Eastern Europe that the plans of Eastern European governments in exile could be stopped if 
they were to develop an effective diplomacy. 
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The Holocaust and the Geopolitics of Jewish Death  
As the director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, Robinson was deeply informed about the 
discussions between Jewish groups and the Polish and Czech governments in exile on the future 
of Jews after the war. In a September 1941 report for the leaders of the World Jewish Congress 
Robinson forcefully attacked Beneš’ position. “The policy suggested by Dr. Beneš can, in plain 
language,” he wrote, “be summarized as putting before every Jew in Europe this cruel 
alternative.” “Either he accepts the idea of being evicted in 30-60 years, and in the meantime he 
and his children and his children’s children will live under a status of aliens, or he will receive 
full rights of citizenship for the price of renouncing any connection with Jewish life (excepting 
the performance of religious ceremonies).” Beneš’ vision, Robinson argued, in fact amounted to 
nothing short of a plan to de-nationalize masses of Jews in Eastern Europe after the war – to 
create a category of Jewish statelessness in Europe that will last for generations. For even if a 
Jewish state were to be created immediately after the war, he argued, it would not be able to 
absorb millions of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe. “Could we imagine that this little 
Jewish state in Palestine would be in a position to give effective protection to millions of Jews in 
Europe?” Beneš’ plan, Robinson insisted, would thus “inevitably lead to a situation in which the 
Jews will be aliens without protection, a situation of which we had seen in the case of Rumania 
during the period 1878-1919.” “Is this war,” Robinson lamented, “to end with a universal 
acceptance of the cruel methods of Rumanian oligarchy? … Could a democratic leader, like Dr. 
Beneš, advocate such a method?”115 
 Robinson’s memo indicates that in late 1941 he shared the view common among Jewish 
national leaders that the positions of Beneš and of the Polish Government in Exile should be 																																																								
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forcefully rejected and resisted. Indeed, just several months after he wrote this memo Robinson 
published an issue of the institute’s publication Jewish Affairs in support of a return to minority 
rights in postwar Europe.116 Yet less than two years later Robinson radically reversed his 
position. As he argued his in his June 1943 memo to the World Jewish Congress leadership 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Jewish leaders should abandon their demands for 
minority rights after the war. Drawing on a Beneš-like rhetoric he had previously strongly 
condemned, Robinson insisted in his memo that the time for “both-and” – for a Jewish national 
program based both on the promotion of minority rights in Eastern Europe and the development 
of a Jewish center in Palestine, must came to an end. “Today is the time for either-or” he wrote. 
In Robinson’s view, Jewish leadership should focus exclusively on the realization of what he 
termed ‘radical Zionism’ – the transfer of the majority of Jewish refugees in Europe to Palestine 
after the war.117 Though in late 1941 he doubted a future Jewish state could absorb such a large 
numbers of refugees, in 1943 Robinson called for the immigration of some 200-300 thousands 
Jewish refugees to Palestine for “two, three or four years” after the war.118 Most strikingly, 
Robinson’s call on Jewish leaders to abandon minority rights and focus exclusively on Zionism 
in Palestine came hand in hand with a general embrace of the idea of population transfers as an 
organizing principle of the postwar order. In a 1943 essay “Minorities after the War” Robinson 
carefully discussed the solution of population transfers. While reminding his readers he was 
aware of the humanitarian challenges such a solution entailed, he nonetheless insisted that “after 
all, the peace of Europe and the world is of greater importance than adherence to certain 
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procedures for the protection of minorities.” The transfer solution, Robinson insisted, was not to 
be applied equally to all minorities but only to those “irredentist” minorities “which neglect the 
duties of citizenship and continually look to their powerful co-national for help.” Yet it was not 
at all clear what Robinson planned for the other minorities, since in the same breath he added 
that “there is no great probability that the international protection of minorities after this war will 
take the form of a return to the minorities’ treaties.”119 
 Why did Robinson radically change his position? In May 1943 Robinson provided an 
answer of his own to this question. In his response to a pamphlet by the American Jewish 
Committee that discussed the future of minority rights and described the positions of Jewish 
groups on the subject, Robinson argued that the pamphlet was entirely misguided because it 
ignored “the two fundamental facts” shaping the topic: “the tremendous decrease in the Jewish 
population in both relative and absolute numbers,” and “the current process of the 
homogenization of the European state units.”120 
 Indeed, Robinson’s change of position was in part a response to his early knowledge of 
the extent of destruction of Jewish life in Europe during the war. News of large-scale massacres 
of Jews in the Soviet Union had began to reach the Allied capitols from late 1941 and during the 
summer of 1942 the World Jewish Congress leadership in New-York had received official 
reports from its office in Geneva – among them the famous Riegner telegram - that the Nazis 
were carrying out a systematic plan aimed at exterminating the entirety of European Jewry.121 In 
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October 1942 Robinson had directed the Institute of Jewish Affair’s staff to draft a 
comprehensive study on the fate of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe that will provide both the 
leadership of the World Jewish Congress and the general public an accurate picture of the extent 
of Jewish destruction in Europe. Within a few months Robinson had began to receive drafts of 
chapters that surveyed the position of Jews throughout the Axis empire - from Poland and 
Czechoslovakia to Greece, Hungary and France. The study, entitled Hitler’s Ten Year War on 
the Jews, was eventually published in August 1943 to mark ten years since Hitler rose to 
power.122 In the conclusion, Robinson summarized the grim findings of the research: “Some 
3,000,000 Jews of Europe have perished since the war began four years ago.”  “… They have 
been destroyed by deliberate means: by planned starvation, forced labor, deportation, pogroms, 
and the methodical murder in German-run extermination centers in Eastern Europe.” 123 The 
economic destruction of European Jewry, Robinson concluded, is “virtually complete” as Jews 
throughout Axis-occupied Europe had been removed from their professions and robbed of their 
property and possessions. Hitler’s Ten Years War on the Jews was not the first publication to 
report that the Nazis had been carrying out a plan to systematically murder European Jewry. In 
late 1942 the World Jewish Congress, the Polish-Government in Exile and the Allied 
governments had issued statements confirming their knowledge of such a plan. But the study was 
nonetheless the first to offer a comprehensive and meticulously detailed report on the fate of 
Jews in Nazi Europe and a specific figure – three million Jews, that allowed observers to 
conceptualize the extent of the extermination in concrete terms. Indeed, from late 1942 the press 
in the Allied capitols regularly published news on massacres of Jew in Europe. Some observers 																																																								
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regarded these reports as exaggerated and inaccurate while many others became desensitized to 
them by the sheer volume of horror. As the London based Jewish Standard put it, “Jewish 
slaughter became an every day affair and the senses of non-Jews were dulled into indifference.” 
“The whole thing is so starkly tragic,” wrote Harold Ickes, British Secretary of the Interior, in 
response to a report on massacres of Jews in Poland, “that it saturates the imagination.” One 
Jewish observes spoke about the “feverish competition” between Jewish bodies “each seeking to 
anticipate the other” by publishing “still newer and larger horrors.” 124 In this context Robinson 
envisioned his study as a comprehensive scientific intervention that both verified and 
summarized the sea of information from Europe. 
 Robinson’s early knowledge of both the Nazi extermination plan and the degree to which 
it had been carried out in Europe significantly shaped his position on the future of minority 
rights. Robinson came to envision a postwar Eastern Europe with a significantly diminished and 
economically ravaged Jewish community that will not be able to sustain the type of social, 
cultural and economic cohesiveness that had underpinned the vision of Jewish diaspora 
nationalism before the war. As he put it in his June 1943 memo, “the number of Jews left in 
Europe after the war ... will be so small that all of them will be needed for the up-building of 
either European Jewry or the Yishuv.”125  
It was not only the prospects of a significantly diminished Jewish population, however, 
that prompted Robinson to reject minority rights. Equally significant for him was what he termed 																																																								
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“the current process of the homogenization of the European state units.” Robinson, as we have 
seen, was well aware of the plans of the Polish and Czech governments in exile to prevent the 
reintegration of a significant portion of their Jewish population after the war. In 1942 he in fact 
noted that even the expulsion of German minorities by these states after the war would be 
detrimental for the Jews. “Imagine a Europe without German minorities and reorganized on a 
very strong basis of transfer of population, which is now in the line of development,” he 
observed, “…I am very strongly afraid that the reorganization of Europe means also the creation 
of homogenous units which means also that we will be the only minority.”126 Under such 
conditions, he warned, it may be impossible to expect a restoration of international minority 
protection after the war. Moreover, over the course of 1942 Robinson gained first-hand and 
detailed knowledge on the extent of population transfers already carried out under Nazi-rule: he 
realized early on that population transfers was not just a postwar vision but in fact a reality 
across Axis-occupied Europe. Earlier that year he had commissioned Joseph Schechtman, a 
Zionist revisionist activist and a close-aide of Jabotinsky, to write a three-volume study on the 
history of population transfers with emphasis on the years 1939 to 1942. Schechtman was a 
peculiar choice for this task: though he served as Jabotinsky’s de-facto ambassador in Poland 
between 1936-1939 and expert on the Zionist Revisionist ‘Evacuation plan’, he had not 
established himself at the time as a scholar of European population transfers.127 Robinson’s 
decision to hire him for this task might indicate Robinson’s growing ideological affinity with 
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some of the tenets of the Zionist Revisionist position. Arriving in New York as a refugee in late 
1941, Schechtman quickly became part of the Jewish postwar planning scene and engaged in 
writing the study. Over the course of 1942 Schechtman had sent Robinson parts of his research, 
which detailed the large-scale process of transfers that had taken place in Europe from the start 
of the war. By late 1942 Robinson already had a clear and over-arching picture of the extent of 
population movements in Europe – it is important to note that this knowledge was not widely 
available at the time, as Schechtman’s study was the first and most detailed on the topic.128 As 
Robinson told his students in his lectures on “National Minorities in Europe” he delivered as a 
research fellow at Columbia University in the course of 1943 and 1944, from the start of the war 
the ethnic make-up of Eastern Europe had radically transformed. The German minority had been 
transferred almost in its entirety from South Tyrol, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Fewer 
numbers of Germans were also transferred from Transylvania, Bosnia, Croatia and the Caucasus. 
Hundreds of thousands of Poles from western Poland were transferred by the Nazis to central 
and eastern Poland. Romania and Hungary absorbed many of their nationals who evacuated 
territories annexed by the Soviet Union. And at the same time, previously multinational states 
such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were dismantled, and ethnically homogenous states were 
created in parts of their former territories such as Slovakia and Croatia.129 When Robinson thus 
spoke in 1942 on the “current process of the homogenization of the European state unit,” he was 																																																								
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referring not only to the growing legitimacy of population transfers as a principle for postwar 
organization but also to the very fact that the minority group as an element of European national 
life was fast disappearing in reality throughout Axis-occupied Europe. “The Jews in Europe have 
lost their natural allies – the other minorities,” he wrote in 1944. “There are today, and will be 
after the war, practically no minorities in Europe. Measures, from which we profited, which were 
adopted to solve the problem, will no longer be considered necessary.”130 
Robinson was not the only proponent of diaspora nationalism who lamented the demise 
of the vision of Jewish national rights in Eastern Europe as he observed the radical demographic 
changes in the region. Similarly to Robinson, Letschinsky too had written extensively during the 
war on how postwar population transfers in Eastern Europe would bring about the demise of 
Jewish minority rights. Letschinsky began his career as a committed Yiddish Marxist nationalist, 
an advocate of Jewish autonomism and territorialism - but in the 1930s increasingly gravitated 
toward Zionism.131 His wartime essays reflected his growing conviction that Jewish autonomism 
in Eastern Europe had come to an end and that the center of Jewish life after the war will have to 
be rebuilt primarily in Palestine. Already in March 1941 Letschinsky declared “one thing is clear 
and that is the most important thing for us: the minority question had disappeared from politics. 
It had almost vanished from the minds of political thinkers and planners.”  “The war,” he argued, 
“will end with massive popualtion transfers – states would become ethnically homogenous.”132 
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In a 1944 essay “How Jews Will Live in Europe” Letschinsky elaborated on this observation. 
Letschinsky’s analysis focused on how the demographic changes in Eastern Europe will 
completely shatter the structure of the Jewish economy and thus preclude the reconstitution of 
Jewish life as a minority group. Letschinsky believed that many Eastern European states – 
Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia - would expel their minorities, but focused his analysis on 
Poland. “After the war we will have a completely ethnically homogenous Poland with one 
minority – the Jews, but its size will not be close to 10%, as before the war, and not close to 30% 
in the urban areas … but much smaller.” This development, he argued, would have a profound 
impact on the structure of Jewish economic life. The interwar Jewish economy, he argued, was 
significantly based on trade within community members – the drastic depletion of the size of the 
Jewish popualtion after the war would mean that Jews would be much more dependent on trade 
with the larger economy. Yet when Jews traded with other members of the economy they 
enjoyed the advantage of trade with the Germans and Ukrainian minorities who regularly 
preferred to buy from Jews rather than from members of the ethnic majority. This situation, he 
noted, protected Jews from the full effects of the economic boycott in Poland. The disappearance 
of these minorities will make Jews far more vulnerable to such boycotts. Most importantly, these 
states will expel minorities as part of a larger policy of economic nationalism – and will thus not 
help Jews recover those professions and properties they lost during the war. Poland, he argued, 
will let members of the ethnic majority enjoy the spoils of the Jewish middle class.133 This means 
that Jews will face an impossible task – “building their economy from the start” in an 
increasingly nationalist environment. As Letschinsky put it in another essay “The Shoah of 
European Jewry,” after the war “we will face a fateful question” – “if Jewish life is completely 																																																								
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destroyed and all the roots have been uprooted … and we must build everything anew – then we 
must ask – where and how? If we are to be reborn again as a group, a collective, then history 
says the change will have to be radical.”134   
 
Defending Minority Rights  
Robinson’s 1943 call on Jewish leaders to forgo minority rights did not reflect a general shift of 
opinion among diaspora nationalist leaders. Indeed, in the World Jewish Congress meeting 
convened to discuss Robinson’s recommendation many of the delegates decried Robinson’s 
views as an unnecessary call for ‘the negation of the diaspora’ and as nothing short of an 
endorsement of the Zionist Revisionist evacuation plan of the 1930s. Goldman was particularly 
acerbic in his response. “I consider Dr. Robinson’s whole approach wrong,” he argued, “it would 
not only be the abandonment of the Galuth, but the ruin of Zionism.” Robinson’s views, 
Goldman charged, amounted to an endorsement of Beneš’ conception – “which is more 
dangerous than some antisemitic ideas.”135 Unlike Robinson, Goldman argued that successful 
Jewish diplomacy could still result in gaining new minority rights guarantees in Eastern Europe 
after the war. In May 1943, just a month before Robinson drafted his memos, Goldman arranged 
for a meeting with Beneš – which he attended together with Wise - to get further clarifications on 
Beneš’ position and dissuade him from his opposition to Jewish minority rights. Goldman told 
Beneš at the meeting that he was sorry to hear of his views on minority rights and that he finds 
these views hard to reconcile with his liberal credentials. Beneš replied that he had only 
expressed serious doubts concerning the wisdom of demanding simultaneously a Jewish state in 
Palestine and political minority rights in the countries where Jews live. Goldman replied that 																																																								
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what Jews want “is only recognition of the fact that there is a Jewish people in the world, that 
Jewish citizens of various states have the right to remain members of this Jewish people; that 
they may continue to instruct their children in the Hebrew language and in Jewish values, to 
display a deep interest in Palestine and in the Jewish fate everywhere”. “This,” Goldman 
concluded, “is what we mean when talking of minority rights.” “Whoever told you I oppose such 
legitimate demands,” Beneš responded, “misunderstood me.”136 
 Over the course of 1944 and 1945 several other diaspora nationalist leaders rejected 
Robinson’s position and advocated for a return to minority rights. In a 1944 essay, Laserson 
decried the new voices in the Jewish world – Robinson among them - that called to give up on 
minority rights in favor of a Jewish national program centered exclusively on Palestine. “It has 
now become the mode in certain circles … to combine negation of the galut with maximalist 
demands for Palestine.” “The authors of this argumentation, however, forget that Zionism is 
rooted also in the diaspora.”137 Rejecting this view, Laserson published a detailed article 
outlining a program for a revamped system of minority protection after the war.138  
Vishniak too, openly attacked Robinson’s position. In a 1945 article Vishniak repeated 
his advocacy for minority rights after the war. Citing Robinson’s 1944 article “Minorities in a 
Free World” in which Robinson heavily criticized minority rights, Vishniak noted his 
astonishment that even among the Jews - “those who are doomed to remain a minority, whatever 
the remodeling of the world map” – there are leaders who call to give-up on minority rights after 
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the war.139 “As the failure of the League of Nations does not make international organization 
unnecessary,” Vishniak argued, “so the abortive protection of minorities does not prove that the 
objectives for which it was created no longer exist.”140 Vishniak was particularly disturbed by 
Robinson’s endorsement of the concept of human rights as a substitute for minority rights.141 The 
idea of an international bill for the protection of the rights of man had become prominent in 
internationalist circles in the United States during the war.142 In 1944 the American Jewish 
Committee publicly endorsed the idea of human rights as an organizing principle of a postwar 
European federation in a two-page ad in the New-York Times.143 The American Jewish 
Committee’s support for human rights was part of its broader anti-national agenda – the 
organization’s leaders fiercely opposed a return to minority rights after the war and viewed 
support for individual rights as a way to obliterate “the concept of minority groups and majority 
groups” and the “race-state idea.”144 Though Vishniak, as other diaspora nationalist leaders, 																																																								
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supported an international bill of human rights they insisted it should supplement rather than 
replace the protection of the rights of groups.145  
Several diaspora nationalist thinkers rejected Robinson’s position because they disagreed 
with his analysis that the demographic changes in Europe after the war would be so radical as to 
preclude a return to minority rights. Janowsky, for example, argued that Robinson’s prediction of 
a completely ethnically homogenous order in postwar Eastern Europe was premature. “We do 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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not know what the composition of the population of Eastern and Central Europe will be after the 
war,” Janowksy told Robinson in a 1942 meeting of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, “What then 
would be the point in stating a definite position that in all likelihood they will be 
homogenous?”146 Janowsky expanded on this argument in his 1945 proposal for a federation in 
Eastern Europe with extensive rights for minorities, Nationalities and National Minorities. In his 
study, Janowsky carefully reconstructed Beneš’ wartime statements on population transfers and 
argued that Beneš was not planning a wholesale deportation of minorities after the war. Rather, 
Janowsky insisted, Beneš was only planning for “the elimination of those Germans and 
Hungarians who as disloyal irredentist plotted the destruction of the Czechoslovak state.”147 This 
analysis led Janowsky to conclude that Eastern Europe will remain an ethnically heterogeneous 
region after the war with millions of members of ethnic minority groups in need of new 
guarantees for minority protection.148 
Yet even some of those who agreed with Robinson’s demographic analysis of postwar 
Eastern Europe still rejected his political conclusions. In his 1945 essay “Antisemitism in the 
Postwar World,” historian and diaspora nationalist advocate Koppel S. Pinson carefully analyzed 
the plans of the Polish and Czech governments to expel minorities as well as the efforts by the 
Soviet-sponsored new Romanian government to deny Jews rights as a group.149 “The tendency 
now seems to be,” Pinson observed, “toward the elimination of national minority problems by 																																																								
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wholesale shifts and exchanges of population in order to attain national homogeneity in each of 
the reconstituted states.”150 “This tendency … represents to my mind one of the most serious 
problems for the collective Jewry of Central and Eastern Europe in the post-war world,” for “no 
matter what transfers of population take place, the Jewish group will always remain a minority 
group.”151 “The record of Jewish suffering and annihilation during the past twelve years makes 
imperative, even more than after the last war,” Pinson asserted, “provisions for the international 
protection of minorities.”152 Much like Pinson, Tenenbaum also shared Robinson’s demographic 
analysis of the future of Eastern Europe but rejected the political conclusions he had reached. In 
his 1945 book on the Jewish future after the war, Peace for the Jews, Tenenbaum lamented that 
“there seems to be a widespread tendency to get rid of troublesome minorities altogether instead 
of protecting them.” “Hitler rooted out some. It is proposed that others be subject to wholesale 
transfer.” And Tenenbaum also acknowledged that in this new nationalist Europe the number of 
Jews has “shrunk drastically.” Still, Tenenbaum asserted, “I am sure that whatever their number, 
Jews want to remain Jews, and the smaller the minority the stronger the need of protection. I am 
therefore unqualifiedly for minority rights for the Jewish people.” Referring directly to 
Robinson, “the eminent international lawyer and writer,” Tenenbaum forcefully rejected the 
argument that the failure of minority protection in the past should serve as a ground to prevent 
their reinstatement in the future.153 
Similarly to Pinson and Tenenbaum, Polish Jewish international lawyer Raphael Lemkin 
also advocated for a resurrected and expanded system of minority protection after the war as he 																																																								
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analyzed the ethnic transformation of Europe under Nazi rule. In his 1944 study Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe, Lemkin examined the methods of Nazi occupation throughout Axis-ruled 
Europe and coined the term ‘genocide’ to describe the various mechanisms by which the Nazis 
brought about the physical, economic, social and cultural destruction of national groups.154 In 
Lemkin’s view genocide was only a descriptive term but also a new legal category that would 
shape the future of international law for the defense of minorities and protect against the 
recurrence of state actions against groups.155 As James Loeffler has recently shown, Lemkin’s 
ideas need to be situated firmly in the context of interwar Jewish politics in Poland of the 1930s 
and more specifically in its Zionist, diaspora nationalist variety.156 During this period Lemkin 
wrote repeatedly for Jewish papers on Jewish national affairs - penning legal advice columns on 
issues relating to Jewish rights for the popular Yiddish daily Haynt and celebrating Jewish 
national achievements in Palestine.157 As Loeffler argues, after the outbreak of war and in 																																																								
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subsequent years Lemkin sought to hide his interwar engagement with Zionist politics, 
presumably in order to prevent his advocacy for genocide from being tainted by the claim of 
partisan Jewish politics. Yet a careful reading of Axis Rule indicates that during the war Lemkin 
remained deeply informed and engaged with the specifically Jewish debates on the postwar 
order. In the chapter in which Lemkin firsts introduced the concept of genocide, he argued that 
what differentiates genocide from previous similar legal conceptions such as ‘denationalization’ 
is the fact that genocide concern not only the cultural erasure of a national pattern of a group but 
also the “physical decline and even destruction of the population involved”.158 In light of this 
observation it is important to note that the section on physical destruction in the chapter on 
genocide is based extensively on writings by Robinson and the Institute of Jewish Affairs. In the 
three page section, Lemkin cites two of the Institute’s publications a total of four times – 
Starvation over Europe and Hitler’s Ten Years War on the Jews, in which, as we have already 
seen, Robinson had first concluded that three million Jews had been exterminated in Europe.159 
Lemkin notes that the figures quoted in the section on physical destruction were taken from the 
Institute’s publications and extends his gratitude to the Institute for its permission to use this 
information. Moreover, in the body of the text Lemkin acknowledges that his estimate of the 
number of Jews killed in organized Nazi murders – 1,702,500 – is based on the calculations of 
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the Institute.160 From these scattered pieces of evidence it seems reasonable to conclude that 
Lemkin was both deeply familiar with the work of the Institute and that his conception of 
genocide as a form of physical destruction owed in part to Robinson’s early formulation of the 
magnitude of Jewish destruction. This reading of Axis Rule may help understand a rather obtuse 
letter Lemkin sent Robinson in 1946. Urging Robinson to include the concept of genocide in the 
Institute’s proposal for 1946 Paris Peace Conference, Lemkin observed that he does not need to 
convince Robinson of the necessity of promoting genocide “since you [i.e., Robinson] have been 
the great inspiration for genocide.”161 Still, and despite the affinity between Robinson’s and 
Lemkin’s similar understanding of the radical ethnic transformation in Europe, the visions they 
advocated for the future remained radically different.  
 
The Ghost of Minority Rights  
The debate among Jewish leaders over the future of minority rights did not reach a conclusion 
during the war. In fact, as Jewish leaders – Robinson among them - prepared for the 1946 Paris 
Conference, they still laid out demands for new minority rights guarantees. The 1946 Paris 
Conference was convened by the Allied victors as part of the process of settling peace treaties 
with Germany’s wartime allies – Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Italy, countries that at the 
time were home to over 700,000 Jewish survivors. From the very start the Paris conference 
appeared as only a vague shadow of the peace conference of 1919. The high idealism and 
internationalist sentiments of the statesmen in Versailles was replaced by the growing divisions 
of the early Cold War between the ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ blocs. The conference organizers 
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even deliberately omitted the term ‘peace’ from its title to avoid giving the impression the 
conference was to design a new political order in the continent.162 
The conference took place in an atmosphere of deep despair among Jewish leaders over 
the prospects of reconstructing Jewish life in Eastern Europe. A series of pogroms in Poland 
prompted tens of thousands of Jews to flee the country to Displaced Persons in Germany. Jewish 
flight from Poland reached its apogee in June that year following the Kielce pogrom - just weeks 
ahead of the first sessions of the conference.163 In Romania and Hungary hundreds of thousands 
of Jewish survivors lived in dire economic straights. “The most outstanding feature of Jewish life 
in the former satellite countries,” Robinson observed in 1946, “is the lack of their reintegration in 
the economic life of the country from which they were almost totally eradicated…”  “The reason 
is not the precarious economic situation in the country concerned …,” Robinson argued, but “the 
insufficient measures taken by the governments to restore to Jews their properties, rights and 
interests, as well as their positions they were robbed of”.164 Moreover, some 40 percent of the 
400,000 surviving Jews in Romania were still considered aliens for various legal reasons and a 
new Romanian law of nationality specifically precluded recognizing Jews as a national 
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minority.165 At the same time, the prospects for Jewish immigration to Palestine were grim, as 
Britain remained committed to keeping the gates of Palestine closed. In late June, as Jewish 
representatives were making their way to Paris, the British mandatory authorities cracked down 
on the Jewish political leadership in Palestine, arresting prominent leaders of the Jewish Agency 
as well as thousands of others involved in the Yishuv government.166    
In this political climate representatives of nine Jewish organizations from the United 
States, Britain, France and South Africa arrived in Paris in the early summer to pursue the Jewish 
case.167 Though in past international conferences Jewish organizations repeatedly clashed over 
ideological divisions – reflecting the tensions between an ‘assimilationist’ and ‘nationalist’ 
agendas, in Paris Jewish groups agreed to work in unity and formulate a common set of 
demands. As Robinson observed, Jewish unity at the conference reflected a radically new 
“phenomena of Jewish life in the postwar period … the tremendous reduction of points of 
difference among various Jewish groups.” 168 Over the course of July and August Jewish groups 
formulated their proposed amendments to the treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary and 
Bulgaria. The main documents they drafted dealt with the future of Romania and Hungary and 
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laid out demands for the protection of human rights, for the restitution of and indemnification for 
lost Jewish property and for new minority rights guarantees. All of these provisions were aimed 
at providing the legal basis for restoring Jewish collective rights. Even the demand for human 
rights was framed in collectivist terms. The human rights article called for freedom of religious 
practice, for ensuring individuals have a right to pursue any economic activity and for the right 
of all individuals to “preserve and develop their cultural entity.”169 As one of the Jewish 
delegates later reminisced, the human rights clause was formulated with the experience of Polish 
Jewry in the 1930s in mind. The amendment on religious practice was designed to address issues 
such as the ban on Jewish religious slaughter while the amendment on freedom of economic 
activity was proposed to address the long history of economic boycotts on Jews.170 
Yet unlike Jewish success in guaranteeing Jewish rights at Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, in 1946 Jewish leaders did not even get a chance to officially voice their demands. The 
Paris conference precluded the participation of non-state actors. To submit their demands for 
consideration Jewish leaders were required to find a state that would act as a sponsor and 
distribute their proposed amendments. In late August Jewish leaders “knocked on every door” 
and “begged before every delegation” in the hope of finding a sponsor - but no state agreed.171 
The deadline for submitting the amendments passed on August 28 and the Jewish proposal was 
left completely off the conference agenda. Only a few weeks later did specifically Jewish 
interests appear on the agenda as Britain and the United States proposed three amendments 
concerned with the Jewish equality, compensation and restitution in Hungary, Romania and 
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Bulgaria. Though the word Jew did not specifically appear in those amendments, they were 
widely referred to at the conference as the “Jewish clauses”. Members of the Eastern Block and 
many Jewish leaders viewed them as a half-hearted concession by Britain aimed primarily at 
deflecting accusations against its policies in Palestine.172 After some resistance by the Soviet 
delegation, a revised form of these amendments was ultimately inserted into the treaties. These 
three amendments became the sole achievements of Jewish groups at the conference. An 
expanded article on human rights in the treaties with Romania and Hungary that specifically 
outlawed racial and religious discrimination (but did not include any of the collective rights 
guarantees Jewish groups originally clamored for); a clause promising compensation for lost 
property (but which did not specify the amount of the compensation. Jewish groups demanded 
that the term ‘full compensation’ be used); and a clause designating the transfer of heirless 
property to local organizations for the purpose of relief and rehabilitation.173 
 Robinson arrived at the conference in late July and during his stay in Paris wrote several 
detailed memoranda. In late August Robinson noted his great dismay at the fact that Jewish 
groups did not even gain the opportunity to officially present their demands to the Allies. “The 
first impression gained by the study of the more than 200 amendments is the distressing 
realization of the complete absence of the slightest note taken by the members of the delegations 
of our numerous memoranda.” “Not only is the word ‘Jew’ taboo,” he observed, “but even the 
camouflaged provisions which could have been interpreted as concerned with the Jews, also are 
missing.”174 As Robinson argued, most striking in its absence was any reference to the protection 																																																								
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of collective rights of minorities.  “The general dislike of a renewal of the experiment of the 
protection of minorities …  has been carried to its most radical consequences.”175 Indeed, as he 
remarked just over a week later “one of the greatest nightmares of all this conference is the ghost 
of the factually defunct protection of minorities. The word ‘minority’ is taboo - nothing can be 
said in its favor.”176 The only proposed provisions dealing with minorities in the treaties, 
Robinson observed, were those concerned with regulating the transfer of ethnic Hungarians from 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.177 This sentiment of disdain toward minority protection was 
voiced at the same time as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia were expelling 
millions of members of minority groups, primarily ethnic Germans, to their purported ethnic 
‘homelands’ with Allied support. As one Jewish delegate at the conference observed, the 
conference had taken place against the backdrop of “mass expulsions, population exchanges, and 
boundary alterations … millions of Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia had been 
expelled.”178 “The tragedy of population transfers which accompanies the making of peace,” 
Vishniak declared, “surpasses – both in scope and in intensity – that of the transfers during the 
war.” Jews too, Vishniak noted, had become victims of these expulsion – the Czechoslovak 
government demanded that Jews either be “removed to Palestine, or else cease being a Jewish 
minority and assimilate themselves completely with the dominant majority.” 179 Indeed, Vishniak 																																																								
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lamented how empty was the promise Masaryk had given Weinreich in 1942 - that Jews do not 
form part of the “very hazy plans” for postwar population transfers.180 Jewish delegates at the 
conference were thus placed in a precarious situation, Robinson argued, because speaking for the 
cause of minorities under such circumstances became tantamount to speaking on behalf of the 
defeated, the Germans.181  
 The failure of Jewish groups to achieve new guarantees for minority protection at the 
conference solidified Robinson’s conviction that the era of Jewish diaspora nationalism has come 
to an end. In January 1945 Robinson repeated this conviction in his response to a proposal for an 
English translation of Simon Dubnow’s tract Letters on the Old and New Judaism in which the 
latter expounded his vision of Jewish autonomism.“The importance of Dubnow’s ‘prescriptions’ 
to solve the Jewish problem,” Robinson argued, “has greatly vanished.” “The remaining Jewish 
communities in the surviving traditional centers of Jewish settlement … will consider a political 
program not adjusted to the radically changed conditions of a new Jewish world as wholly 
unrealistic and harmful.” Indeed, as Robinson further noted, the Jews of postwar Europe have 
become “dwarf communities” who now inhibit regimes “which leave no place for autonomous 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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public law bodies for religious or national groups.”182 As Robinson later explained, he decided to 
continue to press for minority rights at the conference not because he believed Jewish groups 
could in fact secure new collective guarantees in the radically new postwar reality in the region, 
but because he felt a moral obligation to give the Jewish agenda a strong voice at the conference. 
“We always took a very realistic view of the possibilities at this juncture of international 
relations. Yet, though fully anticipating meager results, we decided to go on, to continue to 
fight.” “Why did we do so? … because of our general approach to the Jewish problem as an 
international one, which commits us to a diplomacy of being present. Our absence from Paris 
would certainly have been interpreted as meaning that we had given up this basic philosophy in 
favor of the purely domestic concept of the numerous Jewish problems.”183 
 While Robinson had not been surprised by the outcome of the conference, he still 
acknowledged the overwhelming “feeling of frustration” that dominated “the mood of our group 
in Paris.” “The moral standards in Paris,” he observed, “are the lowest I have ever witnessed or 
read about.”184 The purpose of the conference, Robinson concluded, was “either to evade or 
avoid a solution.”185 In early September, humiliated by the disregard for the their advocacy, 
Jewish groups sent a letter of protestation to the Allies in which they expressed their hope that 
“the statesmen assembled in Paris … are not indifferent to the great tragedy that has 
overwhelmed the Jews in Europe and of the need for a solution to the problems confronting 
them.”186 “The special sufferings of the Jewish people at the hands of Hitler, their exposed 
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position as a minority in each of the European countries are well-known,” noted a Jewish 
delegate in his report on the conference, “but it is not apparent that any nation represented in 
Paris is ready to take diplomatic action … to protect the Jews who will continue to remain in 
Europe.”187 “The most casual observer at the Paris Peace Conference,” observed Baron, who 
attended a part of the conference, “could not but help noticing the pitiful role played by Jewish 
representatives.”188 “The fact that at the Paris peace conference of 1946 the term ‘human rights’ 
was used instead of ‘minority rights’ of the peace conference of 1919,” another Jewish delegated 
registered his disappointment, “indicates the radical change that has taken place in the European 
situation...” The Jews, as other minorities “are no longer recognized in theory” and the minority 
group as a social and political entity of European life “is fast disappearing in reality.”189 This 
general mood of humiliation among Jewish delegates was most powerfully captured in an essay 
by Jacob Flaiszer, a delegate of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, later to be known as the 
eminent historian of totalitarianism Jacob Talmon. In his essay “The Jewish Question at the 1946 
Paris Conference” Flaiszer carefully chronicled the efforts of Jewish groups in Paris and 
portrayed the conference as a watershed moment in Jewish history – the end of a century-long 
tradition of fighting for Jewish rights in international conferences. Comparing the failure of 
Jewish delegates in Paris to their success in securing guarantees for minority rights in Versailles, 
Flaiszer declared that “the morality of the world had greatly declined between 1919 and 1946.” It 
was astonishing, he argued, that following the greatest tragedy Jews had ever endured the leaders 
of the world proved to be least receptive to new demands for Jewish rights. His essay was replete 
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with powerful emotional epithets to describe the experience of Jewish delegates in Paris: the 
events in Paris were “disgraceful”, “shameful”, marked by constant humiliating “bitter 
disappointments” and revealing “cruel” truths about the world. Flaiszer acknowledged that the 
Jewish failure at the conference was a product of a new and increasingly nationalist postwar 
order. “Against all the best wishes,” he lamented, “the sovereign state had not been rejected as 
the organizing principle of international life.” “How can one demand minority rights  … at a 
time in which the expulsion of millions from their homes ... has become an accepted solution to 
the minority problem?” Flaiszer’s piece was ultimately constructed as a narrative of a collective 
political transformation: from a life-long commitment to fighting for Jewish rights in Europe to 
an endorsement of nation-state Zionism as the only solution for the Jewish future. Facing their 
failure at the conference and a radically new nationalist reality across Europe, Flaiszer 
concluded, “Jewish representatives in Paris felt in every fiber of their bones the desire of their 
generation for a political status, for a place among the nations – for a state.”190  
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‘The Arabs will have to Make Room’: Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Population 
Transfers between Eastern Europe and Palestine 
 
 
In November 1939 Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder and leader of the right-wing Zionist 
Revisionist movement, penned a handwritten note in which he laid out his vision for the future of 
Jews after the war. Written from London just one month after the Nazi invasion of Poland, 
Jabotinsky’s note reflected his view that the interwar order in Eastern Europe had been 
irrecoverably shattered and will have to be built anew after the war. In Jabotinsky’s radical 
assessment there would remain practically no ethnic minorities in the region after the war. Ten to 
twenty millions members of European minority groups would be forced to evacuate form their 
prewar homes and those who choose to remain would have to assimilate to the majority culture. 
Millions of Jewish refugees would have to be transferred to Palestine after the war. As for the 
Arab population in Palestine, Jabotinsky argued, “they will have to make room” for the Jews and 
leave, perhaps to Saudi Arabia or Iraq with the support of an international loan. “If Balts may be 
moved” Jabotinsky argued, referring to a population exchange agreement between Hitler and 
Stalin for the resettlement of Baltic Germans in occupied Poland, “Palestinian Arabs certainly” 
may be relocated too. Jabotinsky’s model for his proposed ethnic transformation of Palestine was 
the 1923 Greek-Turkish population exchange agreement that sanctioned the transfers of some 1.5 
million Orthodox Greeks from Turkey and about half a million Muslims from Greece, many of 
whom had been displaced during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). Jabotinsky took notes 
from an authoritative study on the agreement written by a renowned expert on the question of 
refugees, John Hope Simpson. Jabotinsky copied from the study a diagram describing how 
Greece had become ethnically homogenous in the aftermath of the agreement as well as details 
	 88 
about its financial stipulations. Jabotinsky copied at length only one paragraph from the study, 
revealing how favorably he viewed the idea of population transfers and the similarities he drew 
between Greece and what he hoped would be a future Jewish state in Palestine:  
 
“The exchange of populations, though at the time it caused infinite misery and was an 
element of crisis for Greece, at least resulted in the solution of a difficult political 
situation. … It has unquestionably strengthened the Greek state by the influx of a stable 
and hard working element, whose ideas and ideals are Greek; moreover, the 
disappearance of irritating minority questions has made it possible for Greece to live on 
good and even friendly terms with her ancient enemies.”191 
 
Jabotinsky’s 1939 note is an astonishing document for it is radically at odds with his 
lifetime political activism and thought. Indeed, though Jabotinsky was repeatedly derided in his 
lifetime as a fascist and right-wing radical, “perhaps the most controversial public figure in the 
Jewish life of his day,” as Michael Stanislawski put it, he had been staunchly committed to the 
protection of the rights of minorities in Europe and Palestine throughout his career.192 Jabotinsky 
was keenly aware of the contrast between his public image as a radical nationalist and his 
steadfast commitment to the principles of minority protection. “This writer, as some readers may 
have heard, is a chauvinist and an extremist and generally a political cannibal,” he cynically 
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noted in a 1930 essay, “but he can produce documentary evidence of always having been a 
staunch adherent of the bi-national, even the multi-national state idea.”193  
Indeed, from the very first days of his political engagement with Zionism and until the 
late 1930s, Jabotinsky was deeply invested in the politics of minority rights. Jabotinsky helped 
draft the 1905 Helsingfors program that for the first time placed the fight for collective rights for 
Jews in the Russian Empire at the center of the political agenda of Russian Zionists.194 In the 
years preceding the First World War, Jabotinsky was consumed by the struggle of minorities for 
national rights within Europe’s multiethnic empires. Jabotinsky wrote a dissertation on Austrian 
socialist Karl Renner’s concept of national cultural autonomy. He carefully followed and 
reported as a journalist on Ottoman nationalities policy during several trips to Constantinople 
following the 1908 Young Turk revolution.195 And he consistently advocated for the cause of 
Jewish as well as Ukrainian national autonomy within the Russian Empire.196 Jabotinsky 
remained committed to the cause of minority rights well into the interwar years and supported 
the League of Nations’ system of minority protection. In one 1928 essay he urged Jews not to 
give up on the “minorities dream” despite the various failures of international guarantees for 
																																																								
193 Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Bi-National Palestine,” Jabotinsky Papers, Jabotinsky Institute, Alef-1-83/7.  
 
194 On Jabotinsky’s role in drafting the Helsingfors program see Joseph Goldstein, “Jabotinsky and Jewish 
Autonomy in the Diaspora,” Studies in Zionism 7, no. 2 (1986), 231.  
 
195 Vladimir Jabotinsky, Turkey and the War (London: Unwin, 1917). 
 
196 Jabotinsky’s writings on autonomism have been recently translated again from the Russian and published in 
Hebrew, see Arye Naor (editor), Zeev Jabotinsky. Ideological Writings. Vol 1: Liberal Nationalism (Tel-Aviv: 
Jabotinsky Institute, 2013), p. 140-242. On Jabotinsky’s support for autonomism see also the introduction by Naor, 
p. 11-56 as well as Joseph Goldstein, “Jabotinsky and Jewish Autonomy,” 219–32. On Jabotinsky’s support for 
Ukrainian nationalism see Israel Kleiner, From Nationalism to Universalism: Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky and the 
Ukrainian Question (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2000). See also 
Schindler’s comprehensive review of Jabotinsky’s relationship with Ukrainain nationalism, Collin Schindler, 
“Jabotinsky and Ukrainian nationalism: A Reinterpretation,” East European Jewish Affairs 31 2 122-131.  
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minority rights.197 And even as Jabotinsky famously advocated for the mass evacuation of Jews 
from Eastern Europe in the mid-1930s, he also insisted on continuing the fight for Jewish 
equality in Europe. 
Jabotinsky’s commitment to minority rights in Europe also significantly shaped his 
outlook on the future of Palestine. From 1917 until the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Jabotinsky advocated repeatedly in favor of a state organized on the basis of Jewish-Arab power 
sharing that would epitomize the philosophy of minority rights Jews were clamoring for in 
Eastern Europe. Moreover, Jabotinsky insisted time and again that under no circumstances would 
Jews support or encourage the expulsion of the Arab population from Palestine. Indeed, few 
other Zionist leaders had written with as much passion and zeal on the rights of the Arab 
population in the future Jewish state. In 1918 Jabotinsky laid out a proposal for the creation of 
bi-national state in Palestine. In 1922 he proposed the establishment of a multi-confessional 
Middle Eastern federation with extensive autonomy for each of its constitutive groups. In 1923 
Jabotinsky worked on a similar federal plan together with Weizmann. In a proposed constitution 
Jabotinsky first drafted in the early 1930s - which he prided himself on writing throughout his 
life - he called for full equality, cultural autonomy and an equal share in government 
administration for the Arab minority. For every Jewish minister, Jabotinsky proclaimed, there 
should be an Arab deputy, and vice-versa. Both Hebrew and Arabic should be used in all official 
capacities as the languages of the state. The state budget should be shared proportionally 
between Jews and Arabs. A joint Arab-Jewish court should regulate the distribution of land. Jews 																																																								
197 Vladimir Jabotinsky, “The Minorities Dream,” Haynt, 10.4.1928 [in Yiddish]. Jabotinsky remained committed to 
the promise minorities protection and to the League of Nations well into the 1930s, even after many other European 
observers dismissed the League as a failed institution. As late as 1938 Jabotinsky referred to the League as an 
‘eternal’ body and hoped it would emerge as a more powerful political arbiter in Europe in the future. Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, “Opening Speech of the 7th World Conference of the Zionist Revisionist Movement,” Unzer Welt 6 
(146), Febraury 11, 1938 [in Yiddish]. See also Amir Goldstein, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in the Thought and 
Action of Ze’ev Jabotinsky (Be’er Sheba: The Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Zionism and Israel, 
2015), p. 401 [in Hebrew]. 
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and Arabs should be recognized as separate autonomous bodies that would independently 
regulate matters relating to culture and religion.198  
Given Jabotinsky’s staunch commitment to minority rights in Europe and Palestine, how 
are we to explain his 1939 – and, as we shall see, subsequent calls - for the expulsion of the Arab 
population from Palestine? As this chapter argues, Jabotinsky’s transformation was shaped by 
his analysis of the future of Jews and the political order in Eastern Europe after the war. 
Jabotinsky predicated the emergence of a Jewish refugee problem in the millions in postwar 
Europe. Millions of Jews had been displaced from their homes and professions in Nazi-occupied 
Europe and would not be allowed to return to their homes even after an Allied victory. As a 
Zionist Revisionist memorandum put it, “despite the draconic measures pursued under Gestapo 
rule, it is not improbable that the greater part of these six million Jews will survive the end of the 
war, and will constitute a problem not merely for the Polish government but even more for the 
body responsible for reshaping Europe.” 199 Eastern European states had been advocating for 
Jewish emigration in the 1930s and, Jabotinsky argued, would not let masses of Jews return after 
the war and reclaim property and professions already taken by members of the ethnic majority. 
																																																								
198 The draft constitution was republished in Vladimir Jabotinsky, The Jewish War Front (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1940) p. 186-189. For a detailed discussion of Jabotinsky’s various constitutional proposals see Yosef 
Gorny, From Binational Society to Jewish State: Federal Concepts in Zionist, 1920-1990 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 
97-103 as well as p. 20-30. For Jabotinsky’s earlier federal proposals see also Arye Naor, “Jabotinsky’s 
Constitutional Guidelines for Israel,” in eds. Avi Bareli and Pinhas Ginossar In the Eye of the Storm: Essays on 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky (Be’er Sheba: The Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Zionism and Israel, 2004), 49- 
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199 Most strikingly this memorandum was written during 1942 (!) and reflected views expressed in other venues 
earlier. See The Zionist Revisionist Office in Jerusalem, “Memorandum on the Jewish Problem and Palestine,” 
Jerusalem, May 1942. JP, Gimel 6 1/9.  
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Indeed, during the war Jabotinsky and other Zionist Revisionist activists had been in contact with 
the Polish and Czech Governments in Exile in the hope that, much like during the late 1930s, 
they could cooperate to promote plans for the resettlement of Eastern European Jews in 
Palestine. The only solution to this unprecedented Jewish refugee problem, they argued, lay in 
the large-scale transfer of millions of Jews to Palestine within a few short years after the war - an 
‘Evacuation plan’ on a far larger scale than he had promoted in the 1930s. In 1936 Jabotinsky 
advocated for the immigration 1.5 million Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine over the course 
of 10 years. In early 1940 Jabotinsky insisted that two million Jews would have to be transferred 
to Palestine in the first year after the war alone. The resettlement of such a large Jewish 
population in Palestine, Jabotinsky believed, could only succeed if land and homes were made 
available to these refugees, and this would have to take place at the expense of the local Arab 
population.  
Jabotinsky’s shift from support for minority rights to an endorsement of population 
transfers was also significantly shaped by his conviction that the era of minority rights in Europe 
had come to an end. Jabotinsky carefully followed the disintegration of the system of minority 
protection in Europe in the 1930s and the growth of support among liberals and fascist alike for 
the idea of population transfers. On the eve of the war, commenting on a population exchange 
agreement between Nazi Germany and Italy, Jabotinsky argued that European states would soon 
attempt to solve their minority problems through a series of bilateral populations exchange 
agreements. The outbreak of war signaled in his view a radical acceleration of this process: the 
interwar Versailles order based on minority rights had been completely destroyed under Nazi 
occupation, and in the aftermath of the war Eastern European states would carry out large-scale 
transfers of minorities. The role of Zionist leaders, Jabotinsky believed, was to adjust their 
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political thinking to this new reality of population transfers. After Jabotinsky’s death in 
September 1940, three of his closest associates– Benjamin Akzin, Joseph Schecthman and 
Eliyahu Ben-Horin – recognized their leaders’ newfound support for population transfers, and 
envisioned themselves as an avant-garde movement that would help popularize the idea of 
population transfers as a solution to the problem of minorities in Eastern Europe and Palestine.  
In the previous chapter we have seen how Jewish diaspora nationalist leaders lamented 
the demise of the vision of Jewish minority rights as they responded to the extermination of 
European Jewry and the ethnic transformation of Eastern Europe during the war and in its 
immediate aftermath. This chapter begins the second part of the dissertation focused on how 
Zionist leaders, responding to the same developments, abandoned the federalist and autonomist 
visions of Jewish-Arab power-sharing in Palestine they advocated for in the interwar years and 
began to envision a Jewish ethnic nation-state.  
 In recent years scholars have challenged the idea that during in the 1920s and 1930s 
Zionist leaders had been committed exclusively, or even primarily, to the establishment of a 
Jewish ethnic nation-state in Palestine. Scholars have shown that during the interwar period not 
only groups such as Brit Shalom but also prominent Zionist leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, 
Chaim Weizmann and Jabotinsky supported extensive federalist and autonomist plans for the 
future of Palestine.200 Skeptical that Jews could achieve a significant majority in Palestine in the 
near future, their political visions were based on an assumption of some form of power-sharing 
between Jewish and Arab autonomous communities. Yet missing from scholarship is an 
understanding of when and why did these visions decline. When and why did Zionist leaders 
																																																								
200 Weizmann’s and Ben-Gurion’s federalist visions will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. For more on their 
visions see primarily Gorny, From Binational Society to Jewish State, Schumsky, “Zionism and the Nation-State,” 
as well as the seminal study by Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 
chapter 2.  
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stop thinking about Palestine in federalist and autonomist terms and begin to imagine a Jewish 
ethnic nation-state? This chapter begins to answer this question by recovering Jabotinsky’s 
wartime writings. As one of the Zionist leaders who wrote most passionately and extensively on 
the rights of the Arab population in Palestine, Jabotinsky’s wartime embrace of population 
transfers offers a particularly compelling case for examining the impact of the war on Zionist 
thought. Moreover, because Jabotinsky passed away in September 1940, his case calls upon us to 
pay particular attention to an important but understudied wartime period, spanning roughly 
between September 1939 and late 1942 – that is, before knowledge of the extermination of 
European Jews had been registered by Zionist leaders, a time in which these leaders expected 
that the war will end with a Jewish refugee problem in the millions. Embracing utopian politics 
in the midst of catastrophe, Zionist leaders abandoned the autonomist and federalist political 
models that dominated their thinking between the wars and conceived of an ethnic nation-state 
with a Jewish majority larger than they had ever before believed was possible. 
 Before we turn to examine the evolution of Jabotinsky’s thought on population transfers, 
I would like to offer a few additional historiographical remarks. The first concern the 
relationship between Jabotinsky’s wartime support for population transfers and his over-arching 
philosophy with regard to the ‘Arab question’ in Palestine – “The Iron Wall.” In two 1923 
essays, “The Iron Wall” and “On the Morality of the Iron Wall,” which constitute the 
foundational texts of right-wing Zionism, Jabotinsky rejected the idea, prevalent among many 
Zionist leaders, that Jews and Arabs could reach a political agreement regarding the future of 
Palestine.201 Like all native populations, Jabotinsky argued, the Arabs in Palestine will oppose 
Jewish immigration and settlement so long as there would remain a sliver of hope Jews might 																																																								
201 Both essay were originally published in Russian in in paper Razsviet in 1923. For an English translation see 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/ironwall.html  
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give up on their designs for Palestine in the face of resistance.202 In place of an agreement 
Jabotinsky advocated for the creation of an “Iron Wall” in Palestine – a metaphor that meant 
establishing a Jewish majority in the country despite Arab opposition. Once Jews constitute a 
majority, Jabotinsky believed, the conflict would inevitably subside: The Arab population would 
come to terms with the reality of Jewish dominance and friendly relations between the sides 
would ensue. In Jabotinsky’s view extensive autonomy and minority rights were thus to be 
granted to the Arabs in Palestine not as part of a political settlement, but as a generous 
expression of the goodwill of the future Jewish majority toward the future Arab minority. 
Jabotinsky’s sudden shift after the outbreak of war from support for minority rights to an 
embrace of population transfers could thus be construed not as an ideological break from the past 
but simply as a another political approach aimed at securing Jewish dominance in Palestine.  
While it is important to highlight the continuities between Jabotinsky’s visions of “The 
Iron Wall” and “The Arabs will have to Make Room,” it is also imperative to underscore the 																																																								
202 Despite his “hawkish” views on Jewish-Arab relations, Jabotinsky recognized that Jewish settlement will prompt 
the development of a strong Arab nationalist movement in opposition to Zionism. In this sense his analysis differed 
markedly from many members of the socialist Zionist left prominent in the Yishuv leadership, who at the same time 
as Jabotinsky wrote these essays dismissed the inevitability of Arab national opposition and believed that a socialist 
economic transformation in Palestine would diminish the national-religious aspects of the conflict and promote class 
solidarity between a Jewish and Arab proletariat. Jabotinsky’s view were steeped in a Mazzinian philosophy that 
may be termed ‘nationalist internationalism’ - the idea that each nation deserves to develop its own national culture 
and that relations between nations could be made harmonious (though Jabotinsky insisted this harmony will only 
follow Jewish dominance.) In his autobiography Story of My Life Jabotinsky writes that “the stories of Garibaldi, the 
writings of Mazzini, the poetry of Lepoardi and Giusti, enriched and deepend my superficial Zionism, and 
developed it as a tangible concept evolving form an instinctive feeling.” See Jabotinsky, Story of My Life (Detroit: 
Wayne University Press, 2016), 50. As Michal Stanislawski has shown, it is important to view Jabotinsky’s 
autobiographical writings less as an accurate historical description and more as an exercise in self-fashioning. At the 
time of writing his autobiography Jabotinsky was a highly controversial public figure in the Jewish world who 
sought to create a public image of himself “fit for the public consumption and the ideological battle that defined his 
adult life.” Since most of Jabotinsky’s opponents were socialists, he presented himself “as a callow lad who flirted 
with socialism during his student days in Italy and saw the light and found his way back to the Jewish people 
through the examples of Garibaldi and Mazzini.” Even if Jabotinsky’s description of the influence of Mazzini on his 
thought is exaggerated, he nonetheless felt the need to publicly define himself as a disciple of Mazzini’s nationalism. 
See Stanislawski, Zionism and the Fin de Siècle, P. 119. For more on the influence of Mazzini and Italian thinkers 
on Jabotinsky’s thought see Arie Naor, “With Blood and Sweat/ Shall Arise a Race: The New Jew according to 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky,” Israel, 16 (2009), p. 119-142 [in Hebrew]. On Mazzini’s vision of nationalist internationalism 
see Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), primarily 
pages 48-54. 
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differences. This is significant not only for an understanding of the evolution of Jabotinsky’s 
own thought, but also for a broader analysis of how Zionist leaders came to imagine a majority 
Jewish ethnic nation-state in Palestine as such a state came to be in the wake of the war of 1948. 
Alon Confino recently proposed to re-examine the history of 1948 through a cultural history 
lens. Challenging both the interpretations of Benny Morris that explain the expulsion of 
Palestinians merely as a product of wartime contingencies, and of Ilan Peppe who argues these 
actions were an inherent aspect of Zionist policy as a colonial enterprise, Confino argues that we 
ought to recover the cultural imagination within which Zionist leaders viewed a land without – or 
with a significantly diminished Arab population - as a possibility.203 Confino is mainly 
concerned with showing how the surprising early success of the Hagnah in the war and the 
massive Arab flight was interpreted by Zionist leaders as a miracle – and how this interpretation 
give rise to dreams of a land without Arabs which in turn provided context and impetus for 
further actions aimed at expelling and encouraging Arab departure.204 A corollary aspect pursued 
in this and subsequent chapters concern how Zionist leaders began to imagine the possibility of a 
land without Arabs in the early 1940s as they watched the ethnic transformation in Eastern 																																																								
203 Alon Confino, “Miracle and Snow in Palestine and Israel: Tantura, A History of 1948,” Israel Studies 17 2 
(2012), pp. 36-38. See also Confino, “The Warm Sands of the Coast of Tantura: History and Memory in Israel after 
1948,” History and Memory 27 1 (2015), 48-82.  
 
204 It is important to note that this explanatory model draws extensively on categories and concept used to explain 
the Holocaust. The role of victory in prompting more violence calls to mind Christopher Browning’s “Euphoria of 
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the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2005) and Alon Confino, A World Without Jews: The Nazi Imagination from Persecution to 
Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).  
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Europe. This relationship between the histories of Eastern Europe and 1948 is particularly 
glaring in the case of Jabotinsky and his followers. Schechtman, for example, served as an 
advisor to the Israeli government’s Transfer Committee in 1948 – where he drew on knowledge 
and experience forged as part of the Revisionist Zionist support for population transfers during 
the Second World War in order to shape Israeli policies that would legalize and entrench the new 
status quo created after Arab expulsion.205 This chapter does not propose however that the 
engagement of Zionist leaders with visions of population transfers during the Second World War 
led to a decision to expel Palestinian. This chapter shares Morris’ and Confino’s position that in 
the final analysis Israeli actions in 1948 can only be understood in the specific context of the 
war. Zionist leaders certainly could not envision swift victory in a war in the early 1940s (if they 
expected such a war would take place at all) and even in late 1947 and in the early months of 
1948 many prominent Zionist leaders doubted they would be triumphant in the war and in fact 
opposed a deceleration of statehood to prevent the violent clashes in Palestine from escalating 
into a regional conflict.206 Indeed, any discussion of Zionist policy in the 1940s ought to begin by 
stressing the weakness of the Zionist position in this period – as the Nazis were exterminating 
Eastern European Jewry, the “human capital” Zionists had dreamed would build the future state, 
and as Britain, from the mid-1930s, opposed Zionist aspirations and closed the gates of Palestine 
to Jewish refugees.207 This and subsequent chapters thus seek to amplify the sense of 
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contingency in our understanding of the events of 1948. Rather than speaking about the Zionist 
fascination with population transfers as a unified concept, these chapters seek to highlight how 
Zionist thinking about population transfers changed during the war. In the first years of the war 
Zionist leaders discussed the prospects of Arab transfer in relation to what they believed would 
be the need to resettle millions of Jewish refugees in Palestine. Yet from late 1942, as Zionist 
leaders learned about the extent of destruction of Jewish life in Europe, they increasingly argued 
that the only way to establish a state with a Jewish majority would be by partitioning the land. 
Partition – as the 1937 Peel Commissions proposed – entailed some form of population transfers 
and exchange, but it was a vague shadow compared to the large-scale resettlement plans that 
preoccupied Zionist thinking in the first years of the war.  
 The second comment concerns another historiographical issue this chapter engages with 
– the way the legacy of Jabotinsky had been shaped in scholarship I the past decade. In recent 
years scholars have begun to reexamine the legacy of Jabotinsky and emphasize the centrality of 
his commitment to equality and minority rights to his political thought. Arie Naor edited a recent 
volume of Jabotinsky’s writings dedicated almost exclusively to his early essays on minority 
rights, autonomism and federalism.208 Collin Schindler’s history of the Israeli right dedicates a 
chapter to Jabotinsky’s thought on minority rights, examining how his writings on autonomism 
in the Russian Empire shaped his views on Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine.209 In his 
pioneering study on the concept of federalism in Zionist thought, Yosef Gorny carefully 
discusses Jabotinsky’s various federalist plans for Palestine, characterizing the Revisionist leader 
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as “a consistent champion of the rights of national minorities to his dying day.”210 Dimitri 
Schumsky has also written extensively on Jabotinsky’s autonomist worldview. In embracing an 
autonomist philosophy as a solution to the nationalities questions in Eastern Europe and 
Palestine, Schumsky argues that “there was no difference … between that future member of 
‘Birth Shalom’ Hugo Bergmann and the future revisionist Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky.”211 In his 
introduction to the English translation of Jabotinsky’s autobiography Story of My Life, Brian 
Horowitz too notes that “throughout his life Jabotinsky … did not insist on a Jewish nation-state 
in Palestine … [but] was satisfied with a multiethnic and multiconfessional state under the 
conditions that Jews comprised a majority and have political dominance.”212  
By recovering Jabotinsky’s wartime support for population transfers, this chapter seeks to 
challenge his contemporary historical portrayal as an unwavering defender of minority rights. 
The purpose of this historical revision however is not to simply replace one image of Jabotinsky 
- a defender of minority rights, with another - a supporter of population transfers, but rather to 
offer a more contextualized and nuanced understanding of his political worldview and its 
development in time. Jabotinsky is continuously portrayed as the defender of minority rights not 
because we know his vision for Palestine would have markedly differed from that of Ben-Gurion 
in the 1940s, but because his death in 1940 fossilized him in the interwar period - a period 
marked by the salience of ideas on minority rights in European and Zionist thinking. By 
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recovering his early wartime writings this chapter seeks for the first time to place Jabotinsky in 
the 1940s, a period of his life other scholars have either overlooked or discussed only in passing.  
 
Jabotinsky and Population Transfers in the 1920s  
Jabotinsky’s endorsement of population transfers in his 1939 note is striking not only because of 
his lifelong commitment to the principles of minority protection, but also because Jabotinsky had 
repeatedly rejected the idea of population transfers throughout the interwar years, even as some 
Zionist leaders came to endorse it.  
 As Jabotinsky reminisced in a 1926 obituary for British Zionist leader and playwright 
Israel Zangwill, he first learned about the idea of population transfers in 1917 – during a speech 
by Zangwill and a subsequent exchange between the two.213 In a party convened in London to 
celebrate the Balfour declaration, Zangwill had shared his great hope that the Arabs would be 
convinced to leave Palestine and provide Jews with a greater area for settlement. Following the 
party Jabotinsky and Zangwill walked together through the street of London. Jabotinsky had 
asked Zangwill how he could believe that a million Arabs would voluntarily agree to leave their 
homes. Zangwill replied that it would not be only for the Jews, but as part of a general remaking 
of the world, the ‘unmixing of races’. In Europe and the Near East, Zangwill claimed, ethnic 
hatreds are too ancient and endemic: The Turks could never overcome their hatred to the 
Armenians and Greeks; Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia, and Germans and Czechs in Moravia, 
could never live together. Where no clear separation between such races exists, an international 
mechanism should be set up to separate them. All the Greeks from Anatolia, Zangwill insisted, 																																																								
213 Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Zangwill’s Mistake,” Der Morgen Zshurnal, August 20, 1926 p. 8-10 [in Yiddish]. For 
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should emigrate to Greece, and the Turks from Macedonia to Turkey.214 Writing in the mid-
1920s, Jabotinsky ascribed to Zangwill a great degree of foresight. Six years after our 
conversation, Jabotinsky reminisced, Zangwill’s prediction regarding Greece and Turkey had 
come true. Yet while Zangwill had predicated the population exchange in the Balkans, 
Jabotinsky noted, he was wrong in his assumption that such transfers could be carried out on a 
voluntary and peaceful basis. The Greek-Turkish exchange of populations, Jabotinsky argued, 
was “brutal, carried out through hunger and tears.” Indeed, Jabotinsky was astonished that the 
League of Nations and what he called the ‘enlightened world’ had at all given support and 
credence to such a policy.215 Just a few months after publishing his piece on Zangwill, 
Jabotinsky repeated his critique of population transfers. When a paper misquoted Jabotinsky as 
speaking in favor of the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine, Jabotinsky quickly sent a letter of 
correction to the editor. “I did not say those words or any words that could be interpreted along 
these lines.” “My opinion,” Jabotinsky emphasized, is the contrary “that if anyone tried to push 
the Arabs out of Palestine, all or a part of them – he would be doing, first of all, something 
immoral and – impossible.”216  
Jabotinsky’s staunch rejection of population transfers in the 1920s was based on his 
commitment to ideals of minority protection and belief that majority-minority relations in states 
could ultimately be made more harmonious. Even as in the late 1920s the system of minority 
protection had failed to make significant gains for minorities, Jabotinsky rejected the idea that 																																																								
214 For a recent overview of Zangwill thought – and his intellectual trajectory from territorialism to Zionism see 
Laura Almagor, “Forgotten Alternatives: Jewish Territorialism as a Movement of Political Action and Ideology,” 
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Jews should give up their faith in minority rights. In 1927 Jabotinsky urged Polish Jews to vote 
for the ‘minority bloc’ in the parliamentary elections over Pilusdki’s party because, he argued, 
Pilsudski may soon disappear from the public scene whereas the principle of minority 
representation and protection will always remain part of Polish politics.217 In his 1928 essay 
“The Minorities Dream,” Jabotinsky called on Jews to continue to fight for the realization of 
minority rights and the principles of gegenwartsarbeit Zionism he helped formulated in the 1905 
Helsingfors program, despite the many shortcomings and failures of the system.218  
Though in his writings from the 1920s Jabotinsky decried the Greek-Turkish exchange of 
populations as brutal, he nonetheless shared an admiration for the Greek state’s success at 
resettling 1.5 million refugees in the wake of the Greek-Turkish War. This mixture of repulsion 
at the moral consequences of the Greek-Turkish agreement with an admiration for its enormous 
success as a settlement enterprise would shape, as we shall see, Jabotinsky’s later attitude toward 
the idea of population transfers. In his 1927 essay, “When a State Colonizes,” Jabotinsky 
contrasted the failure of the colonization efforts of the mandatory regime in Palestine with the 
remarkable success of the Greek state.219 The essay emerged as part of a larger intra-Zionist 
debate over the causes and consequences of the 1926-1927 financial crisis in the Yishuv. The 
Yishuv experienced a major financial crisis at the time that led to a large wave of Jewish out-
migration and instigated fears over the future of Jewish colonization efforts in Palestine. 
Jabotinsky sought to dispel the fatalistic attitudes among Zionist leaders and the Jewish public 
over the future of the Jewish settlement in Palestine by highlighting the Greek example: a state 
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that successfully settled more than ten times the amount of immigrants than came to Palestine in 
the 1920s, with much less funds per capita and within a significantly shorter time frame. 
Jabotinsky listed many reasons for the Greek success. In particular, he noted the 5 million 
dunams of land, vacated by expelled Muslims and redistributed to incoming Greek refugees, as a 
significant factor that positively influenced the Greek resettlement efforts. His main point was 
that a simple fact separated the Greek success from the failure of the Yishuv in Palestine. 
Whereas in Greece the state was in charge of resettlement, in Palestine Jews had to rely on the 
mandatory government. The future success of Jewish colonization in Palestine, Jabotinsky 
argued, thus lay in fully entrusting its management in Jewish hands.220  
 
Jabotinsky and the ‘Evacuation Plan’ 
At a September 1935 convention of the Revisionist movement in Vienna, Jabotinsky laid out his 
famous ‘Evacuation plan’, a plan for the large-scale transfer of 1.5 million Jews from Eastern 
Europe to Palestine over the course of ten years. Jabotinsky conceived of the ‘Evacuation plan’ 
in the context of the increasing political and economic marginalization of Jews in the region and 
growing demands by Poland, Romania and Hungary that their ‘surplus’ Jewish population 
emigrate. Jabotinsky’s vision was based on the idea that the alliance of interests between the 
Zionist movement and governments in Eastern Europe – particularly Poland - could greatly 
benefit the Zionist cause. As part of this alliance, the Revisionist movement would organize and 
seek financing for the emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, while the Polish and other 
governments in the region would apply pressure on Britain to open the gates of Palestine to 
Jewish immigration. As Jabotinsky framed his plan, the plan would be a step in the direction of 
completely transplanting Jewish life from Eastern Europe to Palestine. The plan never 																																																								
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materialized, to a large extent because Jabotinsky over-estimated the degree of support he could 
gain from Poland. After 1935, the Polish government certainly wanted for the majority of its 
Jewish citizens to emigrate, but it mattered to it little where the Jews would go.221 Moreover, the 
Polish government was not willing to risk a fight with Britain - by no means an enemy state - for 
the sake of opening Palestine for Jewish immigration.222  
 It is important to emphasize the differences Jabotinsky saw between the ‘Evacuation 
plan’ and the idea of population transfers. In Jabotinsky’s view population transfers was a 
compulsory act, carried out by a majority against a minority. The ‘Evacuation plan’, in 																																																								
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contradistinction, was to be organized by Jews for Jews. Moreover, Jabotinsky repeatedly 
emphasized that the ‘Evacuation plan’ ought not be compulsory. To ensure that the voluntary 
component was meaningful, Jabotinsky insisted on continuing the fight for equality for Jews in 
Poland alongside his campaign for the ‘Evacuation plan’. Indeed, at the same time as Jabotinsky 
advocated for the ‘Evacuation plan’ he also demanded that Poland issue a new declaration 
vouching for Jewish equality.223 At the outset of the very first speech in Warsaw in which 
Jabotinsky laid out the ‘Evacuation plan’, he reminded his audience about his role in drafting the 
Helsingfors program. The ‘Evacuation plan’, he argued, was in fact not so different from the 
program he had formulated in 1905: both envision Palestine as the solution to the ‘Jewish 
question’ alongside a fight for the rights of Jews in Europe.224  
 Scholars have generally overlooked Jabotinsky’s continued commitment to Jewish 
equality in Europe in the second half of the 1930s. In this reading Jabotinsky was a prophet-like 
leader who foresaw the impending catastrophe and was the first to urge all Jews to leave East 
Central Europe. But a careful reading of the ‘Evacuation plan’ reveals it was in fact consistent 
with the Zionist interwar worldview that advocated for the development of two Jewish national 
centers in Eastern Europe and Palestine. For even if the ‘Evacuation plan’ had been realized 
according to Jabotinsky’s wildest dreams – a possibility that appeared outright fantastical at the 
time - it would have only managed to bring to Palestine 1.5 million Jewish immigrants from 																																																								
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eEstern Europe, primarily Poland and Romania over the course of a decade. The Jewish 
population of Poland alone however was three million on the eve of the war. At most then 
Jabotinsky could assume that in a perfect scenario the ‘Evacuation plan’ could offer a solution to 
only a third of Eastern European Jewry within the next ten year. As for the remaining two thirds 
– Jabotinsky believed that they necessitated that Jewish leaders continue to fight for meaningful 
equality.   
 Such a reading of the ‘Evacuation plan’ as consistent with Jabotinsky’s support for 
Jewish equality and minority rights in Europe can also be ascertained by examining Jabotinsky’s 
writings on antisemitism from the 1930s. In several essays Jabotinsky argued that antisemitism 
in Eastern Europe, as opposed to antisemitism in Nazi Germany, was a result of objective 
economic factors rather than an inherent irrational hate. Eastern European antisemitism, 
Jabotinsky contended, was a reaction to the over-preponderance of Jews in the middle class. It 
was a natural reaction, in his view, to the overwhelming presence of an ethnic minority in the 
economic sphere. Radically reducing the size of Eastern European Jewry through immigration to 
Palestine would decrease Jewish representation in the middle class, and, consequently, could 
significantly abate anti-Jewish sentiments and policies.225 Taking all this evidence into account, 
it is safe to assert that in the mid-1930s – even as he often publicly spoke about ‘liquidating the 
Jewish diaspora’- Jabotinsky assumed that in the most successful scenario a Jewish center would 
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Jabotinsky and the 1937 Peel Commission  
One year after Jabotinsky first presented the ‘Evacuation plan’ in Warsaw, the question of 
population transfers emerged at the center of the debate over the future of Palestine. To quell the 
1936 Arab revolt, Britain had sent to Palestine a commission of inquiry charged with formulating 
recommendations for a new British policy for the mandate. In July 1937 the Peel Commission 
laid out a proposal for the partition of Palestine and for a mutual population exchange between 
Arabs and Jews. According to the plan, 200-300 thousand Arabs are to be transferred from the 
territory of the proposed Jewish state while 1,250 Jews were to be transferred from the territories 
allotted to a proposed Arab state. In advocating for population transfers in Palestine, the Peel 
Commission approvingly cited the 1923 Greek-Turkish Exchange of Populations as a model.226 
 The Peel Commission recommendation was a topic of incessant debate in Zionist circles. 
After prolonged deliberations, the Zionist executive endorsed the plan. Ben-Gurion and Chaim 
Weizmann, among other Zionist leaders, approved of the transfer component of the plan. 
Jabotinsky, carefully following the debate on the Peel Commission recommendations, repeatedly 
and unequivocally criticized and rejected the partition plan. The main grounds on which 
Jabotinsky based his opposition to the plan was that a partitioned Palestine would be too small to 
absorb the millions of Jewish immigrants he hoped would settle in Palestine in the coming 
decades.227 But Jabotinsky also rejected the plan on moral grounds, fiercely opposing the idea of 
transferring the Arab population out of Palestine. Jabotinsky underscored this point in several 
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letters and speeches from 1937, and expanded on it in an article published in the Revisionist 
Zionist publication Hayarden: 
 
 “From a Jewish perspective it [population transfers] is a crime. When the Royal 
commission is chatting about ‘the great precedent’ (that is, the expulsion of about one 
million Greeks from Turkey), it is one of those instances in which it plays around with a 
term not one of its members has any clue about. ... Until this day, we remained steadfast 
about one principle … do not expel a single person! … and now a commission, consisting 
of six biased gentleman … proposes what seems to them like a trifling matter: ‘non-Jews’ 
should be expelled from the future Jewish territory. What a ‘great precedent’ indeed for 
all the enemies of the Jews!228  
 
As this quote shows, Jabotinsky was vehemently opposed to the transfer of Arabs from Palestine. 
Jabotinsky emphasized, as he did in the 1920s, his commitment to the principle that not a single 
person – Jew or Arab – should be expelled. He also argued that the Peel Commission drew the 
wrong lesson from the Greek-Turkish Exchange of Populations. It was not a ‘great precedent’, as 
the commission noted in its report, but a tragedy that involved the expulsion of one millions 
Greeks from Turkey. Most revealingly, Jabotinsky argued that the idea of expelling the Arabs 
from Palestine should be rejected because it could serve as a precedent for ‘the enemies of the 
Jews’. Jabotinsky was referring here both to Nazi Germany as well as to Eastern European 
governments who were actively promoting the emigration of their Jewish citizens at the time. 
Jabotinsky recognized the fine line that separated between humanitarian plans for Jewish 																																																								
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resettlement and outright expulsion. In Jabotinsky’s view, the fate of the Arabs in Palestine and 
that of the Jews in Europe were intimately related. Jews could not continue to fight for equality 
in Europe at the same time as they advocate for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine. Moreover, 
calling for the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine could embolden those who call to expel Jews 
from their countries in Europe. As late as 1937, and even as he called for the mass immigration 
of Jews from eastern Europe, Jabotinsky continued to believe in the fight for Jewish equality in 
Europe – and feared that support for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine could undermine this 
struggle. 
 
From the ‘Evacuation Plan’ to the ‘Emergency Plan’  
Only on the eve of the war do we find initial evidence of Jabotinsky’s subsequent support for 
population transfers. In late 1938 and early 1939 Jabotinsky had issued a new and more radical 
mass Jewish emigration plan, the ‘Emergency plan.’ Jabotinsky’s revised plan called for the 
immigration of a million Jews to Palestine within a single year. It was a direct response to the 
worsening condition of Jews in East Central Europe on the eve of the war. Jabotinsky now 
believed that a ten-year immigration scheme was too slow to meet the needs of Eastern European 
Jews for resettlement. Yet if the ‘Evacuation plan’ of 1936 seemed fantastical, the ‘Emergency 
plan’ of 1939 appeared even less realistic. Jabotinsky authored the plan following the failure of 
the 1938 Evian conference – convened by US president Franklin D. Roosevelt to find a solution 
to the worsening German-Jewish refugee problem. With the exception of the Dominican 
Republic, none of the states that attended the conference offered to accept any significant 
number of Jewish refugees, and Britain remained steadfastly committed to keeping the gates of 
Palestine closed to large-scale Jewish immigration. Within this international atmosphere, there 
	 110 
was little reason to believe Jabotinsky could garner international support for such a massive 
Jewish resettlement plan. Still, highlighting the ‘Emergency plan’ is important for our 
discussion. The ‘Emergency plan’ indicates that on the eve of the war Jabotinsky had become 
completely disillusioned with the possibility of continued Jewish life and equality in Eastern 
Europe, and advocated for the immediate mass evacuation of Jews to Palestine on a scale and 
within a time frame from more radical than he had advocated in 1936.229  
 
Jabotinsky and the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement  
Only on the eve of the war do we find initial evidence of Jabotinsky’s subsequent support for 
population transfers. In the summer of 1939, just a few months before the Nazi invasion of 
Poland, Hitler and Mussolini had reached an agreement that stipulated the transfer of some 
250,000 German speakers from the Alto Adige region in the Italian Alps, also known in German 
as South Tyrol, to Germany. The agreement did not receive much international attention at the 
time, but Jabotinsky nonetheless viewed it as a momentous development. The South Tyrol 
agreement, he argued in a June 1939 essay, had set a precedent “the world will feel and never 
forget …”230 The novelty of the agreement, Jabotinsky explained, was that for the first time 
population transfers was to take place not as a result of war, but as part of an agreement between 
two friendly states in a time of peace. Jabotinsky hinted that this was an omen of things to come. 
The idea of population transfers was no longer merely a fascist idea but had now become popular 
even among the “circles of intelligentsia around the League of Nations in Geneva.” Recalling his 
1917 conversation with Zangwill, Jabotinsky noted how Zangwill’s theory about ‘the 
redistribution of races’ had become increasingly popular among European thinkers. In the near 																																																								
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future, Jabotinsky argued, the South Tyrol precedent could serve as a method for solving other 
minorities problems throughout Europe. Indeed, Jabotinsky believed that states in Europe might 
increasingly draw on the South Tyrol precedent to expel their unwanted minorities. It is 
important to note that in early 1939 Jabotinsky rejected the notion – prevalent among many 
observers in Europe – that Europe was headed inevitably toward war. Instead, as this article 
reveals, he believed states in East Central Europe would begin to solve their conflicts by shifting 
minority populations to their purported ethnic ‘homelands’ and replacing the multiethnic 
European order enshrined in Versailles with a new order based on the principle of ethnic 
homogeneity.231  
Was the growth of support in Europe for population transfers good or bad for the Jews? 
Jabotinsky posed this question in the essay but refrained from taking a conclusive position. The 
expulsion of Greeks after the Great War, he reminded his readers, constituted “a rejection of all 
our previous concepts of justice and injustice, of the distinction between humanity and 
barbarism”.232 Indeed, as Jabotinsky pointed out, the rise in legitimacy of population transfers in 
Europe would no doubt play into the hands of the enemies of the Jews, who had long hoped to 
strip Jews of their rights and expel them. Yet this development, Jabotinsky acknowledged, could 
also promote the Zionist dream. For the first time Jabotinsky introduced the thought that 
population transfers could be beneficial for Jewish aspirations in Palestine: perhaps, he noted, the 
South Tyrol precedent “had been set in order to fulfill, in the future, an important role in our own 
Jewish history.”233  
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Though Jabotinsky presented his views in the essay as a reaction to the South Tyrol 
agreement, there is reason to believe his increasingly positive views on population transfers 
crystalized a few weeks earlier as part of an intellectual exchange with Ben-Zion Netanyahu, a 
historian, journalist and Zionist Revisionist activist. Several weeks before Jabotinsky wrote his 
essay on the South Tyrol agreement, he had met Netanyahu in his London home. Netanyahu 
gave Jabotinsky a copy of a volume of speeches by Zangwill he had edited, and Jabotinsky had 
remarked that this would be his reading material on his subsequent trip to Poland.234 The volume 
contained many of the Zangwill essays Jabotinsky had been familiar with and was prefaced by 
an introduction in which Netanyahu elaborately praised Zangwill for his support for population 
transfers. “Zangwill regarded as immoral not those who will transfer the Arabs from Palestine to 
the vast territories they have in the Middle-East, but those who will keep the Arabs within the 
Land of Israel and allow them to take the place of the most persecuted race who has no place 
anywhere in the world.”235 During the Great War Zionist leaders mocked Zangwill’s proposal for 
the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine as immoral, Netanyahu noted, but Zangwill’s vision of 
population transfers had now become a popular and accepted solution throughout Europe. 
Indeed, as Netanyahu further observed, many Zionist leaders embraced Zangwill’s vision when 
they accepted the 1937 Peel Commission recommendations. Though Netanyahu ascribed to 
Zangwill great foresight, he ultimately lamented the fact that his call for the expulsion of Arabs 																																																								
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from Palestine was no longer feasible: Jews could have carried out such a policy during the 
tumultuous years of the Great War when the Middle East was engulfed in chaos and was being 
reshaped, but these conditions are no longer present.236 “The tragedy of the statesmen who lack 
foresight,” Netanyahu attacked the Zionist leadership in Palestine, “is that they embrace old 
proposals only when the conditions which make them possible in the first place disappear.”237 A 
few months after Netanyahu gave Jabotinsky a copy of his book, war broke out in Europe and 
the chaotic world conditions returned. After Jabotinsky’s arrival in New York in March 1940, 
Netanyahu would serve for a time as his personal secretary.  
 
Jabotinsky and the Postwar ‘Jewish Question’ 
After the Nazi invasion of Poland and the outbreak of war in Europe, Jabotinsky began to 
support population transfers as a solution to the Jewish question in Europe and to the future of 
Arabs in Palestine. Speaking to a Jewish audience shortly after his arrival in New York, 
Jabotinsky declared that the war in Europe would bring about “a thorough shake-up, a world-
wide revision of all international and national conditions.” This, he predicted, would have a 
particularly lasting impact on the Jews:  it would be impossible to restore Jewish rights in 
Eastern Europe after the war. Even before the war Jews were rapidly losing their economic 
positions in Poland as part of a concentrated government effort. The Nazis now accelerated the 
process, “sending the Jews to Lublin (or to the next ditch) and letting Poles to inherit their 
miserable jobs.” Jews have lost their economic positions in Poland – and they will never be 
allowed to reclaim their prewar professions. The only solution for the ‘Jewish question’ after the 
war lay in a large-scale immigration plan of the vast majority of eastern European Jews from 
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Europe to Palestine – an ‘Evacuation plan’ on a far grander scale than Jabotinsky had previously 
imagined. Jabotinsky now called for “’dumping’ the first million in the first year [after the war], 
the rest to follow at a slower but still accelerated pace.” Reversing his longstanding critique of 
the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations, Jabotinsky for the first time invoked it as a political 
model: ‘The Turco-Greek experiment of 1923, 1,300,000 immigrants within a few months has 
proved that such miracles are not impossible …”.238 
 Jabotinsky’s framing of the future evacuation of Jews from Europe to Palestine along the 
model of the Greek-Turkish agreement went hand in hand with a newfound support for the 
transfer of Arabs from Palestine. In private notes Jabotinsky drafted in November 1939 explored 
in the introduction, Jabotinsky predicted that 10-20 millions European minorities would be 
resettled in their ‘homelands’ after the war, that Jews would be first among them, and that the 
“Arabs will have to make room.” Jabotinsky also invoked the Hitler-Stalin agreement that 
provided for resettlement of Baltic Germans in the Reich as a political model for Arab 
resettlement. Jabotinsky did not elaborate on the details of his proposed transfer of Arabs, except 
for stating that they would have to go ‘east’ and that perhaps an agreement could be reached with 
Saudi Arabia or Iraq.239 In his 1940 book on the future of Jews after the war, The Jewish War 
Front, written just a few months after he drafted his note on population transfers, Jabotinsky 
expanded on his call for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine in more detail. Indeed, Jabotinsky’s 
1939 note referenced above may have been a draft or initial sketch of one of the chapters of his 
book. Though Jabotinsky observed that such a solution was by no means necessary and promised 
full equality for the Arabs in a future Jewish state, he nonetheless dedicated several pages in his 
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book to discussing the possibility of the transfer of the Arabs. Particularly noteworthy is 
Jabotinsky’s completely transformed rhetoric on the issue of population transfers. The departure 
of 900,000 Arabs from Transjordan, he wrote, should not be regarded as “tragedy” or with 
“dismay”. “Any Arab country which should find the courage … for inviting such an immigration 
of trekkers,” he promised, “would immediately have unlimited sums of capital and the world’s 
best experts at its disposal for the most ambitions schemes of land reclamation and irrigation.”240 
The title of the chapter reflected the aloofness with which Jabotinsky approached the moral 
questions concerning the future of Arabs in Palestine – ‘The Arab Angle – Undramatized’. 
Reversing his repeated interwar criticisms of population transfers, Jabotinsky now portrayed this 
method as a just and necessary political solution. The 1937 Royal Commission’s proposal for the 
transfer of Arab’s from Palestine was no longer ‘dangerous chatter’, as he claimed in 1937, but a 
‘courageous’ and morally ‘contagious’ proposal. Even “Herr Hitler – detested as he is,” 
Jabotinsky wrote in the chapter, was at fault not for transferring the Germans but rather for 
dispossessing the Poles while doing so.241 In the spring of 1940, just months before he would 
pass away, Jabotinsky worked on a second book in which he sought to lay out in greater detail 
his vision for the future of Jews after the war. From the preserved outline of the book we learn 
that Jabotinsky intended to elaborate on the idea of population transfers.  The section of the book 
on the Jewish future begins with a chapter titled: ‘Re-distribution of Races as a General Line of 
World Policy.’242 It should be recalled that Jabotinsky had claimed he had learned about the 
concept of ‘re-distribution of races’ from Zangwill in 1917, and in both of his interwar essays in 
which he mentioned his discussions with Zangwill he had referred to this concept derisively.  																																																								
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Jabotinsky‘s endorsement of the transfer of the majority of Eastern European Jews from 
Europe to Palestine and of Arab population from Palestine is startling given, as we have seen, his 
consistent and longstanding principled rejection of such ideas before the war. His change of heart 
is first and foremost a result of his predictions regarding the enormity of the Jewish refugee 
problem in Europe after the war. Jabotinsky concluded that the aftermath of the war would 
necessitate a far more radical emigration plan than he had previously envisioned – millions of 
Jews would have to be transferred to Palestine within a few short years. These radically different 
emigration plans called for different colonization plans. In the 1930s Jabotinsky believed that 
with the support of international loans the Yishuv could facilitate the integration of about 100,000 
immigrants per year into Palestine’s existing economic structure. The prospects of millions of 
Jewish refugees in Palestine within a few years, however, would require in Jabotinsky’s view 
clearing up arable land and providing homes for the refugees – at the expense of the Arab 
population. This was a lesson Jabotinsky had drawn from the Greek-Turkish exchange of 
populations. As we have seen, even as he decried the moral barbarity of population transfers 
between the wars, Jabotinsky nonetheless admired the success of the Greek state in resettling 
over a million refugees within a short time span -  a success he ascribed in part to the fact that 
Greece expelled a large segment of its Muslim population to clear up homes and land for the 
incoming Greek refugees.243  
Jabotinsky’s wartime embrace of population transfers must also be understood as based 
on his predictions regarding the ethnic make-up of Europe after the war. On the eve of the war 
Jabotinsky was startled by the degree of support population transfers had come to enjoy among 
liberals and fascist alike; after the outbreak of war he noted that it had become even more 																																																								
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popular, winning the support of US President Roosevelt who spoke about the need for the 
postwar resettlement of millions of refugees.244 Indeed, Roosevelt’s statement fitted within a 
broader wartime intellectual clamor in Europe and the United States in favor of population 
transfers as a solution for the minorities’ problem in Europe. Already in October 1939 Swiss 
ethnologist George Montandon, who first laid out a proposal for large scale population transfers 
in Europe during the First World War, called on the pages of the influential French journal 
Merkur for the creation of a ‘Poland of the Future’ after the war that would annex east Prussia 
and parts of west Prussia and expel German minorities from those territories.245 “Everything 
leads us to believe,” noted a French scholar several months later, “that the [transfer of 
populations] would be one of the major innovations of the peace treaties of the future.”246 C.A 
Macartney, a leading British scholar of the minority question, lamented in the summer of 1940 
how population transfers has become “the present fashionable panacea for all difficulties 
connected with national minorities”.247 Based on these developments, Jabotinsky predicated that 
the aftermath of the war would bring about a massive reshuffling of minorities throughout 
Europe. For Jabotinsky the era of minorities and minority rights in Europe - for which he fought 
for decades - had come to a final end.  
Jabotinsky articulated his newfound rejection of the principle of minority rights in a 1940 
essay ‘Shall We Try?’As Jabotinsky argued at the outset of the essay, there will be no return to 
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the status quo ante based on minority protection in postwar Europe. Jabotinsky was particularly 
dismissive of the leaders of the World Jewish Congress who fought for the restoration of 
minority rights after the war. From the start of the war Jewish leaders in London and New York 
had pressed the Polish and Czechoslovak governments in exile to issue a deceleration on Jewish 
rights after the war. These diplomatic efforts emerged as a response to genuine fear these groups 
had that these governments would deny Jews rights after the war, fail to restore their prewar 
property and professions and encourage their emigration. 248 The efforts to secure a declaration 
on postwar Jewish equality in Eastern Europe, Jabotinsky argued in his essay, were a 
meaningless battle that distracted Jews from the more important goal of fighting for a Jewish 
state in Palestine. In one of the most riveting paragraphs in this essay, Jabotinsky publicly 
rejected the struggle for Jewish minority rights in Europe after the war. These lines reflect how 
radically Jabotinsky’s thought transformed in the first year of the war – for even in the mid-
1930s, as we have seen, he defended the ‘Evacuation plan’ as consistent with his life-long 
struggle for Jewish equality and rights in Europe:  
 
… We are promised that after victory the world will be repaired … In this new order our 
brothers too will enjoy equality of rights, and a reconstructed League of Nations will 
watch over them … To no avail I look for a voice of wisdom in this desert of foolishness: 
Enough with the lie! It is as if Jews have become mad, and have begun plotting their own 
destruction. … [Jews] are taking part in spreading the illusion … that a day after victory, 
																																																								




a clause on equality will be inserted into the Peace Treaties, and it would be agreed that 
enough had been done for the Jews, that the Jews had been saved.”249 
 
Jabotinsky’s dismissal of the demands of Jewish groups for new guarantees for Jewish equality 
went hand in hand with his own efforts to revive the short-lived and feeble alliance of the 1930s 
between Eastern European government and the Revisionist movement. Jabotinsky believed that 
these governments were hiding their support for Jewish postwar ‘evacuation’ for fear of the 
repercussions holding such a policy publicly would have in liberal quarters in the Allied capitols. 
Jabotinsky sought to work together with these governments to promote the idea of postwar 
Jewish evacuation and help them frame such policies as progressive rather than anti-Jewish. In 
an April 1940 meeting between Abraham Abrahams, director of the political department of the 
London office of the Revisionist movement and a close associate of Jabotinsky, and Józef 
Retinger, personal secretary of Władysław Sikorski, prime minister of the Polish Government in 
Exile, Abrahams told Retinger that he views the postwar goals of the Zionist Revisionist 
movement as fully in line with those of Poland, and that he is willing to put the entirety of the 
Revisionist movement under the leadership of the Polish government. He also specifically asked 
for Polish financial support in order of fund the movement’s propaganda efforts in America in 
favor of a Jewish army and postwar transfer of Eastern European Jews to Palestine.250 During the 
same months Abrahams also met Benes to discuss similar matters and later remarked that Benes’ 
views have brought him “great solace.” In August that year Abrahams sent Benes a 
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memorandum outlining the Revisionist policy on postwar Jewish evacuation – which specifically 
mentioned the movement’s support for transferring Jewish refugees to Palestine after the war 
rather than restoring their rights, property and professions: 
 
“The Jews have, by deliberate policy of the German government, been expelled from 
their economic positions en masse, and these positions have been taken by non-Jews. 
This means that the vacuum left by Jews has been filled, and the Jewish position cannot 
be restored except at the expense of the vast masses of non-Jewish populations in many 
European countries. Such a restoration of the Jewish economic positions would produce a 
new set of adverse repercussions more intense than anything that has gone before. This 
fact has become obvious even to the opponents of evacuation and has driven many of 
them to support the policy.” 
 
The memorandum further noted that “those government favorably disposed to the Jews who fear 
being castigated as antisemitic,” that is, those governments who support Jewish evacuation rather 
than their postwar reintegration, should not worry, for the Revisionist movement has started a 
propaganda campaign in the United States “for a true understanding of our evacuation policy 
with a view of destroying the belief, wherever it exists, that such a policy is inevitably associated 
with antisemitism.”251 
 
Population Transfers in Zionist Revisionist Thought After Jabotinsky  
In September 1940 Jabotinsky passed away in upstate New York. His death early in the war 
leaves us with very little evidence on the evolution of his thought on population transfers. At the 																																																								
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same time, Jabotinsky’s embrace of population transfers in 1939 and 1940 cannot be dismissed 
as a trifling moment, even as it stands to contradict much of the views he expressed before the 
war. Some of Jabotinsky’s closest associates and followers in the Zionist Revisionist movement 
recognized Jabotinsky’s embrace of population transfers as significant, and made the support for 
population transfers a cornerstone of their own general and specifically Zionist wartime politics. 
Indeed, after Jabotinsky’s death, four of his close followers – Benjamin Azkin, Joseph 
Schechtman, Eliahu Ben-Horin and to a lesser extent also Ben-Zion Netanyahu – argued that the 
success of the Zionist cause depended on the rise of support for the idea of population transfers 
in postwar Europe and envisioned themselves as an avant-grade movement that would help 
popularize these ideas as a solution to the problem of minorities in Eastern Europe and the future 
of Jews in the Middle East.  
 The first Zionist Revisionist leader other than Jabotinsky to make support for population 
transfers a central element of his political activism was Benjamin Akzin (1904-1985). Akzin is 
primarily known today as a distinguished professor of law and political science at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. Born in Latvia and trained in law in Vienna and at Harvard, Jabotinsky 
viewed Akzin as a worldly man and in particular prized his keen familiarity with American 
culture. In the 1930s Jabotinsky appointed Akzin head of the Zionist Revisionist political office 
in London. In this capacity Akzin helped Jabotinsky reach out to various government legations to 
promote the ‘Evacaution plan’.252 In 1937 Akzin represented the Revisionist movement in the 
deliberations over the Peel Commission’s partition plan.253 In 1938 Akzin returned to New-York 
and shortly after the outbreak of war began publishing a Zionist Revisionist-themed paper, 
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American Jewish Chronicle.254 After Jabotinsky’s arrival in the city in March, Jabotinsky asked 
Akzin to return to political activity with the movement and to set-up a one man mission in 
Washington, DC. In Washington Akzin met with various European ambassadors and American 
officials in an effort to promote the two main items on the Zionists Revisionist wartime agenda: 
the establishment of a Jewish army and the endorsement of an immigration scheme for millions 
of Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine.255 In May 1940 Akzin met with William Pell, a 
State Department official, to discuss the Allied stance on population transfers and lobby for a 
large-scale Jewish immigration scheme after the war. Pell explained that the Allies were in 
disagreement over this issue: the British see population transfers as “one of the methods of 
Hitlerism against which they fight” while President Roosevelt believes that “such shifts will be 
necessary.” Akzin then proposed the help of the Zionist Revisionist movement in popularizing 
the idea of population transfers “by getting American journalists to take it up as the last word in 
constructive liberalism” and by “increasing the political pressure for it by cooperating with the 
central European states.”256 In April 1941 Akzin met with Retinger and asked him to raise the 
issue of postwar Jewish evacuation from Eastern Europe in future talks with President Roosevelt 
as well as for Polish support for the Zionist Revisionist propaganda efforts in the United 
States.257  																																																								
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 In August 1940 Jabotinsky passed away from a heart attack – Akzin was among a small 
group of followers who spent the final hours with Jabotinsky on his deathbed.258 In the following 
months Akzin’s mission in Washington DC, beset by poor funding from the start, had crumbled. 
In May 1941 Akzin officially left his work for the Revisionist Movement and took up a research 
position with the United States Congress, specializing in the study of military laws of 
occupation. But even as he moved away from fully engaging with Zionist politics, Akzin 
remained committed to the Zionist Revisionist cause. In September 1941, fulfilling his promise 
to Pell to help popularize the idea of population transfers, Akzin published an essay in the 
influential Harpers magazine entitled “The Jewish Question after the War.”259 This essay was 
the first public Jewish defense of the idea of population transfers published during the war 
written under the spirit of Jabotisnky, whom Akzin referred to in the essay as “the most brilliant 
thinker and leader in contemporary Jewry.” Indeed, the essay offered a distillation of the views 
Jabotinsky had articulated early in the war. The Nazis had removed Jews in eastern Europe from 
their homes and professions, and the local population quickly occupied their former positions. 
Eastern European governments had been clamoring for Jewish emigration in the 1930s – there 
was no reason to believe that after the war they would “reintegrate the Jews in their possessions 
and jobs, throwing out the non-Jews who in the meantime had occupied them.”260 Even the 
leaders of Czechoslovakia – the most liberal of eastern European states – had publicly promised 
that the Jews would not come back and reclaim their prewar property. And the Polish 
Government in Exile - though issuing various declarations on Jewish equality to win favor with 
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“Western liberal opinion” - is prevented only by “diplomatic caution” from declaring its 
continued commitment to the policy of Jewish evacuation. The aftermath of the war, Akzin thus 
argued, would see the emergence of an unprecedented Jewish refugee problem. The postwar 
world, he declared, would be divided with regard to the Jews into two parts  “that which the Jews 
will have to leave and that which they will be unable to enter.” The only solution lay in the large-
scale transfer of millions of Jewish refugees to Palestine. This transfer will take place as part of a 
general reorganization of the European order along ethnically homogenous lines after the war. 
“There are regions in Europe the internal peace of which depends on a better distribution of 
population than that brought about by history.”261 The transfer of Jews from Europe to Palestine 
would be the most complex of these many postwar transfers, he argued, because Jews would 
have to be brought over by sea and because the local population and surrounding states would 
actively resist this immigration.262  
 Akzin’s plan hinted that the transfer of millions of Jews to Palestine after the war will 
result in “active resistance” by the local population, but he refrained from mentioning the 
possibility of transferring the Arab population from Palestine.263 This issue was raised shortly 																																																								
261 Ibid., 436. 
 
262 Ibid., 437. 
 
263 Though I did not find evidence Akzin specifically called for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine during the war 
several details in his memoir indicate his support for such a solution. First, Akzin notes that during his time in 
London he helped Edward Norman, an American Jewish philanthropist, draft his proposal for an Arab-Jewish 
population exchange agreement that advocated for the the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
Arabs in Iraq as part of a new irrigation scheme, and for the immigration of Iraqi Jews to Palestine. Akzin notes 
however that at the time he thought the program was completely unfeasible. Moreover, in a section in his memoirs 
in which Akzin expounds his views on Zionism and the Palestinians, he notes how his positions on the issue were 
shaped by the set of problems related to “minorities, refugees and the process called population exchange.” “Many 
Jews decided to replace their precarious life as a minority with territorial concentration … millions of Indians, 
muslims from India, Greeks, Turks, Germans, French from Algeria and more – some of them willingly, other with 
force or duress – left their places of residence in country’s with a foreign ethnic majority. Arabs from Israel and 
Jews from Europe and Arab countries joined this stream. If for all other mass swarms of refugees the right solution 
was resettlement in a new country, especially in countries where their ethnic kin formed a majority, and not the 
return to their countries of origin, there is no reason to demand a different a solution for Arabs who left Israel. As for 
the minority that remained in Israel, they have an unquestionable right to live in it as equal citizens. But if among the 
	 125 
after the publication of the article in a conversation he held with the renowned American 
political scientist and international relations scholar Quincy Wright. Akzin and Wright got to 
know each other during the war as part of their mutual activities in the Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, an international relations think-tank that sought to shape the United 
States’ postwar policy.264 Wright responded to Akzin’s vision of transferring millions of Jews to 
Palestine after the war by arguing that “there is no room in Palestine for all the Jews that want to 
emigrate … unless you want to transfer the Arabs.” Akzin evaded the issue of Arab expulsion 
and responded by arguing that Palestine could successfully develop with a population far larger 
than Wright anticipates is maximal.265 Akzin left the conversation frustrated. Wright exemplified 
to him the American liberal point of view that fails to fathom the passions nationalism plays in 
European life. “He sincerely wishes to see as few differentiations between human beings as 
possible,” Akzin observed in a report on the meeting, “if there is the slightest possibility of 
assuming that a pretended differentiations does not exist, or is merely artificial, temporary, or 
skin-deep, he does so with enthusiasm.” “He has not experienced nationality and therefore finds 
it hard to believe such an animal really exists,” Akzin added, “an attitude fairly wide-spread 
among the intelligentsia in the USA.” 266 Akzin saw this intellectual mindset as dangerous 
because it meant that “the Jewish problem would then become a minor one” after the war – 
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assimilated into the larger world problems rather than solved as a separate national issue.267 In 
his paper American Jewish Chronicle, Akzin crusaded against this “international mindedness” 
which he regarded as especially “characteristic of Jews of the present generation” who believe 
one ought to “terminate the existence of any specific national or cultural group, as a preliminary 
to the brotherhood of nations.”268  
While Akzin did not specifically write about the transfer of Arabs, this second aspect of 
Jabotinsky’s vision of postwar population transfers would be elaborated on by another prominent 
Revisionist Zionist activist – Eliyahu Ben-Horin. A publicist, editor of a Zionist Revisionist daily 
and a close associate of Jabotinsky, Ben-Horin would run the Revisionist Zionist movement’s 
executive from 1935 until 1943. For a few years after Jabotinsky’s death, Ben-Horin effectively 
served as the head of the Revisionist movement and its office in New York. In 1942 Ben-Horin 
took part in drafting the New Zionist Organization resolution on the postwar order declaring that 
Palestinian Arabs who do not wish to live in a Jewish state should be offered “full compensation 
for the immovable property left behind them” if they choose to immigrate.269 A year later, Ben-
Horin authored a detailed plan for the transfer of the Arab population from Palestine, published 
in a book on the future of the Middle East The Middle East: Crossroads of History.270 The plan 
mirrored Jabotinsky’s vision: millions of Jews would have to be settled in Palestine after the war; 																																																								
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to successfully resettle and absorb such a larger Jewish population, a transfer of the local Arab 
population to Iraq would be required; and such a transfer would ultimately lead to better relations 
between Jews and Arabs. “I suggest that the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan be transferred to 
Iraq, or the united Iraq-Syrian state,” Ben-Horin wrote, “that means shifting about 1.2 million 
persons. A larger number were involved in the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations: many 
more in the internal shifts in Russia.271 Such a large-scale transfer, Ben-Horin argued, should 
take place within 18 months, the same time period during which the Greek-Turkish exchange of 
populations was executed. “If both the transfer and colonization of the Arabs and the 
colonization of the Jews in Palestine are carried out with firmness and justice,” Ben-Horin 
concluded, “the time is not far off when the Jews and Arabs in the Middle East will live in peace 
and amity.”272 Ben-Horin made clear that this ethnic transformation of Palestine will take place 
alongside – and will thus be legitimized by – planned population transfers in Europe after the 
war. As he wrote in an article for Harper’s Magazine that distilled some of the main argument of 
his book, “millions of people still have to be shifted after this war: Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia to Germany, Germans from East Prussia to Germany, Poles from provinces 
which will be incorporated into Russia to Poland, Italians from the Fiume-Trieste region to Italy, 
and many more.” “Why not apply similar measures in the world’s orphan area in the Middle 
East?”273 
 Much like Akzin, Ben-Horin hoped to popularize his population transfers plan by 
reaching out to prominent statesmen in the United States. In 1943 Ben-Horin became executive 
director of the American Resettlement Committee for Uprooted European Jewry, an offshoot 																																																								
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organization of the Zionist Revisionist movement in the United Sates. In this capacity he worked 
closely with Ben-Zion Netanyahu to gain support for the Revisionist program of mass 
evacuation. The Committee was short-lived, but it left a mark by publishing a full page ad in the 
Times that advocate for the resettlement of Palestinian Arabs in Iraq.274 In 1945 Ben-Horin met 
with former US President Herbert Hoover, a Zionist sympathizer who also supported the idea of 
population transfers during the war, in order to gain his support for his Arab resettlement plan. 
At the beginning of the war Hoover advocated for a plan for a resettlement of Jews in Alaska. 
Impressed by Ben-Horin’s vision, Hoover revised his plan and began to publicly support Ben-
Horin’s plan for the transfer of European Jews to Palestine and resettlement of Palestinians 
Arabs in Iraq.275  
 While both Akzin and Ben-Horin supported population transfers, it was another 
prominent Revisionist Zionist activist, Joseph Schechtman, who emerged as the staunchest 
Zionist defender of the idea of population transfers during the war.276 Schechtman’s intellectual 
trajectory mirrored that of Jabotinsky: both were born in multiethnic Odessa and spent the early 
years of their Zionist careers fighting for Jewish minority rights. During Ukraine’s short-lived 
independence, Schechtman was elected a member of the Jewish national council and took part in 
in shaping the first Jewish experience in national autonomy. His friendship with Jabotinsky was 
forged during this period, as both advocated for the creation of Jewish self-defense units as part 
of an agreement with the Ukrainian government. In 1925, Schechtman took part in founding the 																																																								
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Revisionist movement together with Jabotinsky, served for a time as his personal secretary and 
between 1936-1939, at the height of the campaign for the ‘Evacuation plan’, acted as 
Jabotinsky’s ambassador in Poland. In this capacity Schechtman published a proposal for the 
large-scale transfer of Eastern European Jews to Palestine “The Self-Evacuation of the 
Diaspora,” that studied the financial, political and moral aspects of dealing with the problem of 
the lack of Jewish ‘Lebensraum,’ as he put it, in Europe.277 In 1941, Schechtman arrived in the 
United States and quickly made himself a name as an expert scholar on European population 
transfers in Europe. Shortly after his arrival in the New-York Schechtman had begun researching 
and writing a comprehensive study for the Institute of Jewish Affairs on wartime population 
transfers in Europe, published in 1945 as European Population Transfers.278At the same time 
Schechtman also engaged with various other organizations dealing with the questions of postwar 
migrations. He founded a research group – The Research Bureau on Population Movements – 
that brought together several scholars of European migrations to discuss postwar policy, such as 
the Kiev-born Eugene M. Kulischer. Schechtman also served as an advisor for Henry Field’s 
‘Migration Project’ (M-Project), commissioned by president Roosevelt to explore avenues for 
large-scale postwar migrations of refugees. In 1944-1945 Schechtman was also employed as an 
expert on migrations by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the CIA.279 
Though Schechtman presented his work as a product of objective scholarship, his interest 
in population transfers was tied to his Revisionist Zionist politics. Like Jabotinsky, Akzin and 
Ben-Horin, Schechtman saw the success of the Zionist cause after the war as tied to growing 																																																								
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support for population transfers in Europe and the Middle East. In his works Schechtman thus 
sought to legitimize and popularize the idea of population transfers. His 1946 influential study of 
wartime population transfers, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, concluded with a long 
survey of the writings of contemporary intellectuals and leaders who voiced support for such a 
solution. Schechtman also outlined various guidelines for the execution of successful transfers – 
noting the importance of speed in its execution as well as proper planning with regard to the 
distribution of evacuee properties. Schechtman also proposed a legal and moral principle for the 
justification of population transfers. Since he believed that outright compulsion is immoral and 
requires much violence, Schechtman formulated a concept he called ‘reverse’ or ‘negative 
option’. According to Schechtman, so long as an individual has a right to opt out of a planned 
transfer scheme by declaring loyalty to his home state, transfer plans could not be considered 
‘compulsory’.280  Schechtman repeated these arguments in a 1946 essay “Legal Basis for 
Population Transfers.” “Removing a minority, even when the removal is made compulsory,” he 
argued in this essay, is a measure aimed to prevent conflict between nationalities. Such actions 
constitute “a bold and hard solution” but “the only one worth trying”. To judge population 
transfers by “the criterion of good and bad is a distortion of the basic idea of the transfer 
scheme.”281  
Schechtman drew on his expertise in European population transfers to justify and 
promote plans to resettle the Arab population in Palestine. In 1945 Schechtman advocated for a 
population exchange agreement that would provide for the resettlement of Palestinian in Iraq and 
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of Iraqi Jews in Palestine along the lines of Ben-Horin’s vision.282 After the war Schechtman 
continued to advocate for population transfers in Palestine, serving as a consultant for the Israeli 
government’s transfer committee. Established during the 1948 war, the committee’s main 
function was to provide the new Israeli government with knowledge relating to the political, 
legal and international aspects that would allow it to prevent the return of Arab refugees who 
were expelled and fled during the war. In this capacity Schechtman drafted a new and detailed 
proposal for a population exchange agreement between Israel and Iraq.283 Unlike his 1945 plan, 
this new plan sought to deal with the reality of a massive Arab refugee problem in the wake of 
the 1948 war. “The question is no longer that of transferring a sedentary, deeply-rooted Arab 
population,” Schechtman observed, but rather that of the reality of some 500,000 to 600,000 
already displaced Palestinian Arabs.”284 Rather than resettling those refugees in their former 
homes – where they will live as a minority among a Jewish majority – Schechtman proposed 
their resettlement in Iraq in exchange for the departure of Iraqi Jews to Palestine.285 Schechtman 
also called for the transfer of some of the remaining Arab minorities in Israel as part of the plan. 
“There is every reason to believe that uprooted Palestinian Arabs would be responsive to plans 																																																								
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for their resettlement in Iraq,” he concluded, “with full compensation by the state of Israel for 
property left behind.”286 
 As we have seen, following Jabotinsky’s death three prominent Zionist Revisionist 
activists promoted the idea of population transfers. While we have no evidence indicating their 
positions were shaped directly by Jabotinsky, such an assumption seems plausible given their 
lifelong political association with him. Moreover, all three had begun to advocate for population 
transfers only after Jabotinsky had done so. And all three were committed to preserving and 
fostering Jabotinsky’s political legacy after his death. As Ben-Horin wrote in a 1942 special 
issue of Zionews, the organ of the Revisionist movement in the United States, marking the third 
anniversary of Jabotinsky’s death, “our main responsibility is to live up to the standards and 
ideals of the man who entrusted us” with his legacy. And though “there is obviously no way of 
determining whether our interpretations of his will are correct or not… we must constantly be on 
guard against misrepresentations of his legacy.”287 It is thus remarkable to note that Schechtman 
had dedicated his own contribution to the memory of Jabotinsky that year to the subject of 
Jabotinsky’s newfound support for population transfers. Schechtman’s piece hailed Jabotinsky’s 
“courage to face realities.” “On more than one occasion,” Schechtman observed, Jabotinsky 
“made effective revisions in our methods and tactics.” Perhaps the most telling example, 
Schechtman argued, was seen in Jabotinsky’s “reaction to the idea of transfer and exchange of 
populations.” Schechtman recalled how Jabotinsky expressed “complete disapproval” of such 
methods when he learned about the 1937 Royal Commission’s proposal to expel the Arab 
population of Palestine. Yet only two years later, in response to the agreement between Hitler 
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and Mussolini to resettle the German minority from South Tyrol in the territories of the Reich, 
Jabotinsky had completely changed his views on the subject. Jabotinsky had recognized that the 
transfer of populations had now become the “reality” across Europe and revised his position 
accordingly. “It is noteworthy that even the greatest enemies of World Jewry,” Schechtman 
concluded, “ … were deemed worthy of emulation by him if there was any basis of truth in their 
actions.”288 More than a decade later Schechtman returned to the subject of Jabotinsky’s support 
for population transfers in his 1956 biography of Jabotinsky The Life and Times of Vladimir 
Jabotinsky. Fighter and Prophet. The Last Years. Yet whereas in 1942 Schechtman had argued 
that Jabotinsky had begun to support population transfers in 1939, in his biography Schechtman 
argued that Jabotinsky had in fact first supported this vision in 1937. As evidence Schechtman 
cited a conversation Jabotinsky held with Edward Norman, an American-Jewish philanthropist, 
in which Jabotinsky responded approvingly to a proposal for a voluntary Arab transfer from 
Palestine to Iraq as part of a large scale development and irrigation plan.289 Schechtman also 
noted that in Jabotinsky’s last book, The Jewish War Front, he had “fully endorsed the idea of a 
voluntary Arab transfer from Palestine,” though that he still insisted such transfers were not a 
mandatory requirement for greater Jewish immigration to Palestine.290 Schechtman’s effort to 
read Jabotinsky’ support for population transfers back to 1937 does not bode with the historical 
record. As Schechtman himself noted in his 1942 essay, Jabotinsky had fiercely rejected the Peel 
Commission’s transfer proposal at the very same time.291 It seems that Schechtman sought to 
read back Jabotinsky’s support for population transfers into the mid-late 1930s, perhaps in order 																																																								
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to portray his mentor as a steadfast supporter of population transfers like he himself had 
become.292 This portrayal of Jabotinsky as a supporter of Arab expulsion has vanished from the 
historical memory and subsequent historiography. Scholars and the public overlooked the 
Jabotinsky Schechtman portrayed in his writings and instead privileged the memory of 
Jabotinsky of the early 1900s to the late 1930s as the defender of minority rights.  
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‘If a Jewish state were possible, I would be strongly for it’: David Ben-Gurion, 
Chaim Weizmann and Jewish-Arab ‘Parity’  
 
In January 1930 Chaim Weizmann, president of World Zionist Organization, sent a letter to his 
friend Felix Warburg, a German-born American Jewish philanthropist and Zionist activist. “If a 
Jewish state were possible,” Weizmann wrote, “I would be strongly for it.” “I am not for it 
because I consider it unrealizable. If Palestine were an empty country, the Jewish State would 
have come about, whether we want it or not.” “Palestine being what it is,” he added, “the Jewish 
state will not come about whether we want it or not – unless some fundamental change takes 
place which I cannot envisage at the present.”293 
 Weizmann’s letter is a riveting document – a confession by the architect of the Balfour 
Declaration that a Jewish state will not come into being. And it is a strange document in light of 
subsequent history, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948. Yet Weizmann’s 
historical assessment was not altogether wrong. The letter was written following the 1929 riots, 
the first full-fledged revolt by the Palestinian Arab population against growing Jewish 
immigration and settlement in Palestine that saw a death toll in the hundreds.294 Following the 
riots the British government began to significantly review its policy in Palestine. One month 
after Weizmann wrote his letter, the British government issued the Passfield White Paper that 
called to severely limit Jewish immigration and land purchases and for the formation of an Arab 
majority legislative council. And though the British government soon qualified the Passfield 
																																																								
293 Weizmann to Felix M. Warbug, 16 January 1930, Chaim Weizmann, The Letters and Papers of Chaim 
Weizmann (series A. Hereafter Weizmann’s letters), Vol. 14, p. 201.  
 
294 On the 1929 riots as a watershed moment in the history of the Yishuv see Hillel Cohen, Year Zero of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 1929, (Waltham, Ma: Brandeis University Press, 2015) and Avraham Sela, "The 'Wailing Wall' 
Riots (1929) as a Watershed in the Palestine Conflict," The Muslim World 84.1-2 (1994), p. 60-94. 
	 136 
White Paper, it nonetheless reflected an emerging policy shift away from privileging Zionist 
aspirations in Palestine and toward promoting greater political rights and representation for the 
Palestinian Arab majority. This new policy direction culminated in the adoption of the 1939 
White Paper. The White Paper famously capped Jewish immigration to Palestine, but it is largely 
forgotten that it also stipulated that the establishment of a “Jewish national home” had been 
completed, that the mandate will be terminated within ten years and that Palestine be declared an 
independent Palestinian state – that is, a state with an Arab majority and a Jewish minority. 
Zionism had become a road not taken.295  
 The fear of the change of course in British policy during the 1930s prompted Zionist 
leaders to promote various visions of political compromise based on the idea that Palestine 
would become a shared Jewish-Arab state. After 1929, Weizmann openly recognized that 
Palestine would have to become be a bi-national state and for several years was willing to agree 
to a political settlement in which Jews would become no more than a 40% minority in Palestine. 
David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, was at the forefront of 
attempts to negotiate a political compromise with Arab leaders. The guiding principle of Ben-
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Gurion’s compromise vision was the concept of political parity – though he insisted that Jews 
ultimately become a majority in Palestine, he proposed a future state based on 50%-50% power-
sharing arrangement between Jews and Arabs in all government and state functions. Political 
parity had in fact become the official political program of some of the main political institutions 
of the Zionist movement during the 1930s. In 1931 the socialist Mapai, the main political party 
in the Yishuv, adopted parity as its political program, and in 1936 the Jewish Agency, the 
executive arm of the Zionist movement, endorsed parity as its proposal to the Palestine Royal 
Peel Commission.296 
Scholars have interpreted the prevalence of autonomist, federal and binational ideas in 
interwar mainstream Zionist thought in two radically different ways. Historians such as Anita 
Shapira, Yosef Gorny and Shabtai Teveth analyzed many of these visions in their works but 
tended to dismiss them as an expression of a short-lived tactical concession, a deliberate ruse, or 
a set of utopian ideas that existed alongside the “true” commitment of Zionist leaders to establish 
a Jewish nation-state in Palestine.297 In a recent influential article “Zionism and the Nation-State: 
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A Reevaluation,” Dimity Schumsky proposed a diametrically opposed interpretation.298     
Criticizing historians of Zionism for anachronistically imposing the post-1948 category of a 
Jewish nation-state on interwar Zionist thought, Schumsky argued that mainstream Zionist 
leaders such as Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky did not strive for, and in fact ideologically opposed, 
the creation of Jewish a nation-state. Instead, drawing on ideas of national autonomy and 
minority rights that shaped Jewish national thought in Eastern Europe, these leaders envisioned 
Palestine as a Jewish-Arab state with extensive national autonomy for each national group.299  
Schumsky’s work importantly highlights the rich history of opposition by Zionist leaders and 
thinker to the idea of the ethnic nation-state. As we have seen in the previous chapter in the case 
of Jabotinsky, and as we shall in this chapter in the cases of Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, the 
rejection of the ethnic nation-state and support for a state based on extensive autonomy for Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine form central themes in these leaders’ interwar politics and thought. But 
Schumsky’s account nonetheless too sweepingly dismisses the insights of an earlier generation 
of historians, and ultimately obscures our understanding of the history of Zionism. For the main 
goal of Zionist leaders in the interwar period was not to establish a bi-national Jewish Arab state 
in Palestine, but rather a Jewish demographic majority. Once Jews constitute a majority, Zionist 
leaders insisted, they will oversee the establishment of a Jewish-Arab state based on extensive 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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autonomy for each group – a dream version of the state of nationalities Jews were clamoring for 
in Eastern Europe. The primacy of Zionist leaders’ commitment to the creation of a Jewish 
majority in Palestine over instituting Arab-Jewish autonomy and equality has enormous 
consequences for our understanding of the history of these federalist and autonomist visions. 
During the 1920s, as we shall see, when Ben-Gurion and Weizmann believed gradual Jewish 
immigration under the terms of the mandate would ultimately lead to the establishment a Jewish 
majority, they opposed any Jewish-Arab compromise vision that would have changed the status 
quo in a manner that would grant Palestinian Arabs greater political representation, autonomy 
and rights. Such arrangements, they argued, would have to await the establishment of Jewish 
demographic superiority. Only from the late 1920s, once Ben-Gurion and Weizmann believed 
that the British were reneging on their support for Zionist aspirations and feared for the 
possibility of ever establishing a Jewish immigration, did they begin to push for an immediate 
political compromise agreement with the British and Arab leaders for Jewish-Arab power-
sharing in Palestine. The current discussions on the one-state solution foster a new historical 
imagination that allows us to reexamine the history of the Yishuv in the interwar period from the 
perspective that seemed most plausible to its contemporaries. During the 1930s a Jewish nation-
state appeared as a far off dream, and Zionist leaders recognized that Palestine was either to 
become a shared Jewish-Arab state or an Arab nation-state.  
This chapter offers a new interpretation of the history of federalist and autonomist ideas 
in interwar Zionist thought by emphasizing the importance of the question of the Jewish majority 
to the development of their views. The chapter is divided into two parts that explore the 
development of Ben-Gurion and Weizmnan’s thinking on Jewish-Arab autonomy respectively. 
There are three main reasons why Ben-Gurion and Weizmann are the focus of this chapter. First, 
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they were two of the most prominent leaders of the Zionist movement in the interwar years. 
Second, during the 1930s both were at the forefront of attempts to promote and negotiate a 
federal compromise plan in Palestine. Lastly, as we shall see in the next chapter, in 1942 both 
were the main architects of the Biltmore program – the first program in which Zionist leaders 
explicitly laid out the demand for the establishment of a Jewish nation-state in Palestine. 
Analyzing why they shifted from supporting Jewish-Arab parity in the 1930s to a Jewish nation-
state during the war thus offers a particularly compelling lens to examine the main theme of this 
dissertation – the wartime decline of autonomist visions of Jewish nationalism and the 
emergence of a Jewish ethnic nation-state as the dominant form of Jewish nationalism.   
 
Ben-Gurion and Federal Autonomy 
From his very first days of political activism and until at least the late 1930s Ben-Gurion 
envisioned Jewish settlement in Palestine as a form of territorial cultural autonomy rather than a 
project aimed at the creation of a Jewish ethnic nation-state. In embracing this vision Ben-Gurion 
sought to adapt the categories of Jewish nationalism and autonomism prevalent in Jewish 
national thought in Eastern Europe of his day to the political realities in Palestine. Yet whereas 
Jewish supporters of autonomism in Eastern Europe such as Simon Dubnow advocated for 
Jewish cultural rights as a dispersed community within a larger imperial framework, Ben-Gurion, 
deeply influenced by Ber Borochov’s ideas, insisted that Jewish autonomy in Palestine be 
concentrated in a specific territory.300  
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 After he first arrived to Palestine in 1906, Ben-Gurion was elected head of the small 
Poaeli Zion in Eretz Yisrael party, an offshoot of the Poalei Zion movement in Russia. Ben-
Gurion and the members of the party advocated for the development of Palestine as a site of 
Jewish territorial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. After the 1908 Young Turk revolution, 
Ben-Gurion was enthralled by the possibility of reforming the empire into a state of nationalities, 
much like the vision Jewish and other nationality groups were advocating for in the Tsartist and 
Habsburg empires. Ben-Gurion Ottomanized: he relocated to Istanbul to study law, grew a 
mustache, dressed in Ottoman garb and planned to be elected to represent Jews in the Ottoman 
assembly. Ben-Gurion sought to organize the Jewish communities across the empire into a 
national movement and urged Jews to declare loyalty to the Ottoman state, give up on their 
foreign citizenships and the various privileges they enjoyed through the system of capitulations. 
Even after the outbreak of the Great War Ben-Gurion remained committed to a vision of Jewish 
autonomy within an Ottoman federation. Only after he was banished from the empire in 1915 by 
an official decree did his faith in a Jewish alliance with the empire wane. Based in New York for 
the remainder of the war, Ben-Gurion advocated for applying international pressure through the 
United States to gain the right for Jewish territorial autonomy in what he believed would still be 
an Ottoman Palestine after the war.301 
 The aftermath of the war radically transformed the political status of Palestine. The 
Ottoman Empire was dismembered and Palestine became a British mandate under the 
supervision of the League of Nations. In the 1917 Balfour declaration the British Empire 																																																								
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expressed its commitment to develop Palestine as a “Jewish national home”. From the early 
1920s onward Ben-Gurion repeatedly insisted that main goal of the Zionist movement in these 
new political conditions was to establish a state. In 1925 Ben-Gurion declared, “Zionism means 
the establishment of a state. Once you take out of Zionism this inner principle, it becomes 
neutered and empty.”302 Yet the state Ben-Gurion envisioned during the 1920s and early 1930s 
was not an ethnic-nation state – he insisted that his goal was not to establish a “Prussian-like” 
state - but a federated state consisting of two separate Jewish and Arab autonomous communities 
within a larger imperial or federative framework. As Ben-Gurion put it in a 1925 speech, 
“National Autonomy and Neighborly Relations,” the ethnic diversity of Palestine made it 
inconceivable that a single set of laws and government - be it Arab or Jewish - be established in 
Palestine. Comparing the fledgling Jewish autonomy in Palestine to the struggle of Jews for 
national rights in Eastern Europe, Ben-Gurion insisted that Jews could not justifiably clamor for 
minority rights in Eastern Europe if at the same time they seek to establish dominance and rule 
over the Arab population in Palestine.303 Underlying this view was Ben-Gurion’s conviction that 
Jews in Palestine were to remain a minority for decades to come. During this period Ben-Gurion 
advocated for the immigration to Palestine of select, young Jewish socialist pioneers rather than 
the Jewish masses of Eastern Europe. Palestine would thus be in his view a Jewish national 
center that would thrive alongside, not instead of, the vibrant Jewish cultural centers in Eastern 
Europe. And though Ben-Gurion hoped Jews would ultimately constitute a majority in Palestine, 
he believed this would be a slow process requiring decades of immigration. In the late 1920s 
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Zionist demographer Arthur Ruppin estimated that even under a favorable immigration rate of 
30,000 Jews per year, it would take some 30 years for the number of Jews in Palestine to equal 
that of Arabs. Ben-Gurion was familiar with Ruppin’s calculations, and estimated at the time that 
the soonest Jews could become a majority would be within twelve years, and then too under an 
utopian scenario - that 30,000 Jewish immigrants settle in Palestine each year, that all of those 
immigrants will be married young couples, and that each couple would give birth to five 
children.304 
 Though Ben-Gurion repeatedly spoke in favor of a future state based on extensive 
autonomy for Jews and Arabs, it is important to emphasize that in the 1920s he actively opposed 
the two dominant initiatives of Zionist leaders to increase Arab representation and rights in 
Palestine through an agreement with Arab and British leaders that would revise the terms of the 
mandate. Following a series of violent clashes in 1921, the British issued the Churchill White 
Paper that sought to balance Jewish and Arab claims over Palestine and adjusted Jewish 
immigration to the principle of the ‘absorptive capacity of the land’ – aimed as an assurance to 
Arab leaders that Jewish immigration will not result in Arab economic displacement. Based on 
this new line of policy, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel proposed the establishment of a 
legislative council with an Arab majority that would give Palestinian Arabs a prominent voice in 
the administration of the land. The legislative council was a legal instrument developed at the 
same time by the British colonial office to deal with ethnic strife in other mixed territories 
throughout the Empire in order to fulfill its mandate promise of promoting self-determination of 
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the local populations.305 According to Samuel’s proposal the council will be prevented from 
legislating against the Balfour deceleration. In its 1924 assembly, the socialist Zionist party 
Ahdut Ha’avoda debated its official policy toward the council idea. Moshe Kaplinsky, a 
prominent voice within the socialist Zionist movement, proposed endorsing the council program 
with variations and called for the establishment of a legislative body in Palestine based on two 
chambers – a lower chamber elected on a proportional basis and a higher chamber elected on the 
basis of political parity between Jews and Arabs. The higher chamber will be allowed to veto any 
legislation that violates the Balfour declaration. Kaplinsky argued that the Zionist movement 
would not be able to justify its settlement enterprise for long if it continues to base its policy on 
the support of a British colonial enterprise that denies representation from the majority of the 
population, especially as Arab nationalism is rising throughout the Middle East.306 Ben-Gurion 
vigorously rejected Kaplinsky’s proposal. Any political program that would see the 
establishment of a parliament or a legislative assembly favors the Arab majority, he argued, and 
thus means “giving away the Land of Israel to the Arabs.”307 Ben-Gurion thus insisted that 
Zionist leaders should oppose any change to the status quo until the demographic reality favors 
the Jews. This line of reasoning also informed Ben-Gurion spirited rejection of Brit Shalom’s 
advocacy for an agreement with Arab leaders over the creation of a council and a bi-national 
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state in which Jews would remain a minority.308 Ben-Gurion participated in the 1925 founding 
assembly of Brit Shalom in. In his speech at the assembly, Ben-Gurion argued that while he 
shares Brit Shalom’s constitutional vision of Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine, he rejects their 
proposal to amend the juridical structure of the mandate in a way that could prevent Jews from 
ultimately becoming a majority. Brit Shalom proposed at the time that Jews could reach an 
agreement with Arab leaders based on the idea that Jews would remain a minority but have an 
equal share in government.309 In a 1927 meeting with the leaders of Brit Shalom, Ben-Gurion 
repeated these arguments. Reaching an agreement on the future of Palestine based on the current 
demographic reality, he argued, would imply the end of Zionism and the establishment in 
Palestine not of a bi-national state but an Arab state.310 
 While Ben-Gurion opposed the various council proposals during the 1920s, he 
nonetheless shared many of the moral qualms over the Zionist settlement enterprise expressed by 
Kaplinsky and Brit Shalom. Indeed, Ben-Gurion’s repeated engagement with, rather than 
dismissal of, the moral argumentation of the bi-national Zionist left reflected the value he 
assigned to their positions. Steeped in the socialist, democratic and anti-colonial thought of 
European socialist movements of his day, Ben-Gurion expressed repeated unease over the 
Zionist reliance on a British colonial apparatus for the fulfillment of its settlement goals and the 
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denial of political representation from the Arab majority in Palestine.311 Moreover, Ben-Gurion 
regarded the morality of the Zionist movement as an important form of political capital. In the 
1920s and 1930s the Zionist movement competed with the Bund and other socialist movements 
for every young Jewish socialist pioneer. Zionism had to be cast as a just enterprise to attract the 
Jewish youth.  
During the 1920s Ben-Gurion thus developed an elaborate justification for his rejection 
of democratization in Palestine and laid out an alternative program to promote Jewish-Arab 
autonomy and equality. Ben-Gurion repeatedly argued that the creation of a legislative council 
would merely empower the effendis, the powerful Arab landlords, at the expense of the 
oppressed Arab masses. To rectify this situation, Ben-Gurion insisted that the Zionist movement 
ought to raise class-consciousness among the Arab population and take part in the creation of a 
new Arab leadership class and an Arab workers movement. Ben-Gurion began publishing a 
socialist paper in Arabic with translations of writings by thinkers such as Ferdinand Lassalle, 
Maxim Gorky and the Yiddish socialist writer Avrom Reyzen, and took part in the establishment 
an Arab workers union modeled after the Histradrut, with a self-managed health care and 
education systems.312 The creation of a viable Arab workers movement was to lead to a future 
Palestine based on a program Ben-Gurion termed ‘the common organization’ - a socialist state 
consisting of separate Jewish and Arab workers movements, each acting as an autonomous 
organization with regard to matters concerning culture and economy but with a common 
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government presiding over issues related to the organization of the state - such as the railroads, 
the mail and those common to all workers.313  
Ben-Gurion’s insistence that development of an Arab working class was a precondition 
for Arab political representation and autonomy allowed him to morally reconcile his 
commitment to the preservation of the political status quo with socialist democratic principles. 
Arab political autonomy, Ben-Gurion argued, would have to await the emergence of a new Arab 
leadership class. It also enabled him to argue – perhaps even to convince himself - that the Arab-
Jewish conflict was fleeting, a case of misplaced class anger rather than an ethnic or religious 
clash. Once the local Arab population will be freed from the oppression of its powerful 
landowners, the effendis, and see the benefits of a socialist organization of the land, Ben-Gurion 
insisted, Arab hostility toward Jewish immigration would wane. This explanation again reflected 
Ben-Gurion’s imposition of Eastern European Jewish categories of thought on the reality in 
Palestine. The idea that pogroms and anti-Jewish sentiments among the local population in 
Eastern Europe were a product of misplaced class hostility was common among all varieties of 
Jewish socialist thinkers and socialists analysts of antisetmsim of his day - it was a belief that 
united otherwise opposed groups such as Socialist Zionists and the Bund. Once “the people” 
were to be freed from class oppression, they argued, amicable relations between Jews and other 
nationalities will ensue. 
The 1929 riots – that constituted the first full-fledged revolt by the Palestinian Arab 
population against growing Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and saw a death toll 
in the hundreds - left a lasting mark on Ben-Gurion’s vision of the future of Jewish-Arab 																																																								
313 David Ben-Gurion, “The Rights of Jews and their Neighbors in the Land of Israel,” originally published in 1918 
and republished in Ben-Gurion, We and Our Neighbors. For more on the idea of the ‘common organization’ see the 
following articles and speeches in the same volume “The Jewish and Arab Worker,” “Our Attitude Toward the Arab 
Worker,” “To the Arab Workers,” “International Workers Union in the Land of Israel,” “The Foundations of an 
International Workers Union.”  
	 148 
relations. In his writings from the period Ben-Gurion described the riots as a watershed moment 
in the history of the Yishuv. The riots, he argued, emboldened the once minority voices among 
the Arab community who believed Jewish settlement could be halted by force. They raised 
doubts among Jews over the future prospects of settlement activities. And most alarmingly for 
him the riots galvanized renewed and serious reservations among the British and international 
observers over the moral legitimacy and political costs of supporting continued Jewish 
immigration to Palestine.314 Indeed, after 1929 Ben-Gurion’s thinking on Palestine was 
significantly shaped by the fear that the British might soon renege on the promise of the Balfour 
declaration and seek to establish in Palestine a majority Arab state governed by an Arab majority 
national legislator. The 1930 Passfield White Paper, which was officially endorsed by the British 
government in response to the 1929 riots, confirmed Ben-Gurion’s fear. The White Paper called 
to severely limit Jewish immigration and land purchases and for the establishment of an Arab 
majority legislative council in Palestine. Though the Passifield Paper was soon qualified by the 
British government, the creation of the council remained a central goal of British policy 
throughout most of the 1930s. Support for the legislative council program was the cornerstone of 
High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope’s policy between 1931-1938 - even as he oversaw the 
massive demographic growth of the Jewish population in Palestine between 1933-1935. 
Wauchope sought to let enough Jews into Palestine to offset Zionist fears of being a small 
minority in an Arab majority state while instilling enough alarm among Palestinian Arabs over 
the growth of the Jewish Yishuv to push them to compromise. This policy blew up in mid-1936 
with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt. 315 The revolt spurred the British government to 
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significantly review its mandate policy, a process that culminated in the 1939 White Paper 
which, as noted, endorsed the demand of Arab leaders for the establishment in Palestine of an 
Arab state based on the underlying principle of the legislative council – majority rule. 
After 1929 Ben-Gurion concluded that the status quo that allowed for gradual Jewish 
immigration under British support was no longer sustainable and that the Zionist movement 
ought to take initiative and outline its own program for the constitutional structure of Palestine as 
an alternative to the legislative council program. From 1929 until mid-1936 Ben-Gurion was at 
the forefront of attempts to negotiate a political agreement with Arab leaders on terms he hoped 
both sides could find acceptable. In 1929 Ben-Gurion sought to publish a collection of his 
writings on autonomism and Jewish Arab-relations in a book entitled We and Our Neighbors, 
which he believed could serve as a testament to his life-long commitment to Jewish-Arab 
equality ahead of negotiations with Palestinian Arab leaders.316 From the early 1930s and until 
1936 Ben-Gurion organized a series of meetings with Arab leaders in Palestine, among them the 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Huessini, in the hope of reaching an agreement. The 
guiding principle of Ben-Gurion’s new proposals was the concept of political parity - in any 
future government in Palestine, Ben-Gurion argued, Jews and Arabs should have equal 
representation - 50%-50% - regardless of each group’s proportion of the country’s population, 
but only so long as no caps will be put on continued Jewish immigration (though in 1936 he did 
propose capping Jewish immigration for the following five years at its 1935 level, which was a 
high 60,000). Moreover, Ben-Gurion proposed in several occasions the inclusion of this bi-
national Palestine within a broader Arab federation in the Middle East – hoping that Arab 
political unity could offset the fears of Palestinian Arabs over becoming a minority in 																																																								
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Palestine.317 In November 1929, four months after the outbreak of the riots, Ben-Gurion laid out 
a detailed program for the future of Palestine, “Principles for the Establishment of a Government 
in Eretz-Yisael” that outlined his vision of Jewish-Arab parity. This plan saw Palestine as 
developing in three stages over the next fifteen or so years during which power will increasingly 
be devolved from the British mandatory authorities to local Jewish and Arab communities. Once 
the number of Jews in Palestine “will not be smaller than the number of Arabs,” Palestine will be 
declared an independent federal state, based on territorial autonomy for numerous Jewish and 
Arab cantons consisting of at least 25,000 residents each, with a central government elected by 
two legislative chambers highly reminiscent of Kaplinsky’s vision – the first consisting of 
absolute parity between Jews and Arabs, and the second representing the cantons and elected on 
a proportional basis.318 Ben-Gurion’s specific proposal was rejected in the 1931 Mapai executive 
meeting that debated the party’s attitude toward the British legislative council plan. One of the 
participants in the meeting in fact argued the Ben-Gurion’s proposal went too far and amounted 
to an abandonment of the dream of a Jewish state. Still, the principle of political parity was 
adopted as the official Mapai policy line, at the time the central political parity in the Yishuv.319 
Ben-Gurion’s embrace of parity from 1929 through the late 1930s marked a significant 
departure form the vision of autonomy he promoted in the 1920s. During the 1920s, as we have 
seen, Ben-Gurion opposed changing the status quo in Palestine, rejected the authority of the 																																																								
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existing Arab leadership and insisted that any future constitutional changes in Palestine must be 
negotiated only once Jews form a majority. After 1929 Ben-Gurion sought to put in motion a 
plan that would effectively begin to revise the terms of the mandate at a point in which Jew still 
constituted a minority and eventually turn Palestine into a bi-national Jewish-Arab state. For 
Ben-Gurion this meant that the Zionist movement will compromise on and ultimately revise its 
greatest political achievement: The Balfour declaration and the mandate charter’s recognition 
that Palestine was to see the establishment of a Jewish national home, which made no reference 
to Arab national aspirations.  
Ben-Gurion’s vision of political parity constituted a middle way between the programs of 
Jabotinsky and Brit Shalom. Unlike Jabotinsky, who at the time advocated for the establishment 
of a Jewish majority state as precondition for the subsequent extension of autonomy and minority 
rights to the Arabs, Ben-Gurion recognized that Palestine would be a state equally shared out of 
a political agreement between two national groups – the Jews and Palestinian Arabs. But unlike 
Brit Shalom, Ben-Gurion insisted that Jews should ultimately constitute a majority in such a 
state. Ben-Gurion’s compromise vision did not win over the support of Palestinian Arab leaders. 
From the point of view of a nascent national movement that demanded turning Palestine into 
democratic state with majority Arab rule, Ben-Gurion’s proposal was preposterous – a demand 
by a minority to become a majority and enjoy at least 50% representation in all the future 
political functions of the state.320 
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 Even after the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936, Ben-Gurion remained committed to 
his vision of political parity and a federal arrangement in Palestine.321 Ben-Gurion only 
abandoned his federal proposals briefly in 1937 (he returned to them again in 1938) when he 
excitingly endorsed the Peel Commission recommendations, formulated as part of British efforts 
to conceive of a new policy for the mandate in the midst of violence, which called to partition 
Palestine and establish separate Jewish and Arab states.322 Ben-Gurion envisioned the small 
Jewish state outlined in the proposal as a nucleus of a future larger Jewish state that would be 
achieved through territorial expansion.323  
Though Ben-Gurion endorsed the establishment of a Jewish state in 1937, it is important 
not to overestimate the significance of the Peel Commission episode in its time. The Peel 
Commission has been the subject of outsized scholarly attention, mainly because its vision of 
partition and support for population transfers anticipated the reality that emerged in Palestine in 
1947/1948. But it ought to be remembered that the commission was far less significant in its 
historical time than its place in subsequent historiography suggests. The commission’s 
recommendations were at no point adopted as official British policy and were in fact tabled by 
the government just a few months after they were first proposed. And while the partition aspect 
of the report was laid to rest, the British government nonetheless remained committed to the 
immigration component of the report. It is largely forgotten that the Peel Commission outlined a 
new British immigration approach. From 1922 onward the discussion on Jewish immigration to 
Palestine was framed by the discourse of the ‘economic absorptive capacity of the land.’ British 																																																								
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and Zionist leaders quarreled over what specifically that concept meant - Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann argued that the ‘absorptive capacity’ of Palestine lay in the range of 40-60 thousand 
Jewish immigrant per annum. Yet the assumption of Zionist leaders always was that the principle 
of absorptive capacity laid the ground for continued and steady Jewish immigration and 
ultimately the creation of a Jewish majority. The Peel Commission report however determined 
that “the principle of economic absorptive capacity …  is at present inadequate and ignores 
factors in the situation which wise statesmanship cannot disregard. Political, social and 
psychological factors should be taken into account.” The report outlined a new approach – a 
“high level” of Jewish immigration, meaning that Jews under no circumstances become more 
numerous than a certain percentage of the population defined by the British government. The 
report put that number at 12,000 Jewish immigrants per year for the next five years.324 This new 
policy approach culminated in the adoption of the 1939 White Paper. The White Paper capped 
Jewish immigration at 10,000 immigrants per year (with an additional 25,000 certificates for 
Jewish refugees on humanitarian grounds) and capped the “high level” of the Jewish population 
in Palestine at 30%.325 This conception - that the Jewish population in Palestine would not 
exceed some 30% of the population - was widespread in British policy and intellectual circles in 
the 1930s. This new immigration policy took shape at the same time as the Jewish refugee 
problem from Nazi Germany became more acute and as Eastern European governments were 
advocating for the ‘evacuation’ of masses of their Jewish citizens.  
On the eve of the war then Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the future prospects of Zionism 
was that of great despair. He recognized that Eastern Europe Jewry is “being chocked and 																																																								
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destroyed” but also that the Zionist movement cannot offer a solution to this growing Jewish 
problem.326 In his testimony before the Peel Commission Ben-Gurion in fact acknowledged that 
even under condition of favorable cooperation with the British government it may take 30-40 
years to bring a critical mass of millions of Jews from Eastern Europe to Palestine.327 Privately 
Ben-Gurion remarked that at most the Zionist movement could succeed in bringing tens of 
thousands of Jews to Palestine in the near future.328 The failure of the Zionist movement to offer 
a site of refuge for European Jews at the moment of their greatest crisis, Ben-Gurion lamented in 
a riveting May 1938 speech, may make the whole Zionist enterprise obsolete in the eyes of Jews 
and European governments. Zionism, he declared, will soon become devoid of “its political 
value” and “fall off the international stage” as a solution to the Jewish problem.329  
 
Weizmann and Zionist Binationalism  
Much like Ben-Gurion, from the late 1920s until the late 1930s Weizmann too supported a vision 
of Palestine as a bi-national Arab-Jewish state. In fact, the vision Weizmann proposed during this 
period was much closer to the bi-nationalism of Brit Shalom than the parity proposals of Ben-
Gurion. Whereas Ben-Gurion insisted that under no circumstances will Jews enjoy less than 50% 
percent political representation in the future state in Palestine, and never yielded from his 
commitment to establish a Jewish majority, Weizmann proposed a state with minority Jewish 
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representation - around 40%, and publicly doubted the feasibility of establishing a Jewish 
majority in Palestine.330   
Weizmann’s support for a bi-national political arrangement in Palestine during the 1930s 
marked a significant departure from the vision of Zionism he had advocated for during and after 
the First World War and in the early 1920s. Weizmann was the key architect of the 1917 Balfour 
Declaration. For Weizmann the Balfour declaration promised nothing short of a British 
commitment to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Palestine was to be Jewish, he argued at the 
1919 Paris Peace Conference, as much as Britain was British.331 Weizmann envisioned the 
British mandate as transitory regime until a significant Jewish population center is established in 
Palestine.332 In the early 1920s, as the British began to limit Jewish immigration and increasingly 
sought to accommodate Arab aspirations in Palestine, Weizmann came tor realize that his vision 
of imminent Jewish statehood was no longer feasible. Still, he continued to advocate for the 
establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine through a slow and gradual process of 
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immigration in cooperation with the British mandatory authorities and in accordance with the so-
called absorptive capacity of the land.333 
From the late 1920s, however, Weizmann had begun to express growing doubts over the 
feasibility of establishing a Jewish majority in Palestine. The major 1927 financial crisis in the 
Yishuv - which led to a significant wave of Jewish out-migration - challenged his evolutionary 
approach that saw Jewish settlement as growing in tandem with the economic development and 
increasing absorptive capacity of the land.334 And similarly to Ben-Gurion, after the 1929 riots, 
Weizmann became convinced that British policy was moving in the direction of establishing a 
legislative council and an Arab majority state in Palestine. During this period Weizmann began 
to advocate for a bi-national Jewish-Arab state, convinced that ‘time was running out’ and that 
the Zionist movement ought to reach a constitutional agreement over the future of Palestine. 
Indeed, from 1929 until the mid 1930s Weizmann described himself as a bi-nationalist and as 
ideologically akin to Brit Shalom. Much like Brit Shalom, Weizmann realized that a new 
constitutional arrangement in Palestine would mean that Jews would remain a minority. Unlike 
Brit Shalom, however, Weizmann doubted such an agreement could be reach directly with Arab 
leaders and insisted that what mattered most for Zionist aspirations was receiving the support of 
the British government. 
 Already in a 1927 speech Weizmann spoke about Palestine as a ‘common homeland’ for 
Jews and Arabs.335 Two years later, Weizmann reiterated his support for Palestine as a ‘common 
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homeland’ in a speech he delivered at the Central Asian Society in London, and argued that the 
creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine need not necessarily be the end goal of the Zionist 
movement. Jews, Weizmann argued, only demand that the British authorities fulfill the promise 
of the mandate “and it is impossible to tell if that would lead to the establishment of a majority.” 
Moreover, Weizmann insisted that it was important that Palestine be based on a political 
arrangement in which Jews do not rule over others and would not be ruled over by others.336 
Several months later, in a letter he sent Robert Weltsch, editor of the influential Berlin-based 
Juedische Rundchau and a prominent supporter of Brit Shalom, Weizmann expounded on his 
newfound support for bi-nationalism. In this letter Weizmann portrayed his support for this 
vision as his lifelong conviction rather than a more recent development. “As to the principles of 
future policy in Palestine and cooperation with the Arabs on bi-national lines,” Weizmann wrote, 
“I have never swerved from it, and knowing very well that it is unpopular amongst the Zionist I 
have never hesitated in giving expression to my views: I have done it only recently in a speech 
delivered before the Central Asian Society.”337  
Several months later Weizmann explained the grounds for his support for bi-nationalism 
in a letter to his friend and bi-nationalism supporter James Marshall, the son of American-Jewish 
leader Louis Marshall. In this letter Weizmann elaborated on these views and expounded on his 
pessimistic interpretation of the prospects of Zionism. Weizmann observed how the international 
moral climate regarding Zionism transformed between 1917 and 1930. At the time of the Balfour 
declaration, Weizmann reminisced, no international observer had asked for the consent of the 
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Arabs for Jewish settlement in Palestine. The Jewish national home was intended to be a Jewish 
state with the Arab population enjoying equality of rights as individuals rather than as a national 
group. Indeed, for the expression of their nationality the Arabs in Palestine were expected to turn 
to “the surrounding Arab countries - Syria, Iraq, Hedjaz, etc.” “Was that a dream? I do not know. 
I mention these facts of almost contemporary history, as history only, without wishing to put 
them forward, still less to press them, as a postulate. Let them stand as a landmark of the ground 
which has been lost in these ten years ...” “Now” Weizmann lamented, “we should be content 
with a bi-national state, provided it was truly bi-national. … But equality in rights between 
partners as yet very unequal in numbers, requires careful thought and constant watching. 
Palestine is to be shared by two nations: one is there already in full strength, while the other so 
far a mere vanguard has reached it.” “The force of inertia,” Weizmann argued, “works in favor 
of the Arabs … While we accept the principle of equality between Jews and Arabs in the future 
Palestinian State, the Arabs press for having that State constituted immediately, because 
circumstances would enable them now to distort it into an Arab dominion from which no path 
would lead us back to real equality.”338 
Between l927 and 1929, when Weizmann publicly spoke about his support for 
binationalism he used the vague term ‘a common homeland’ - a term that, incidentally, was also 
officially used in the 1921 Twelfth Zionist Congress to describe the Zionist vision of Jewish-
Arab relations in Palestine, and thus could be interpreted by observers as not deviating from the 
official Zionist policy of his day.339 In August 1930, however, at the time in which the Hope 
Simpson Commission was reviewing British policy in Palestine in the wake of the riots, 
Weizmann first publicly employed the concept of Palestine as a specifically bi-national Jewish-																																																								
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Arab state in speech before the World Zionist Actions Committee. “We must agree to Palestine 
becoming a bi-national state,” Weizmann declared, “it is impossible to continue the talk about a 
Jewish State as we did during the period when the world was engaged in war. Our present slogan 
must be ‘peaceful cooperation.'”340 Zionist leaders, Weizmann argued, must change their “mental 
outlook and ... consider reality … We cannot drive the Arabs out of Palestine. Two nations must 
exist in Palestine.” The aim of the Zionist movement, Weizmann added, “is not a Jewish State” 
but “the creation of the material foundation for an autonomous and productive Jewish unit.”341 
Several weeks after Weizmann delivered this speech, the Simpson Report and the new 
Passfield White Paper were published and confirmed Weizmann’s greatest fears. The new 
British policy called to significantly limit Jewish immigration and land purchases and establish a 
legislative council in Palestine. Viewing the Passfield White Paper as a personal failure, 
Weizmann tendered his resignation from the presidency of the Jewish Agency and the World 
Zionist Organization.342 Over the course of the following months, contacts by Weizmann and 
British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald led to the issuance in 1931 of the Macdonald letter as 
an official British interpretation of the Passfield White Paper - the letter in effect cancelled the 
White Paper clauses against Jewish immigration and land purchases.343 But even as British 
policy reverted to a more favorable line, Weizmann remained steadfast in his conviction that 
there was no alternative to formulating a long-term policy for Palestine along bi-national lines. In 
May 1931 Weizmann expressed these sentiments in a letter to his friend Gisela Warburg. 																																																								
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“Perhaps I was too far ahead of the other Zionists; they are still stuck with the illusions of the 
utopian time of Zionism, as it was 25 years ago. I probably see too much of the difficult realities 
of life here, and of the political situation.” “650,000 Arabs live in Palestine,” Weizmann wrote, 
“they do not want to let us in and their numbers increase every day … And all the while we tear 
each other to pieces in barren discussion about the long term final aims [i.e., the creation of a 
Jewish state]. I have lost all illusions in these 15 years of unceasing efforts. No manna drops 
from heaven for us. And God will not destroy the enemies in our path. We live in a cold, hard 
epoch; miracles do not occur; we have to earn everything by hard and bitter work.”344 
In early July, just a week ahead of the Seventeenth Zionist Congress, Weizmann’s views 
became a topic of a heated debate in Zionist circles. In interview with the Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency Weizmann expressed his supports for the creation of a legislative council based on 
Jewish-Arab political parity. Weizmann added in the interview that he is not committed to the 
establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine and that the insistence of Zionist leaders – 
referring mainly to Jabotinsky - to publicly lay out such a demand could be construed by outside 
observers as an expression of support for the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine.345 Weizmann’s 
statement was a cause of much uproar in the opening session of the congress. Facing accusations 
from prominent delegates at the congress that he abandoned the Zionist cause, Weizmann 
clarified his statement and apologized for insinuating that those who argue for a Jewish majority 
also support Arab expulsion.346 But Weizmann nonetheless remained committed to the other 
principles he outlined in the interview. In his speech at the congress Weizmann reiterated his 																																																								
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support for a future Palestine based on political equality between “two autonomous cultural” 
units which do not rule over one another regardless of each’s groups demographic proportion of 
the population.347 Moreover, in a proposal he submitted to the political committee at the congress 
Weizmann suggested that the Zionist movement should consent to the creation of a legislative 
council with 40% Jewish representation - in other word, for a status of a minority in Palestine. 
Though Weizmann had hoped to regain his seat as president of the World Zionist Organization at 
the congress, the delegates rejected his candidacy. 
Over the course of 1932, still deeply alarmed by the prospect for Zionism, Weizmann 
sought to promote his vision of a bi-national state in Palestine through direct negotiations with 
Wauchope. As he reported to Chaim Arlosoroff, head of the political department of the Jewish 
Agency, in an October 1932 letter, the British government intends to quickly move forward with 
the legislative council plan - Weizmann estimated the government would establish the council by 
the end of 1933. Warning against an attitude of rejectionism in Zionist circles, Weizmann 
proposed that Zionist leaders should seek to shape the council plan. Wauchope had told 
Weizmann that a fifty-fifty representation was out of the question, but that the council will not be 
allowed to legislate policy on immigration and land purchases. Weizmann responded that it was 
impossible to protect against such legislation in advance. Weizmann then proposed to Arlosoroff 
that they should press Wauchope for the 60%-40% representation plan he first proposed at the 
Zionist congress, and hope to renegotiate the terms of representation when the Jewish population 
grows.348 Arlosoroff shared Weizmann’s pessimistic outlook on the direction of British policy. In 
a response letter to Weizmann, Arlosoroff observed that similar councils had been recently 
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established in Iraq and Syria and that the British will thus imminently move in such a direction in 
Palestine. Unlike Weizmann, however, Arlosoroff rejected the idea of compromise. The 
prospects for Zionism had become so dire, he argued, that the only remaining alternative to 
protect the future of Zionism was a coup d’etat in Palestine - the establishment of a Jewish 
government by force until Jews establish a majority.349 
Between 1933-1935, as Weizmann witnessed the large-scale immigration of 150,000 
Jews to Palestine during the so-called Fifth Aliyah, his pessimistic attitude waned. Weizmann 
hoped hundreds of thousands more Jews could be brought to Palestine in the coming years. 
When Wauchope revived the legislative council scheme again during 1935 and early 1936, 
Weizmann thus embraced a policy of deliberate confusion aimed at delaying the plan - writing to 
Macdonald that Jewish-Arab parity was now “out of the question” and later to Wauchope that he 
opposed the plan because it was not based on Jewish-Arab political parity.350 Weizmann’s 
optimism however had its limits. The success of Jewish immigration depended on the support of 
the British authorities and as Weizmann knew very well Wauchope had no intention of letting 
Jews form a majority in Palestine. Wauchope’s policy was a clear example of what Weizmann at 
times referred to as the British divide and rule approach. As noted earlier, Wauchope had 
planned to let enough Jews in to offset Zionist fears of being a small minority in an Arab 
majority Palestine while instilling enough alarm among Palestinian Arabs over the growth of the 
Jewish Yishuv as to push them to compromise. This policy blew up in mid-1936 with the 
outbreak of the Arab Revolt. Weizmann, fearing as in 1929 a change in course of British policy, 																																																								
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reverted to his compromise approach. In June that year Weizmann considered accepting the Arab 
demand for a complete suspension of Jewish immigration for a certain period of time and 
discussed this matter with Nuri Pasha al-Said, prime minister of Iraq.351 He wrote former High 
Commissioner Samuel that he is willing to negotiate a cap on Jewish immigration at 40,000 
certificates a year for the next ten years, so long as the British will not renounce their 
commitment to ultimately let Jews immigrate in accordance with the absorptive capacity of the 
land.352 When the British announced they will send to Palestine a new Royal Commission, 
Weizmann revived his parity plan as a framework for a new policy in Palestine for the next ten to 
fifteen years.353 And in his August 1936 statement before the Palestine Royal Commission, 
Weizmann argued that Zionist leaders will agree to the formation of a legislative council on the 
basis of Jewish and Arab autonomies and under some specific constitutional guarantees, 
referring it seems to his 10-15 parity framework plan.354 Though Weizmann was still proposing a 
compromise based on some form parity, he was no longer willing to contemplate a status for 
Jews as a minority with less than equal representation as he suggested in the early 1930s - the 
massive demographic growth of the Yishuv precluded that possibility in his view.355 Much like 
Ben-Gurion, in 1937 Weizmann enthusiastically endorsed the Peel Commission recommendation 
to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. But Weizmann’s great hopes over the partition 
plan dissipated just a few months after the publication of the report, as he sensed that the British 																																																								
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were abandoning the plan and that “a new political orientation is in the air” - the “acceptance of 
the Arab demand for the establishment in Palestine of an independent Arab State and the 
reduction of the Jews to the status of a permanent minority, to be guaranteed by the 
euphemistically termed ‘minority rights’.”356 This new policy culminated with the publication of 
the 1939 White Paper. On the eve of the Second World War, then, the grave fears that led 
Weizmann from the late 1920s to promote a policy of compromise along bi-national lines 
became the political reality - the White Paper stipulated that Palestine was to turn into an Arab 
state within ten years. 
 
Conclusion  
As we have seen in this chapter, during the 1930s both Ben-Gurion and Weizmann supported 
turning Palestine into a form of a bi-national Jewish-Arab state based on separate autonomies for 
the Jewish and Arab communities. Ben-Gurion, Weizmann and Zionist leaders’ support for the 
vision of Jewish-Arab parity in Palestine ought to be understood in the context of their general 
ideological rejection of ethnic nationalism in the interwar years and commitment to establish in 
Palestine a dream version of the state of nationalities Jews were clamoring for in Eastern Europe. 
But it was only in the 1930s - as they became convinced that the British were reneging on the 
vision of the Balfour deceleration and were committed to establish in Palestine a majority Arab 
state with Jews remaining a minority – that these federal, bi-national and autonomist visions 
shifted from the realm of theory and ideology to become concrete political proposals. During the 
1930s Ben-Gurion and Weizmann concluded that the Zionist movement faced only two 
alternatives – either establishing in Palestine a shared Jewish-Arab state or remaining a minority 																																																								
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in a majority Arab state.  
 Zionist leaders were not altogether wrong in their political assessments. The 1939 White 
Paper confirmed their greatest fears and publicly stated that the British Empire seeks to establish 
in Palestine an independent Palestinian state with an Arab majority within ten years. The White 
Paper Policy remained in effect throughout the Second World War and in fact was reaffirmed by 
the British governments in 1945 as its vision for the future of Palestine after the war. As we shall 
see in the next chapter that focuses on the first wartime years, it was only after the outbreak of 
war that Zionist leaders for the first time publicly laid out a plan for the creation of a Jewish 
ethnic-nation state in Palestine. Expecting millions of Jewish refugees in postwar Europe, Zionist 
leaders hoped that they could transfer millions of Jews to Palestine after the war and radically 
transformed the Jewish-Arab demographic balance, establishing a state with a Jewish majority 
larger than they had ever before believed was possible.  
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Chapter Four  




In a May 1942 conference in New York, Zionist leaders from the United States and Palestine 
adopted the ‘Biltmore program’. This program, which had been formulated by David Ben-
Gurion, chairman of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, and Chaim Weizmann, president of 
World Zionist Organization, called for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish Commonwealth 
and for the immigration of millions of Jewish refugees to Palestine after the war. The Biltmore 
program was the first time the Zionist movement publicly laid out a program for the 
establishment of a Jewish nation-state. One of the most poignant responses to the Biltmore 
program was written by Shlomo Kaplinsky, a Zionist socialist leader and between 1927-1929 
head of the settlement department of the Zionist executive. In 1939 Kaplisnky was appointed by 
the Jewish Agency to head the Committee on Jewish-Arab Relations, tasked with outlining 
policy recommendations for a Jewish-Arab agreement in Palestine. In a lecture delivered in 
Haifa, Kaplinsky criticized the Biltmore program as a retreat from a broad-based consensus 
among Zionist leaders in the 1930s in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a bi-national 
state consisting of separate autonomy for Jews and Arabs and based on political ‘parity’ - equal 
representation for each national group within a future legislator regardless of its proportion in the 
country’s population. Kaplinsky had begun to promote such a program already in the early 1920s 
but faced opposition within the ranks of his party. From the late 1920s however, as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, prominent Zionist leaders such as Ben-Gurion and Weizmann had too 
embraced the vision of Jewish-Arab parity. During the 1930s ‘parity’ had in fact become the 
official political program of some of the main political institutions in the Yishuv. The Biltmore 
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program, Kaplinsky lamented in his speech, had now replaced the consensus on parity with 
“patriotic chatter” and a “policy of deceit.” The Biltmore vision could never come into being, he 
argued, because it contradicted the very bi- national reality in Palestine.357  
This chapter reconstructs the origins of the Biltmore program in Ben-Gurion’s and 
Weizmann’s thought from Kaplinsky’s point of view – as a shift from the dominance of federal 
and bi-national visions in Zionist thought on the future of Palestine to an embrace of a Jewish 
nation-state program. Scholarship on the origins of the Biltmore program has generally portrayed 
the program as the culmination of a long-planned Zionist vision of establishing a Jewish nation-
state.358 But such accounts overlook the novelty of the idea of a Jewish ethnic nation-state, and 
more specifically, how it emerged out of Zionist leader’s wartime analysis of the future of Jews 
after the war and the changing ethnic landscape and visions of nationalism in Eastern Europe.  
As we shall see in this chapter, early in the war Ben-Gurion and Weizmann learned about 
the plans of the Polish and Czech governments in exile to ‘evacuate’ a large part of their prewar 
Jewish populations after the war. Expecting a Jewish refugee problem in the millions in an 
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increasingly ethnically homogenous order in postwar Eastern Europe, Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann laid out a plan for the immigration of millions of Jewish refugees to Palestine. 
Between the wars Zionist leaders promoted the selective immigration of Jewish pioneers and 
middle class professional to Palestine, and expected it would take several decades of a favorable 
Jewish immigration rate for Jews to equal or slightly outnumber the Arab population in 
Palestine. Yet by early 1940 Zionist leaders embraced a radically new demographic calculus. A 
massive postwar Jewish statelessness problem in Eastern Europe, they argued, will allow them to 
establish a Jewish majority in Palestine larger than they had ever before anticipated was possible 
and significantly outnumber the Arab population in Palestine. The prospects of an overwhelming 
Jewish majority in Palestine also transformed Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s visions of Jewish-
Arab relations. As we have seen in chapter 2, early in the war Jabotinsky abandoned his interwar 
support for a future state in Palestine with extensive autonomy for Jews and Arabs and advocated 
for the expulsion of the Arab population from Palestine after the war. During the early years of 
the war Weizmann too supported large-scale Arab transfer, and Ben-Gurion disavowed of his 
interwar support for visions of Jewish-Arab parity. Historians such as Benny Morris have 
carefully surveyed the views of prominent Zionist leaders on the issue of population transfers 
and Jewish-Arab relations in the future Jewish state, yet it is remarkable that scholars have 
overlooked the critical wartime Eastern European context that gave rise to a new vision of a 
Jewish ethnic nation-state.359 
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From an Arab State to a Jewish State 
The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 galvanized grave fears among Zionist leaders 
over the fate of European Jewry, but it also spurred new hopes for the future. Just as the First 
World War brought about the Balfour Declaration, Zionist leaders argued, the aftermath of the 
present war could offer an opportunity to radically reshape British and international policies in 
favor of Zionism and halt the drift toward the establishment of an Arab majority state in 
Palestine as laid out in the 1939 White Paper.360 Zionist leaders viewed the war a break in 
historical time, a chance to change the direction of history, and throughout the war were 
consumed by debates over the postwar order. Just days after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Ben-
Gurion reminisced about Jewish achievements in the First World War and declared “the World 
War of 1914-1918 brought us the Balfour declaration, this time we need to bring about a Jewish 
state.”361 The protocols of the Jewish Agency Executive that met regularly in Jerusalem during 
the war deal repeatedly with the future of Zionism after the war. “When historians of the Jews 
will read the protocols … of this war,” observed a member of the executive in 1941,“they will be 
amazed by the intellectual grandeur of this executive, that during such a painful storm dedicated 
itself to planning” for the future of Zionism and the Jews after the war.362 “Have we become 
paralyzed? Have we lost the sense of danger?” Labor Zionist leader Berl Katzenlson criticized 
the mood of optimism in Zionist circles in an April 1942 speech. “We live, we discuss, we 
debate with each other … but all we talk about is what would happen after the war.” “I am not 
against those who talk about the tomorrow. I only speak out against those who run away from 
engaging with the today.” Katzenslon feared that the fixation in the Yishuv on the future came at 																																																								
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the expense of preparing for the dangers of the present - in early 1942 the specter of a Nazi 
invasion of Palestine still seemed imminent.363 
 Zionist leaders’ optimism about the future was based on a single assumption that 
dominated their thought in the early years of the war – they believed millions of Jewish refugees 
would remain stateless in postwar Eastern Europe and that the only solution to this massive 
refugee problem would be found in their the resettlement in Palestine. Plans for large-scale 
resettlement of Jews from Eastern European were repeatedly proposed and discussed during the 
mid to late 1930s. Eastern European governments – mainly Poland but also Romania and 
Hungary – spoke about millions of ‘excess’ Jewish citizens, and advocated for their resettlement 
in territories outside Europe. From 1933 Nazi Germany began to limit and ultimately strip 
Jewish of their citizenship rights, effectively expelling some 400,000 Jewish refugees from the 
territories of the expanding German Reich. At the same time, Zionist leaders advocated for the 
resettlement of masses of Jews from Eastern Europe in Palestine. In 1936 Jabotinsky famously 
laid out the ‘Evacuation plan’ and Ben-Gurion and Weizmann too variously proposed large-scale 
Jewish resettlement.364 During the 1930s however these plans repeatedly failed to materialize 
and many of their proponents regarded them as mere rhetorical calls rather than concrete and 
realizable political plans. From 1936 Britain had increasingly capped Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. And as the 1939 Evian Conference soon revealed, no country – with the exception of 
the Dominican Republic - was willing to absorb any significant number of the hundreds of 																																																								
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thousands of Jewish refugee in Europe, let alone the millions more Eastern European states 
claimed should be ‘evacuated.’ The war, Zionist leaders believed, had radically transformed the 
scale of the Jewish problem in Europe. Throughout Eastern Europe Nazi Germany had 
ghettoized and uprooted millions of Jews from their prewar homes and professions. The Polish 
and Czech governments in Exile had informed Zionist leaders early in the war they would not 
seek to economically reintegrate, and in fact actively promote the departure, of these Jewish 
masses after the war. The edifice of Jewish life in Eastern Europe had been destroyed. Zionist 
leaders thus estimated that the aftermath of the war would see the emergence of Jewish refugee 
problem in the scale of some two to five million. As Ben-Gurion put it in October 1942, “The 
tragedy of millions” of Jewish refugees in Europe “will become the redemptive force” of 
Zionism.365 
Weizmann was the first Zionist leader to gain comprehensive knowledge of the extent of 
the expected postwar Jewish refugee problem. As we have seen in chapter I, between 1940-1941 
Polish and Czech leaders had privately expressed to Jewish leaders their plans to ‘evacuate’ a 
significant portion of their pre-war Jewish population after the war. Edward Beneš, president of 
the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, told Chaim Weizmann in December 1941 that the 
country’s Jewish population would have to be “diluted” by about a third after the war.” Benes 
elaborated on these views in a meeting with British Jewish historian and close-Weizmann aide 
Louis Namier who later prepared a detailed memo for Weizmann on Jewish postwar immigration 
demographics.366 Similarly, prominent leaders of the Polish Government in Exile had told Selig 																																																								
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Brodetsky, director of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, that only about a third of the 
country’s prewar population would be allowed to remain in Poland after the war and Jewish 
leaders became convinced that the Polish government would use the chaos of the postwar years 
to finally realize its plans for Jewish resettlement.367 Based on these meetings, Weizmann had 
estimated that about a third of the prewar Jewish population of Eastern Europe would become 
stateless and be in need of immigration after the war.368 Weizmann expanded on this observation 
in a January 1942 letter to Anthondy D. Rothschild. “My own conversations, and also the 
conversations that British representatives had with the Czechs and the Poles in this country, drive 
me to the conclusion that at least one-third of the Jewish population of these States cannot be re-
integrated when the states are restored.” “… [T]he Jewish people of Czechoslovakia will have to 
be thinned out to two thirds of its original density. Taking into consideration Romania, Hungary, 
Poland, and some of the Balkan states, one may assume that between 2-3 millions Jews at least 
will find themselves homeless …”.369 
Weizmann expanded on these observations in a September 1941 meeting of Jewish 
leaders in London which both Brodetsky and Namier attended. There are eight million Jews in 
countries occupied by the Nazis, Weizmann argued, and these numbers are increasing as the 
Germans advance into Russia. The Nazis are perpetrating a “physical destruction” of European 
Jewry in a rate that could not be determined, and thus there may only remain “six or seven 
million Jews after the war”. The livelihood of the Jewish middle class in Eastern Europe has 																																																								
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“gone forever.”370 Based on his conversation with leaders of Eastern European governments 
Weizmann asserted that the majority of Jews who had already been driven out of their homes 
would not be able to reclaim their property and re-integrate into their pre-war societies after the 
war. The new Poland that would be created after the war, Weizmann argued, would not seek to 
“digest” the large masses of Jews that lived in it before the war. Indeed, Weizmann added, even 
before the war Polish officials argued that there were a million or a million and half too many 
Jews in Poland. After the war there would thus remain two and a half to three million Jews in 
Europe “for whom the only solution could be Palestine.”371 
Weizmann outlined a vision for large-scale postwar immigration of these refugees aimed 
at resettling them in Palestine. Weizmann proposed that first the young Jewish survivors should 
immigrate to Palestine at a rate of about 100,000 per year. The remainder of the Jewish 
population in Europe would prepare for their immigration in training camps in their prewar 
countries. Weizmann argued that the prospect of the imminent immigration of the Jewish masses 
from Eastern Europe would alleviate tensions and anti-Jewish sentiments in those countries, 
which would allow them to remain there until they would be able to immigrate. Weizmann’s 
immigration plan reflected a significant shift from the scale of immigration he proposed during 
the 1930s. His most radical proposal, laid out in response the 1937 Peel Commission report, 
envisioned the immigration of 50-60 thousands Jews to Palestine per year. But there is reason to 
believe Weizmann doubted the feasibility of that radical plan at the time. In a 1937 conversation 
with Polish foreign minister Jozef Beck, Weizmann had argued that the Polish government could 
not expect Palestine to be able to absorb more than 25-30 thousand Jewish immigration per 
																																																								





year.372 Weizmann’s new plan thus saw the immigration of four times the number of Jews per 
year than he believed could be settled in Palestine in the late 1930s. This new plan reflected his 
recognition of the enormity of the postwar Jewish refugee problem and his realization, as Namier 
and Brodetsky put it in the meeting, that large-scale removal of Jews from Eastern Europe will 
take place alongside the shifting of millions of minorities after the war.373  
In July 1941 Weizmann publicly laid out for the first the demand for the establishment of 
a Jewish state after the war that would offer a solution to what he argued would be “the greatest 
mass migrations in the history of mankind as a result of Jewish homelessness.”374 In January 
1942 he expanded on his vision of a future Jewish state in detail in an article “Palestine’s Role in 
the Solution of the Jewish Problem” published in Foreign Affairs. In this article Weizmann laid 
out a new vision of Zionism: the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine will no longer develop as a national 
center alongside but rather come to replace the Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe and 
the failed protections of minority rights. “In the reconstruction of the new and - let us hope - 
better world,” Weizmann argued, “the reintegration of the Jew will ... present a peculiarly 
difficult problem, and one which which is likely to tax both the energies and the good will of the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.” “The experience of the past twenty years, and the 
vexed problem of “minorities” which has caused so much trouble in Europe, hardly give much 
ground for a satisfactory solution on the spot.” The only solution for the millions of Jewish 
refugees after the war, Weizmann declared, lay in their immigration to Palestine.375  
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Similarly to Weizmann, Ben-Gurion too had reached early in the war the conclusion that 
the aftermath of the war would necessitate the immigration of millions of Jewish refugees to 
Palestine. And like Weizmann, Ben-Gurion too shared the view that this would be a product of 
the changing ethnic landscape of Eastern Europe after the war and the inability of millions of 
Jewish refugees to reintegrate into their former homes. As he put it in a February 1941 speech, 
even if Poland and Romania will restore equal rights for the Jews after the defeat of Hitler, “no 
one will ever believe” that they will also work to reconstruct the Jewish communities and restore 
their livelihood and property, “and this will be the case throughout Europe.”376 Ben-Gurion was 
well aware of the plans of the Polish and Czech Governments in Exile to expel a significant 
number of their prewar Jewish population after the war. In early 1942 Ben-Gurion met Lord 
Moyne, British minister for the Middle East, who informed him that the exiled governments are 
planning to get rid of some three millions Jews after the war.377 In an October 1942 Zionist 
executive meeting Ben-Gurion shared a report on Benes’ plans for the Jews after the war.378 And 
Ben-Gurion also dismissed the efforts of what he termed the ‘court Jews’ in Poland to press the 
Allies to achieve new guarantees for minority rights.379 “Do you believe Jews will go back to 
their towns in Poland and that the rich Poles will integrate them, build them new homes? Do you 
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asked the members of the Jewish Labor Committee in December 1942 who accused him of 
giving up on the fight for Jewish rights in Europe, “I do not believe that will be the case.”380 
Carefully attuned to wartime debates on population transfers, Ben-Gurion argued that the 
failure of Jews to reintegrate into postwar Eastern Europe would be part of the broader efforts of 
the Allies and Eastern European states to create of a new, ethnically homogenous order in the 
region without ethnic minorities. “In the present war the idea of the transfer of populations,” 
Ben-Gurion observed in 1941, “is steadily gaining in popularity as the surest and most practical 
means of solving the thorny and dangerous problem of national minorities.” “The war has 
already brought about the resettlement of large numbers of peoples in East and South Europe,” 
he added, “and in the plans of the post-war settlement, large-scale transfer of populations in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe are taking an increasingly important role.”381 In his 
meeting with Moyne, Moyne had in fact proposed resettling millions of Jews in Prussian 
territory from which Germans will be expelled after the war. Ben-Gurion later reported on the 
meeting to the Zionist executive and shared his assessment of Allied plans for population shifts 
in Eastern Europe. “[the Allies] are planning on uprooting millions of people after the war, their 
plan is to establish a new order in Europe that will last once and for all,” he argued, “they will 
take revenge at the Germans - not a single German will remain outside Germany, … there’s 
Hungary, Romania, they plan to settle the fate of those countries through large scale population 
transfers.”382 
Within this emerging postwar reality, Ben-Gurion argued, the only solution for the 
millions of Jewish refugees in postwar Europe will be what he termed a “Jewish transfer,” the 																																																								
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large-scale resettlement of millions of Jews in Palestine within a few short years. In October 
1941 Ben-Gurion laid out this vision in detail in a memo entitled “Notes on Zionist Policy,” a 25 
page essay – the longest of his political writings - on his plans for the future of Zionism after the 
war.383 Most remarkable about this document is Ben-Gurion’s argument that the creation of a 
Jewish state through the transfer of the Jewish masses from Eastern Europe to Palestine reflected 
not the culmination, but a radical reformulation, of the goals and the meaning of the Zionist 
movement. Ben-Gurion offered a new narrative of Zionist history divided into two periods and 
punctuated by the transformative effect of the war. The first period, spanning forty years - not 
incidentally for Ben-Gurion who was enthralled by biblical mythology the span of a biblical 
generation and the number of years Moses wandered the desert before he brought the Jewish 
people from Egypt to the cusp of the promised Land of Israel – was marked by the salience of 
the spiritual center approach. As we have seen in chapter 3, during this period Ben-Gurion saw 
Jewish settlement in Palestine developing as a form of Jewish autonomy through gradual 
immigration of Jewish pioneers. The outbreak of war now offered an opportunity to begin a new 
period in Zionist history – the period of the nation-state.  “Zionism today can no longer mean 
what it has meant  … in the past forty year,” he wrote, that is “the orientation of a spiritual center 
in Palestine, effected through moderate Jewish immigration.” “Zionism today can no longer 
mean even just a Jewish majority in Palestine, as the Revisionist maintained for some time – 
because the immediate need of the Jews for a country of their own is not to be measured by of 
Arabs who happen to be in Palestine, but by the number of Jews – many times greater – who 
have been completely and hopelessly uprooted form many countries of the Diaspora.” Instead, 
Ben-Gurion declared, the Zionist movement should strive to create s state through large scale 
Jewish immigration of the Jewish masses from Eastern Europe to Palestine. “Given a Jewish 																																																								
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state, I see no reason why such a number should not be absorbed there, not over a long period of 
years, but within a short time, that is within several years, as was done in Greece, as an 
immediate, planned, state undertaking.” In an October 1942 meeting of the Zionist executive, 
Ben-Gurion further elaborated on his point. “I have revised my understanding of Zionism after 
the war. We must stop thinking in the terms of the past …”. “The fundamental aspect of those 
terms,” he argued, “was that we viewed Zionism as a gradual process, a historical process 
spanning over many years, we thought that first we will bring over 1,000 Jews per year, then 
10,000 Jews per year, then we might get to several tens of thousands until we reach 50,000 per 
year, and if anyone spoke about 100,000 per year then that was considered a very large number. 
We cannot continue with this process after the war.” “… The role of Zionism after the war … is 
to transfer two million Jews to Palestine, the entire young generation of Europe. … such a large 
scale transfer already took place in our lifetime, 2 million Greeks were resettled in Greece in 18 
months.”384 Several months later Ben-Gurion articulated these ideas again and invoked post-
World War I Greece as his example for the future of Zionism. “Twenty years ago a massive 
transfer of close to two million Greeks from Turkey to European Greece took place,” Ben-
Gurion declared, “this did no last more than eighteen month.” “The question must be asked: why 
would we be prevent from carrying out such a quick to transfer of masses of Jews from Europe’s 
ghettos to Eretz Yisrael?״385 
 
From Parity to Jewish Rule  
The specter of transferring millions of Jews to Palestine after the war forced Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann to radically rethink their vision of Jewish-Arab relations. Their various interwar 																																																								
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proposals for political parity and Jewish and Arab autonomies were based on the assumption that 
Jews will likely remain a minority in Palestine for decades to come. After the outbreak of war 
however they began to imagine a radically different demographic scenario. Within a few short 
years, they argued, Jews could constitute a decisive majority in Palestine – a shift from some 
20%-30% of the population on the eve of the war to 70%-80% in the immediate postwar years.  
 Though both Ben-Gurion and Weizmann repeatedly emphasized their continued 
commitment to Arab equality and national autonomy in the future Jewish state, they completely 
ruled out the idea of a Jewish-Arab power sharing arrangement and the vision of political parity. 
Ben-Gurion in fact had begun to downplay the sincerity of his interwar support for parity, 
arguing that he never intended for parity to be the final political arrangement in Palestine but 
only an interim program under the mandate. “I was one of those who strongly advocated parity 
between Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate,” Ben-Gurion observed in his Biltmore 
conference speech, “but I doubt whether a regime of parity without a mandatory is practicable, or 
whether a self-governing state can operate at all under such a system, which may mean a 
permanent deadlock.”386 Political parity, Ben-Gurion argued in an October 1942 Zionist 
executive meeting, “is a form of absurdity, there is not a single state in the world organized on 
the basis of this principle.”387 “I supported parity under mandate rule – when a third party could 
make decisions, then we said; we cannot remain a minority …”. In a subsequent meeting of the 
Zionist executive Moshe Sharett, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, reported 
that several British officials are considering the idea of Jewish-Arab parity after the war. Werner 
Senator, a member of the executive and a supporter of Bit Shalom in the 1930s, argued that the 
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Zionist movement should respond positively to these proposals – the concept of parity had been 
a core principle of the Zionist movement between the wars.388 Moreover, Senator added, there 
was no guarantee the Zionist movement would succeed in gaining international support for the 
transfer of two million Jews to Palestine - Zionist policy should thus also consider the possibility 
that Jews could remain for a time a minority. Ben-Gurion rejected these proposals. Parity, he 
insisted, was now entirely out of the question. After the war there will remain only two 
alternatives – either Palestine becomes an Arab state as currently intended or it becomes a Jewish 
state. In his Biltmore conference speech, Ben-Gurion warned about the grave dangers for Jews as 
a minority in a future Arab state in Palestine. When Haj Amin Al Husseini was asked in 1937 by 
the Royal Peel Commission whether a future Arab state would be able to “assimilate and digest” 
the Jewish community in Palestine, Ben-Gurion reminisced, he replied in the negative and 
refused to rule out the idea of expelling the Jews in a process “painful as it may be.” When 
contemplating the status of Jews as a minority in a future Arab state in Palestine, Ben-Gurion 
chillingly remarked, “we should not forget the bitter experience of the Assyrians in Iraq, to 
whom protections were guaranteed by the Anglo-Iraq treaty as well as by the League of 
Nations.”389 
 The prospects of resettling millions of Jewish refugees in Palestine also prompted a 
vigorous debate in Zionist circles over the transfer of Arabs from Palestine. As we have seen 
above, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann were deeply aware of Allied plans for postwar population 
transfers as well as the specific plans of Eastern European states to expel Jews after the war. And 
both Ben-Gurion and Weizmann realized that the resettlement of millions of Jewish refugee in 
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Palestine within a few short years would require an enormous amount of arable land and 
economic resources that may only become available at the expense of the Arab population. 
During the 1930s Ben-Gurion and Weizmann invariably considered the possibility of the 
transfer of a segment of the Arab population from Palestine. But such visions were generally 
fleeting ideas – gestured in a letter, raised briefly in a conversation with British officials - that 
never materialized into a concrete plan.390 Indeed, with the exception of the short-lived Peel 
Commission affair, at no point did Ben-Gurion and Weizmann imagine Arab transfer as a means 
of significantly shifting the demographic balance in Palestine in favor of Jews.391 The 
demographic disparity between Jews and Arab was too large to make any such vision seem 
plausible. Both remained committed to the view that the creation of a Jewish majority would be a 
slow, gradual, decades-long process. In the several instances in which they did propose Arab 
transfer, they envisioned a resettlement scheme that would concern at most tens of thousands of 
individuals. 
After the outbreak of war Weizmann had begun to vigorously advocate for the transfer of 
Arabs from Palestine and sought to gain British, American and Soviet support for such a plan. 
From 1939 through 1942 Weizmann had enthusiastically endorsed the so-called “Phillby Plan.” 
From the late 1930s Sir John Phillby, a British intelligence officer, promoted a plan for the 
incorporation of Palestine as an autonomous Jewish unit into an Arab federation led by Saudi 																																																								
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king Ibn Saud. This plan faltered in the 1930s, but after the outbreak of war Phillby believed 
conditions were set for its revival. Saudi Arabia faced a major financial crisis – mainly as a result 
of the stoppage of pilgrimage to Mecca and Medinah – and Phillby hoped Zionist leaders could 
secure funding and loans for the kingdom in exchange for Ibn Saud’s agreement to the plan. 
Phillby’s plan called the transfer of millions of Arabs from Palestine - Western Palestine, 
including Transjordan, was to be handed over to the Jews clear of its Arab population except for 
in Jerusalem.392 The Phillby plan deeply preoccupied Weizmann in the first years of the war – 
Weizmann became obsessed with its prospects and discussed it in practically all of his meetings 
with high-ranking British and American officials in the first years of the war, among them with 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Moyne and US Undersecretary of State Summner Welles.393 In these 
meetings Weizmann repeatedly raised the issue of Arab transfer from Palestine and proposed 
that Britain and the United States could convince Arab leaders to support the resettlement of 
Arabs from Palestine.394 Churchill and Roosevelt viewed the plan favorably, including its 
transfer component – but the plan fell apart in late 1942 when Ibn Saud formally rejected any 
cooperation with the Zionist movement. Still, Weizmann’s enthusiastic advocacy for the plan 
reflected the link he saw between the postwar settlement of millions of Jewish refugees in 
Palestine and the transfer of the Arab population from Palestine. As Weizmann observed in 
October 1939, when he first learned of Phillby’s plan, “The world would be faced at the end of 																																																								
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the war with a very serious Jewish problem - of Jewish populations being evacuated from East 
European countries - and the man who could supply a possible solution for this problem would 
have a considerable claim on the world for benefits in return.”395 
At the same time as Weizmann was seeking British and American support for the postwar 
transfer of Arabs, he also discussed this matter in January 1941 with Soviet Ambassador in 
London, Ivan Maiskii. In their meeting, Weizmann proposed that about a half a million Arabs 
will be transferred form Palestine after the war and suggested that two million Jews from Eastern 
Europe would be settled in their place. Maiskii’s account of the meeting offers different and 
more staggering numbers: Weizmann proposed the transfer of one million Arabs from Palestine 
and the resettlement of four millions Jews in their stead. As Weizmann put to Maiskii, Jews 
would succeed far better in cultivating Palestine – thus the same territory that previously 
sustained a million Arabs could in the future sustain millions of Jews. Maiskii observed in the 
meeting that after the war there will be large-scale population transfers in Eastern Europe, and 
Weizmann noted that the transfer of Arabs from Palestine would be easier because the distances 
are short – the Arabs will go to Transjordan or Iraq.396 Weizmann’s conversation with Maiskii 
highlights the link between planned postwar population transfers in Eastern Europe and 
Palestine. From early 1940 Maiskii repeatedly met with exiled Czechoslovak leaders in London 
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and expressed Soviet support for the expulsion of Germans from a reconstituted Czechoslovakia 
as well as for the expulsion of Germans from postwar Poland.397  
In a subsequent meeting in London with Jewish leaders Weizmann offered different 
numbers to those he presented to Maiskii. Weizmann had reported in that meeting that he had 
told Moyne that he was willing to accept the 1937 Peel Commission report without “the line” – 
that is, accepting the transfer component of the plan while scrapping its territorial partition 
aspect. That meant that the boundary of the future Jewish state would be Jordan. The transfer of 
Arabs from Palestine, Weizmann noted, “might, of course, be voluntary.” Weizmann suggested 
that if they were able to transfer out of Palestine around 120,000 Arab tenants who own no land, 
they would be able to settle in their stead about half a million Jews.398   
In his January 1942 article in Foreign Affairs Weizmann for the first time publicly 
articulated a call for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine that he had previously only privately 
discussed with Allied and Jewish leaders. While promising full equality and autonomy for the 
Arab minority in the future majority Jewish state, Weizmann nonetheless argued that “if any 
Arabs do not wish to remain in a Jewish state, any facility will be given to them to transfer to one 
of the many and vast Arab countries.”399 
Much like Weizmann, Ben-Gurion too regarded the transfer of the Arab population from 
Palestine as a potentially positive development that would facilitate the resettlement of Eastern 
European Jewry. As Ben-Gurion put it in his 1941 Notes on Zionist Policy, the problem of Arab 																																																								
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states is that “they are too sparsely populated” and thus “will be rather helped than hindered if 
they were willing to absorb the whole or part of the Palestinian Arab population.”400 In a March 
1941 meeting with the Organization of German and Austrian Jewish Immigrants in Palestine, 
Ben-Gurion laid out four visions for the future of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, the first 
being large-scale Arab transfer. “Next to Eretz Yisrael there is a purely Arab state [Transjordan] 
… you can settle there at least six million Arabs, history tells us it was once inhabited by a 
population of twenty million.” Transjodran, Ben-Gurion argued, “has room for the Arabs of 
Eretz Yisrael, especially if we and the English extend any necessary help for their resettlement: 
economic, financial political and knowledge.”401 
Still, unlike Weizmann, Ben-Gurion repeatedly insisted that Zionist leaders should 
remain mute on the issue of population transfer and avoid turning the idea of Arab transfer into 
an official part of their postwar vision. This position stemmed in part from Ben-Gurion’s sincere 
doubts over the feasibility of large-scale Arab transfer. Though “some people, in England as well 
as in America, advocate the transfer of the Palestinian Arabs to Iraq and Syria as the best 
solution of the so-called ‘Arab question’,” Ben-Gurion observed in Notes on Zionist Policy, “… 
complete transfer without compulsion – and ruthless compulsion at that – is hardly 
imaginable.”402 Indeed, this was a main reason why, though Ben-Gurion supported Phillby’s plan 
in principle, he remained deeply reluctant about its prospects – large-scale Arab transfer as 
Phillby envisioned seemed to him unfeasible.403 Moreover, Ben-Gurion argued that the 
advocates of Arab transfer who compare their vision to the planned removal of Germans from 																																																								
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Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union after the war overlook a major difference between 
the cases. Unlike the Germans “… the Arabs … are practically not belligerents, and formally 
rather ‘friends’ of the Allies ...,” it thus “could hardly be expected that victorious England will 
undertake the compulsory transfer of Arabs from Palestine merely for the benefit of the Jewish 
people.”404 Still, Ben-Gurion believed that while “the bulk of the Arab population (which is 
largely agricultural) could hardly be expected to voluntarily remove itself en masse, whatever the 
economic inducements offered” Zionist leaders could expect, and should lay out specific plans, 
for the removal of a small section of the Arab population in Palestine such as the Druze, Bedouin 
and landless agricultural workers.405 
Ben-Gurion also opposed Zionist advocacy for transfer because of the political 
ramification he believed would follow the endorsement of such a program. From the early 1920s 
the Zionist movement had claimed, Ben-Gurion argued, that Jewish settlement in Palestine need 
not come at the expense of the local Arab population. “We are proud of the fact – admitted by all 
impartial observers … that our colonization has not only not displaced Arabs, but had resulted in 
an increase of Arab populations in the area of Jewish settlement.” Moreover, Ben-Gurion 
insisted, a postwar Jewish administration in Palestine could succeed in successfully resettling 
millions of Jewish refugees without needing to displace the Arab population. By advocating for 
the transfer of Arabs, he argued, Zionists create the false impression that the success of their 
movement depends on Arab displacement, a claim that “will undermine our moral position” and 
strengthen opposition to Zionism.406  
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In a May 1941 meeting of the Zionist executive convened to discuss Ben-Gurion’s 
proposals, Mencham Usishkin, a prominent Zionist leader and a member of the executive of the 
Jewish Agency, criticized Ben-Gurion’s position as full of contradictions. Ben-Gurion proposes, 
Usishkin argued, that Zionists declare Palestine a Jewish state after the war and grant complete 
equality to the Arabs without forcibly expelling them. That is, Ussishkin argued, a “round 
square” – an implausible political conception. To settle such a large number of Jews, he argued, 
Palestine would have to be based on a Jewish government immediately after the war. But 
Palestine is a state with 80% Arabs and only 20% Jews. The only other such state in which a 
minority rules over a vast majority, Usishkin remarked, is South Africa, where a 20% white 
minority rules over a black majority without rights. Most Zionists, let alone the non-Jewish 
world, Usishskin insisted, will oppose the creation of such a state. The alternative would be the 
program Ben-Gurion opposes – creating a Jewish majority by transferring the Arabs. Indeed, in a 
subsequent meeting of the Zionist executive one of the delegates had reminded Ben-Gurion that 
Greece – Ben Gurion’s repeated example for the future of Palestine - had only succeeded in 
settling so many Greek refugees after the Great War because “they of course took the homes of 
the Turkish farmers.”407 Ben-Gurion, Ussishkin concluded, is proposing the impossible – a state 
based on minority rule that nonetheless upholds democratic principles.408 
 
Zionism and the Arab Federation   
While Ben-Gurion and Weizmann advocated for the establishment of a Jewish state, the future 
state they envisioned was not to be a completely sovereign nation-state but legally and politically 
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tied to the British Empire or to some other form of postwar federal arrangement. Indeed, the term 
state does not appear once in the Biltmore program. Instead, both Ben-Gurion and Weizmann 
employed the term “a Jewish Commonwealth,” a concept that was first used in the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference to express Zionist designs for Jewish statehood in Palestine but which was 
employed in the Biltmore program in order to keep the question of the sovereign status of the 
state deliberately ambiguous.409 
 Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s call for the establishment of a ‘Jewish commonwealth’ was 
designed in part to accommodate the political vocabulary of Zionism to a wartime atmosphere of 
growing support among Allied policy-makers and intellectuals for visions of federalism in 
postwar Europe and around the globe. As we have seen in chapter I, the war years saw an 
explosion of support for federal ideas. Policy-maker and intellectual in the United States and 
Britain, leaders of European Governments-in-Exile and resistance movements across the 
continent embraced the cause of federalism and laid out numerous programs for the 
establishment of postwar federations such a Polish-Czech federation, a Balkan Union, a United 
States of Europe, a postwar Anglo-American Union and a reformed and more inclusive British 
Commonwealth of Nations.410 Both Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were deeply aware of this 
wartime debate and more generally of the widespread critique among such policy-makers and 
intellectuals of the small state as a root causes of interwar instability in Europe. In a December 
1942 meeting of the Emergency Committee of Zionist Affairs, Weizmann explained the choice 
of the term ‘commonwealth’ as a means of accommodating the growing support for federalism in 
Allied quarters. “We are speaking of a Jewish Commonwealth in the declaration. I welcome this 																																																								
409 The concept of a “Jewish Commonwealth” was in fact used by US President Woodrow Willson in the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference to describe Zionist aspirations in Palestine. On the history of this concept see Natan Feinberg, 
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term because I believe it is more flexible than Jewish state …  the sovereignty in the old 
conception will undergo a very radical change” after the war.411 In a January 1943 letter to 
political confidante and friend Blanche Dugdale, Weizmann explained the choice of the term 
commonwealth much along these lines:  
 
The word ‘commonwealth’ was introduced because (a) it is more popular in America 
than the word ‘state’, and (b) it is considered more flexible. Whether it should be a 
commonwealth attached to the British Empire or under the trusteeship of the United 
Nations is, I think, immaterial to people here, and either opinion would largely depend 
upon the form which the whole political structure in the Middle East will take.”412 
 
Ben-Gurion too explained the choice of the term commonwealth along these lines. With regard 
to the status and external relations of the future Jewish state, Ben-Gurion wrote in ״Notes on 
Zionist Policy״, “we should for the present avoid any commitment…” “[I]t is impossible to 
foresee the political circumstances which will prevail at the end of the war, or the main outlines – 
if any – of the new world order.” “While we should not be too much affected by the prevalent 
tendency to deprecate small states,” he argued, “we should also not loose sight of the real need 
and hope of the world for greater political unity … which implies the abolition of separate 
sovereignty.”413 In his May 1942 speech in the Biltmore conference, Ben-Gurion expanded on 
the topic. “Whether Palestine should remain a separate unit or be associated with a larger and 																																																								
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2, 1942. Listed as H-188. I lost record of original archive this document was found at but likely Weizmann archive 
(their old cataloging system).  
 
412 Chaim Weizmann to Blanche Dugdale, 8 Jan. 1943, in Cohen, Chaim Weizmann, Vol XX, 386.  
 
413 Ben-Gurion, “Notes on Zionist Policy,”. 
	 190 
more comprehensive political entity - A Near Eastern Federation, British Commonwealth of 
Nations, Anglo-American Union or some other larger association - will depend on circumstances 
and developments” which cannot at the present be foreseen. Yet “we will be part of the new 
world and new pattern which, we believe, will come out of this war.”414 
 Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s embrace of the term Jewish commonwealth however 
was not merely lip service to the popular vocabulary of federalism, but reflected their genuine 
political desire to remain part of the British Empire or some other larger international unit after 
the war. This vision stemmed from their recognition that Jews constituted a minority both in 
Palestine and within the broader Arab Middle East and needed Great Power protection for the 
Yishuv’s survival. This attitude toward Great Power protection and association shaped Zionist 
thinking between the wars. Practically the entire leadership of the Zionist movement saw the 
Jewish national home in Palestine as developing under British tutelage for decades to come. This 
British orientation was most famously represented by Weizmann – who insisted that the success 
of Zionism depended on cooperation with the British at all costs. Ben-Gurion too shared this 
view. After the 1929 riots Ben-Gurion argued that the British authorities must remain in 
Palestine at all costs until Jews establish demographic and military superiority over the Arabs.415 
At the same time, prominent Zionist leaders such as Arlozoroff and Jabotinsky advocated 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s for turning Palestine into dominion within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.416 The Biltmore program did not deviate from this commitment to 
remain part of the Empire. As Ben-Gurion stated in an October 1942 meeting of the Zionist 																																																								
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executive, “I see a period in which Palestine is still under British control”.417 Zionist executive 
member Yitzhak Grunbaum observed that the term Jewish Commonwealth has “a specific 
meaning within the British Empire” and insisted that Zionist leaders “should unequivocally 
emphasize that our desire is to remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations.”418 This 
interpretation was also shared by international lawyer Nathan Feinberg who noted that the term 
Commonwealth in the Biltmore program was a deliberate reference to the inclusion of Palestine 
in “the unique structure of the nations and states untied in the British Empire.”419 Eliezer Yapo, 
Haaretz correspondent in London, carefully analyzed the Biltmore program and argued that it 
was in fact consistent with the continuation of the British mandate over Palestine after the war.420 
 Yet inasmuch as the Biltmore program was designed to accommodate the wartime 
federalist discourse and envisioned Palestine as part of the British Empire, it was also aimed to 
reject a specific vision of wartime federalism – the idea of an Arab federation in the Middle East. 
While the idea of an Arab federation originated in attempts to redesign the Middle East political 
order following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, it had become a 
widely discussed political vision and a major political trend in the early years of the Second 
World War. As Britain had become increasingly reliant on Arab support for its war effort in the 
Middle East, Arab leaders believed they could extract far-reaching concessions for the cause of 
Arab independence and advanced visions for pan-Arab political unity. In the summer of 1941 
Britain had publically announced its support for the cause of Arab unity in a speech delivered by 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. By July that year Arab leaders were already convening a 																																																								
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summit in Cairo to discuss plans for an Arab federation. And while British support for an Arab 
federation was intended primarily as a way to galvanize Arab public opinion in favor of the 
Allied invasion of Syria, discussions over an Arab federation proliferated in Arab political circles 
and in the press in Britain and the United States.421 
 Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were deeply alarmed by British support for an Arab 
federation – fearing that Britain was laying out its postwar plan for the Middle East without 
regard to the Zionist position. Some two months after Eden’s speech, Weizmann sent a heartfelt 
letter to South African prime minister Jan Smuts protesting Eden’s position, in which he laid out, 
likely for the first time outside Zionist circles, the demand for the establishment of a Jewish state 
after the war.422 Ben-Gurion, too, was prompted to publicly express his support for a Jewish state 
only in the summer of 1941, as he sensed British postwar designs for the Middle East were 
taking shape. As he put it in Notes on Zionist Policy “Our task for the present, so far as the future 
of Palestine is concerned, is rather the negative one of preventing, by all means in our power, the 
British Government from committing itself to the Arabs and from bringing Palestine within the 
orbit of the contemplated Arab federation.”423 Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, it is important to note, 
did not categorically oppose an Arab federation. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, in the 
mid-1930s Ben-Gurion had hoped to reach an agreement with Arab leaders over the inclusion of 
Palestine as an autonomous unit within an Arab federation. And Weizmann vigorously 
advocated for the Phillby plan in the first years of the war that envisaged the incorporation of 
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Palestine as a Jewish unit in an Arab federation. Yet the plan outlined by Eden in 1941 made no 
mention of a Jewish Palestine – rather, Zionist feared it reflected the continuation of the 1939 
White Paper Policy that saw Palestine developing as an Arab majority state, which in turn would 
be part of a postwar Arab federation. By advocating for a Jewish Commonwealth Ben-Gurion 
and Weizmann sought to publicly lay out an alternative to the vision of an Arab federation 
without entirely disavowing of the progressive language of federalism. 
 At the heart of the concept of the Jewish commonwealth thus lay a series of 
contradictions. The concept of the Jewish commonwealth embraced the vocabulary of wartime 
federalism and the critique of small-state nationalism but envisioned the immigration of millions 
of Jews to Palestine and the creation of a small, new Jewish ethnic nation-state. The Jewish 
commonwealth idea envisioned Palestine as integrated into a postwar federal structure in the 
region, but at the same time was designed to reject the actual federal plan the Allies were 
contemplating for the future of the Middle East.  
These series of contradictions were not lost on the numerous critics of the Biltmore 
program. One of these most poignant critics was the German-Jewish refugee and intellectual 
Hannah Arendt, who arrived in New York in May 1941 and made herself a name as a prolific 
commentator on Jewish affairs and in particular on Zionism. As Arendt put it in a 1943 essay 
“The Crisis of Zionism”, the Biltmore program laid out an anachronistic political vision for it 
called for the establishment of a Jewish state at a time in which nation-state nationalism had 
become intellectually discredited and politically irrelevant in the West. “If among Zionists 
leaders many progressives know and talk about the end of small nations and the end of 
nationalism in the old narrow European sense,” she observed, “no official document or program 
expresses these ideas”. This was because, Arendt argued, “The foundations of Zionism were laid 
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during a time when nobody could imagine any other solution of minority or nationality problems 
than the autonomous national state with homogenous population.” “Zionists are afraid,” she 
argued, “that the whole building might crack if they abandon their old ideas.”424 As she put it in 
another 1943 essay, the Biltmore program offered a particularly extreme version of the outdated 
small state nationalism model for what it proposed was the establishment of a state “based on the 
idea that tomorrow’s majority will concede minority rights to today’s majority, which indeed 
would be something brand new in the history of national-states.”425  
 Judah Leon Magnes, president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a supporter of 
Brit Shalom between the wars, emerged as the staunchest critic of the Biltmore program. In late 
1942, in response to the Biltmore conference, Manges founded Ihud, a political movement that 
rejected the Biltmore vision of a Jewish nation-state and advocated for the establishment of a bi-
national Arab-Jewish state in Palestine.426 Magnes’ program, much like the vision of the Jewish 
Commonwealth, ought to be understood in the context of wartime federalism. When Magnes 
publically articulated the Ihud program in a January 1943 article in Foreign Affairs, he called not 
simply for the establishment of a bi-national state in Palestine but for the incorporation of 
Palestine into the envisaged British sponsored Arab federation, as well as for the inclusion of this 
Arab federation within a broader post-war Anglo-American union.427 In other words, if the 																																																								
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Biltmore program was designed to reject the vision of an Arab federation, the Ihud program was 
envisioned as an endorsement of it. Indeed, Magnes first publicly laid out some of the main 
tenets of the Ihud program in a pamphlet published just three weeks after Eden’s speech on Arab 
political unity. Entitled “Palestine and the Arab Union,” Magnes’ pamphlet welcomed the British 
support for an Arab federation and called for the inclusion of Palestine as a bi-national state 
within it.428 
Magnes’ program overall sought to revive the ideas of Jewish-Arab parity that dominated 
Zionist circles in the 1930s. His plan called for a bi-national state based the principle of political 
parity and for continued Jewish immigration so long as Jews do not come to constitute more than 
40% of the population – a program he already sought to negotiate with Arab leaders in the midst 
of the 1936 Arab revolt.429 As we have seen in the previous chapter, in 1936 Weizmann too 
supported a similar program. Still, a major fact separated between the bi-national and parity 
visions of the 1930s and that promoted by Magnes early in the war. After the outbreak of war the 
bi-nationalism and parity were no longer a consensus view among Zionist leaders as they had 
been before the war. Bi-nationalism became a minority vision that for the first time emerged in 
opposition to the new vision of a Jewish ethnic nation-state.  
 
Biltmore as Political Utopia  
As we have seen in this chapter, after the outbreak of war Ben-Gurion and Weizmann abandoned 
the various visions of Jewish-Arab power sharing in Palestine that dominated their thinking in 
the 1930s and embraced a Jewish nation-state program. Yet is important to emphasize that the 
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Jewish state they envisioned in the Biltmore program was an utopian and rather short-lived 
wartime vision. 
 Indeed, neither Weizmann nor Ben-Gurion had explained during the war why they 
believed Britain, whose victory in the war was a precondition for any Jewish future at all, would 
radically reverse its policy in favor of Arab statehood in Palestine and begin to support the 
transfer of millions of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe to Palestine. The Biltmore vision 
was thus not based on a reasonable assessment of the direction of British policy in the region. 
Arendt powerfully articulated this point. The idea of a Jewish nation-state had become politically 
irrelevant, she argued, because the solution it proposed for the post-war Jewish question - the 
large-scale immigration of millions of Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine, was completely 
out of line with British policy in the Middle East. As a careful observer of the British Empire, 
Arendt argued that the British espousal of an Arab federation was part of its general attempt to 
form a British-Muslim alliance across the Middle East and Asia in order to secure the route to its 
most coveted colonial possession – India, a position she became increasingly convinced of after 
the British crushed the Indian rebellion in late 1942 and worked closely with Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah’s Muslim League to restore order in India.430 Ussishkin offered a similar assessment in a 
Zionist executive meeting convened to discuss Ben-Gurion’s postwar proposals. “The majority 
of you are convinced that after the war we will find a solution … that not only would we be able 
to continue with our Zionist activity but in fact make it far larger and more expansive than ever 
before.” “I wish I could share this belief,” Ussishkin argued, “but I have a different feeling.” 
“…After the war Britain will be the world superpower … and this England … has a negative 
attitude toward the development of the Yishuv.” This attitude was firmly reflected in Eden’s 																																																								
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declaration on an Arab federation. The future of the Middle East was laid out by the British 
government, Ussishkin observed, “without us receiving any message ... as if there was no Zionist 
movement in the world ….” Chiding the executive for its overt optimism, Ussishkin warned that 
the postwar Jewish question would more likely be solved not through the transfer of Jews to 
Palestine but through a new form of territorialism.431 While British policy continued to develop 
in opposition to Zionist aspirations, Zionist leaders also recognized that their vision had little 
support in government quarters in the United States. Though Weizmann met with Roosevelt in 
1941, he failed to receive any assurance of support for the Zionist postwar vision. As Weizmann 
put it in December 1942, “the enemies of Jewish Palestine are people … who fill the various 
commissions in the State Department which have to do with the Middle East. They know 
Palestine, they know our aspirations. They are fully opposed to them.”432 “… This makes me feel 
that we have to hope,” he remarked in a moment of candor, “but we have to be very careful in 
the aspect of what we are likely to achieve.”433 
More centrally, the Biltmore program was an utopian vision because after the summer of 
1941 the underlying premise of the program – that millions of Jewish refugees will survive the 
war, no longer reflected the demographic reality in Eastern Europe. The Biltmore conference 
took place shortly after the first reports on large-scale massacres of Jews in the Soviet Union and 
in Nazi occupied Poland had reached the Allied capitols.434 In his Biltmore conference speech, 
Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress, observed that some reports claim that 
as many as 800 Jews are killed in the Warsaw ghetto every day, and added that such numbers 																																																								
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must be exaggerated for they would mean that “in the course of two years the total of a half a 
million Jews may be wiped out.” Still, Goldman estimated that some several millions Jews will 
likely perish throughout Europe during the war.435 In his subsequent speech at the conference 
Weizmann offered a far more bleak assessment, suggesting that as many as 25% of the Jewish 
population of Europe may be liquated in the war, which will leave only some 2-4 million Jewish 
refugee in postwar Europe.436 Despite these assessments, the overall mood in the Biltmore 
conference was that of optimism about the future. For inasmuch as the Nazi invasion of the 
Soviet Union brought millions of Jews under Nazi rule, it also ended the stalemate in Europe 
following the occupation of France. And within a few months, particularly after the entry of the 
United States into the war, the complete defeat of Nazism by the Allies increasingly appeared as 
a viable prospect. Over the course of 1943 and 1944 this optimism waned as Zionist leaders 
would come to terms with the scale of Jewish destruction in Europe. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, after 1943 Zionist leaders had repeatedly contemplated – will enough Jews survivor the 
war to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine? Is there a future for Zionism without the major 
Jewish population center in Eastern Europe – a Zionism without Jews? During 1945 and 1946, as 
the scope of Jewish extermination became fully clear, Zionist leaders would come to abandon the 
Biltmore dream of transferring millions of Jews to Palestine and conclude that the only way to 
establish a Jewish majority in Palestine is by partitioning the land. 
Though the dream of the transfer of millions of Jews to Palestine was short-lived, the 
Biltmore program nonetheless marked a significant shift in Zionist political thought. In his 
commentary on the Biltmore program Yapo observed with surprise that the program made no 
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mention of a key Zionist moral and legal principle – the historic connection of the Jews to the 
land of Israel. This principle, he noted, was a mainstay of Zionist politics for the past 50 years, 
repeated in every Zionist congress and reaffirmed by the Balfour Declaration and the League of 
Nations mandate over Palestine. Indeed, during the 1920s and 1930s both Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann repeatedly invoked this concept as a justification for Jewish settlement in Palestine 
and as a principle that explained subverting the democratic will of the majority Palestinian Arab 
population. The absence of this principle from the Biltmore program, Yapo suggested, could be 
explained by two reasons – either because it had become so widely accepted it need not be 
repeated again, or because the Zionist movement had begun to base its political struggle “on a set 
of new principles.”437 This new set of new principles was encapsulated by the wartime idea that 
the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was to be justified by the fact that Palestine 
offered the only solution to the postwar Jewish refugee problem in Europe. It marked a shift 
from viewing the Yishuv as a political center of Jewish pioneers that will gradually develop 
alongside the vast Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe to a future Jewish state that will 
offer a humanitarian solution to the uprooted Jewish millions after the war. As Ben-Gurion put it 
in 1941, “the goal of Zionism” in the war “is to prevent the emergence of separate solutions to 
the question of Palestine and to the question of Jews in Europe, the solution ought to be one and 
the same.”438 Ben-Gurion recognized the novelty of this concept. When he first presented his 
postwar vision to the leadership of Mapai in June 1941 he anticipated the response of his critics. 
“There are ideologues among us,” Ben-Gurion observed, “who say there is nothing in Zionist 
ideology about Jewish refugees. Zionism was not created for refugees. Zionism is about our 
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heritage and our love for the land, it is about our desire to lead a fulfilling life … with a 
university of our own, and speak Hebrew … but nothing about Zionism is about refugees.” 
“[But] why do we need such a thing as ideology or ‘schmideology’?” Ben-Gurion argued, “there 
is a Jewish people, and it is fast disappearing…”439 Indeed, it was the prospects of millions of 
Jewish refugees after the war, and, as Senator put it in a 1942 Zionist executive meeting, “the 
emergence of new political categories … of mass population transfers, which until 3-4 years ago 
were for us, for most of the world, unacceptable” that brought about a shift in Zionist thinking, 
from conceiving of Jewish settlement in Palestine through the 19th century category of historic 
right to an embrace of a new mid-20th century political vocabulary of population shifts and 
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‘If there are no more Jews, there is no need for a Jewish State’: Zionism, The 
Holocaust and the Geopolitics of Jewish Death 
 
In September 1942 Richard Lichtheim, representative of the Zionist executive in Europe, sent a 
riveting letter to Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress and a member of the 
Zionist executive. After the outbreak of war Lichtheim had set up the Jewish Agency office in 
Geneva where he collected information on the fate of Jews in Nazi occupied Europe and reported 
on it to the Zionist leadership in Jerusalem, London and New-York. Lichtheim was one of the 
first observers to argue that the Nazis were carrying out a systematic plan aimed at the 
extermination of European Jewry. In communications to Zionist leaders from early 1942 
Lichtheim argued that the Nazis plan to murder millions of Jews through forced labor and 
starvation. In August that year – at about the same time as Gerhart Riegner, head of the office of 
the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, drafted his famous telegram – Lichtheim concluded that 
the large-scale deportation of Jews to camps were a stage in a deliberate Nazi mass killing 
operation. In Lichtheim’s view the mass extermination of Jews had grave implications for the 
future of Zionism. Lichtheim rejected the calculations of Goldman and other Zionist leaders at 
the time according to which some two to three millions Jews outside the Soviet Union will 
survive the war, be in need of immigration and in turn create a demographic majority in a future 
Jewish state in Palestine. The most optimistic forecast today, Lichtheim argued in his letter, is 
that one and a half million Jews would survive the war and even this scenario depended on the 
situation in Hungary, Romania and Italy to remain unchanged, “a most doubtful supposition.” A 
more realistic estimate, he proposed, was that no more than half a million to a million Jews 
would survive the calamity. The vast extent of the Jewish catastrophe, he declared, meant that 
	 202 
the “basis of Zionism as it was understood and preached during the last 50 years has gone.” 
“Whatever number of Jews will be after this war … there will be no need for [a] mass 
emigration” of Jews to Palestine. After an Allied victory the small number of surviving Jews 
could be successfully resettled in various European countries where they would enjoy equal 
rights. “[C]an there be a Zionist movement after this destruction of European Jewry and this 
radical change in their position?” “500,000 Jews are not enough and even 800,000 Jews will be a 
minority in Palestine. How can we ask for that State if we cannot show that several million need 
it or want it?”  “I feel that Zionism …” Lichtheim concluded, “is finished.” “… Let us stop 
talking of Palestine as ‘the solution of the Jewish problem’. … It is now too late.’”441    
 Lichteim letter is startling document in part because it tells us a story about his personal 
political transformation. A prominent leader of the Zionist movement in Germany, in 1925 
Lichtheim joined the ranks of Jabotinsky’s Zionist Revisionist party and in 1933 was one the 
founders of the Revisionist breakaway group, ‘The Jewish State Party’. During the 1930s 
Lichtheim vigorously opposed the position of prominent Zionist leaders such as Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann who refused to declare that the establishment of a Jewish state was the goal of the 
Zionist movement.442 Embracing Jabotinsky’s views, Lichtheim advocated for a more militant 
line against the British mandatory authorities, immediate large-scale Jewish immigration from 
Eastern Europe to Palestine and for the swift establishment of a Jewish majority and a state. In 																																																								
441 Richard Lichtheim to Nahum Goldman, September 9 1942, Ben-Gurion Papers item 204842. For a study of 
Lichtheim’s knowledge and perception of the extermination of Jews in Europe see Raya Cohen, “Confronting the 
Reality of the Holocaust: Richard Lichtheim, 1939-1942,” Yad Vashem Studies Vol. XXIII (Jerusalem, 1993), pp. 
335-68. Lichtheim’s role as representative of the Jewish Agency in Geneva has been the subject of Cohen’s work, 
but interest in Lichtheim as an original Zionist thinker is only beginning to attract attention in recent years. See, for 
example, Andrea Kirchner’s study of Lichtheim’s Zionist activities in Istanbul during World War I, Kirchner “Ein 
vergessenes Kapitel jüdischer Diplomatie: Richard Lichtheim in den Botschaften Konstantinopels (1913–1917)”, 
Naharaim 2015, 9 (1-2), 128–150. This chapter seeks to contribute to the renewed interest in Lichtheim by placing 
his wartime writings in the context of a larger wartime Zionist debate over the future of Zionism in light of the 
extermination of Jews in Europe.  
 
442 See chapters 3 and 4 for an examination of the evolution of Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s positions on the idea of 
a Jewish state.  
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his letter to Goldman Lichtheim had in fact noted the morbid irony that “the same Zionist leaders 
who were always opposed to the idea of a Jewish state are now loudly shouting for it” at the very 
moment in which the possibility of realizing such a state had passed. “Do they ask for a state,” 
Lichtheim observed, “because they have a feeling that the [Zionist] movement has come to an 
end and because they want it to look at least like a happy end?” Lichtheim’s transformation from 
an early advocate for a Jewish state in the interwar period to a self-declared prophet of this 
vision’s demise is a mirror image of Robinson’s transformation explored in chapter I – from one 
of the chief proponents of Jewish diaspora nationalism between the wars to an advocate of 
centering the Jewish national agenda exclusively on state-building in Palestine and abandoning 
the struggle for minority rights for Jews in postwar Europe.443  
 More centrally, Lichtheim’s letter is a startling document for it highlights a largely 
overlooked aspect of the response of Zionist leaders to the Holocaust. Scholarship on the Zionist 
response to the extermination of European Jewry has primarily focused on the morally 
contentious question of whether Zionist leaders had done enough to try to rescue and save Jews 
from Nazi Europe.444 Yet an equally important aspect of the response of Zionist leaders to the 																																																								
443 See chapter I. Lichtheim to Goldman, Ibid. In a 1946 essay Lichtheim reflected on his earlier career as a 
supporter of Revisionist Zionism and argued that it was based on his assumption from the late 1920s and through the 
1930s that the establishment of a Jewish state was a viable political goal. See Lichtheim, “Prognosen,” 
Mitteilungsblatt, no. 32, August 9 1946. I wish to thank Andrea Kirchner for sharing this document with me. An 
Interesting anecdote: in 1935 the Zionist executive debated between hiring Lichtheim and Robinson to serve as the 
Jewish Agency representative in Geneva. Goldman rejected Robinson’s candidacy arguing that Robinson had 
become a “careerist” who doesn’t believe that Zionism could do much to advance his career. Instead, Goldman 
proposed that the executive hire Lichtheim. See report on meeting of the executive on January 28, 1935, the 
Lichtheim file (collected by Shabtai Teveth), Ben-Gurion Papers, item 251869. 
 
444 The debate over the question of whether the Zionist leadership in Yishuv acted vigorously enough to try to save 
Jews in Europe has dominated the scholarly research on the Zionist movement during the Holocaust. This debate 
had its origins during the war – prominent leaders and the press in the Yishuv accused the Jewish Agency leadership, 
in particular Yitzhak Gruenbaum, head of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency, of a timid response to the 
extermination of Jews and of not diverting enough funds and dedicating enough action to rescue efforts. Revisionist 
leaders advocated at the time for an open revolt against the British to let Jewish refugees into Palestine against the 
official line of the Yishuv leadership that feared the implications of such an open defiance of the British for the 
future of Zionist aspirations in Palestine. This debate was revived in the late 1970s following the publication of S. B. 
Beit-Zvi’s indictment of Zionist policy during the war, Post-Ugandian Zionism in the Crucible of the Holocaust. 
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Holocaust has to do with the way in which they interpreted the extermination of Jews as a 
geopolitical question. As news of the extermination of European Jewry had reached the Allied 
capitols and the Yishuv from late 1942, Zionist leaders grappled with the question at the center of 
Lichtheim’s letter - will enough Jews survive the war to enable the establishment of a Jewish 
majority in Palestine? Lichtheim’s position reflected an early and radical response to this 
question. But after 1943 other Zionist leaders grappled with this question not by dismissing the 
vision of a Jewish state by developing new strategies to ensure a future Jewish majority in 
Palestine. As Zionist leaders recognized that the Jewish centers in Eastern Europe – the 
demographic reservoir of Zionism - had been destroyed, they searched for new Jewish candidates 
for mass immigration. Weizmann insisted that the future of Zionism lay in the development of a 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Beit-Zvi, a devout Revisionist Zionist, analyzed the “causes of the failure of the Zionist movement between 1938-
1945” to save European Jews and concluded that its roots lay in an intellectual shift that followed the Zionist 
movement’s rejection of the 1905 ‘Uganda program,’ a proposal for the establishment of a Jewish colony in British 
East Africa. The rejection of the Uganda program, Beit-Zvi argued, reflected a shift from a vision of Zionism as a 
movement aimed at rescuing European Jewry from a sense of an impending catastrophe in Europe into a movement 
focused on Jewish national and cultural revival. This attitude was reflected, Beit-Zvi argued, in Zionist leaders’ 
rejection of various territoiralists proposals for the solution of the ‘Jewish question’ in Europe during the 1930s and 
in a wartime attitude among the Zionist leadership that prioritized protecting the political future of the Yishuv over 
saving individual Jews. Beit-Zvi’s bold thesis spurred a number of scholarly responses aimed at carefully 
documenting the Yishuv’s vast efforts to save Jews – particularly with regard to efforts to save the Jews of Hungary 
- and at clearing the Yishuv leadership of these charges. Prominent examples are works by Poart, Frilling and Ofer. 
While this chapter seeks to move away from the deeply ideological debates over this issue, it is nonetheless deeply 
influenced by an important insight of Beit-Zvi’s work that has been clouded by the subsequent debate: that Zionist 
leaders interpreted the extermination of European Jews as a political question with grave implication for the future 
of Zionism. Yet rather than morally evaluating this position, this chapter is the first to try to offer an in-depth study 
of precisely how did this knowledge shape the Zionist vision for the future. I wish to thank Dan Diner for suggesting 
I read Beit-Zvi’s work and for conversations on the topic. See S. B. Beit Zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism on Trial, 2 vol. 
(Tel-Aviv: Zahala, 1991). The book was originally published in Hebrew in 1977. See also Dina Porat, The Blue and 
Yellow Stars of David: The Zionist leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990); Tuvia Frilling Arrow in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership and Rescue 
Attempts during the Holocaust, 2. Vols. (Madison: Univeristy of Wisconsin Press, 2005) and Dalia Ofer. Escaping 
the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
For an influential but less scholarly intervention in this debate see Tom Segev. The Seventh Million: The Israelis and 
the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). For a return to the thesis according to which the Zionist leadership 
was focused mainly on saving the Yishuv see Idith Zertal, From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors 
and the Emergence of Israel (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1998). For a recent and novel reconsideration of 
Gruenbaum’s activities during the war see chapter 7 of Yosef Gorny, The Jewish Press and the Holocaust, 1939–
1945: Palestine, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Gorny asks whether, and to what extent, has Gruenbaum’s earlier career as a leader of Gegenwartsarbeit Zionism in 
Poland, his work for the promotion of the rights of Jews as a national minority in Poland, had influenced his policies 
and actions during the war.  
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new American Jewish Chalutz movement and in the large-scale immigration of American Jews 
to Palestine. Ben-Gurion looked eastwards and for the first time envisioned the mass 
immigration to Palestine of Jewish communities from across the Middle East and North Africa. 
At the same time, Zionist leaders recognized that the only way to establish a majority in the 
territory of mandatory Palestine is by partitioning the land – thus reducing the number of Arabs 
in the future territory of the Jewish state and the number of Jewish immigrants required to 
‘offset’ the Arab demographic majority.  
 This chapter reconstructs how growing knowledge and differing interpretations of the 
extermination of Jews in Europe reshaped the visions Zionist leaders advocated for the future of 
Jews after the war. This chapter is the last segment in part II of this dissertation that explores the 
transformation of Zionist political thought during the war from the interwar vision of Jewish-
Arab parity to the postwar vision of a Jewish ethnic nation-state. This chapter should also be read 
as a corollary to chapter I that examined how growing knowledge of the Holocaust alongside 
mass population transfers in wartime and postwar Europe prompted diaspora nationalist leaders 
to conclude there was no future for Jewish minority rights in Eastern Europe after the war. 
Overall, these two chapters seek to tell the story of how Jewish national leaders interpreted the 
Holocaust not only as a Jewish collective catastrophe, or as a question of rescue, but also as a 
political question with wide ramifications for the future of Jewish politics.  
 This chapter also seeks to intervene in a broader historiographical debate on the 
relationship between the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel. In the past few 
years scholars have criticized the “moral legitimacy thesis” – the idea that the international 
community, in particular the United States and the United Nations, supported Jewish statehood 
in 1947 out of a moral conviction that Jews were entitled to a nation-state in the wake of the 
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catastrophe in Europe.445 Scholars have shown that US president Harry S. Truman in fact 
initially opposed a Jewish state after the war and supported a bi-national solution for Palestine.446 
Moreover, scholars have emphasized how the crucial Soviet support for Jewish statehood during 
the UN vote on partition was motivated primarily out of a desire to hasten the disintegration of 
the British Empire in the Middle East in the context of the early Cold War and decolonization.447 
In fact, as Evyatar Friesel and Dan Michman observed, as an objective factor (rather than in 
terms of how it was subjectively interpreted by the international community after the war) the 
Holocaust almost destroyed the possibility of establishing a Jewish state, for the millions of Jews 
who were needed for the establishment of such a state were exterminated during the war.448 This 
chapter joins this new historiographical approach but seeks to make several significant 
contributions. This chapter shows how during the war and in its immediate aftermath Zionist 
leaders were deeply aware of the fact that the Holocaust was detrimental to Zionism, and 
examines how this interpretation of the events in Europe prompted them to revise their vision of 
																																																								
445 Dan Michman has recently surveyed the rich historiography of this thesis and examined how it had been 
politicized from 1948 to this day by both supporters and opponents of Zionism in popular historical accounts on 
establishment of Israel. Yehuda Bauer and Idith Zertal have offered a more nuanced articulation of this thesis by 
emphasizing the role of the postwar plight of Jewish Displaced Persons in shaping international support for Jewish 
statehood rather than perceptions of the Holocaust as a unique historical event, which, as other scholars have shown, 
was not a prominent mode of interpretation outside Jewish circles in the immediate postwar years. Zertal differs 
from Bauer in that she emphasizes how the Jewish DP issue was instrumentalized by Zionist leaders to promote 
Jewish collective aspirations at the expense of the postwar rehabilitation of individual Jews. See Dan Michman, 
“The Causal Connection Between the Holocaust and the Birth of Israel: Historiography Between Myth and Reality,” 
Iyunim Bitkumat Israel 10 (2000): 234–259 [in Hebrew]; Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), primarily chapter eleven ‘From the Holocaust to the State of Israel,” and Zertal, From 
Catastrophe to Power. 
   
446 On Truman see Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014) also John B. Judis, Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and  the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict 
(New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). 
 
447 See Cohen, Palestine and The Great Powers as well as Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘The Soviet Union’s Role in the 
Creation of the State of Israel’, The Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 4–20.  For a recent 
overview of the scholarship on the Soviet role in the creation of the state of Israel see Evyatar Friesel, “On the Myth 
of the Connection between the Holocaust and the Creation of Israel,” Israel Affairs, 14, 3 (2008), 449–50. 
 
448 Michman, “The Causal Connection,” and Friesel, “On the Myth,”. 
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Jewish statehood. As Zionist leaders grappled with the extent of Jewish extermination they 
concluded there would not remain enough Jews after the war either for the vision of Jewish-Arab 
parity they promoted in the 1930s nor for the realization of Biltmore vision of transferring 
millions of Jewish refugee to Palestine and establishing a Jewish ethnic-nation state in the whole 
of the mandate. Instead, Zionist leaders embraced a new, post-Holocaust vision of Jewish 
statehood: a small state in a partitioned Palestine that was to be established through the transfer 
of several hundreds of thousands of refugees from the small Jewish remnant in Europe. Just 
enough Jews, Zionist leaders hoped, to establish a majority. In this sense the debate on the 
relationship between the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel is missing a 
crucial distinction: the very vision of the Jewish state that ultimately came into being in 1948 
was itself a product of the Holocaust.  
 
When the facts become known, they will speak for themselves  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, during the first years of the war Zionist leaders were 
convinced that the war would end with a Jewish refugee problem in Eastern Europe in the scale 
of some three to five million. This demographic analysis emerged from contacts between 
Weizmann as well as other prominent Zionist leaders and the leaders of the Polish and Czech 
Governments in Exile in London. These governments informed Zionist leaders that they would 
actively hinder the postwar reintegration of Jews the Nazis had removed from their homes and 
professions during the war. Weizmann and other Zionist leaders concluded that this would be the 
case for Jews throughout Eastern Europe after the war. This expectation for a postwar Jewish 
refugee problem in the millions lay at the center of the vision Zionist leaders articulated in the 
May 1942 Biltmore conference. The future ‘Jewish commonwealth’ in Palestine Zionist leaders 
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advocated for was to come into being through the transfer of several million Jewish refugees 
from postwar Eastern Europe to Palestine which would in turn radically transform the Arab-
Jewish demographic balance and lead to the creation of a Jewish majority state.449 
 The Biltmore conference took place however in a twilight zone – just as knowledge of 
large-scale extermination of Jews by the Nazis in Europe had begun to creep into the 
consciousness of observers in the Allied capitols, and as expectation by Zionist leaders for 
millions of Jewish refugees after the war was being replaced by a new assumption on millions of 
Jewish victims. Indeed, the Biltmore conference took place amidst the publication of growing 
news in the Allied capitols on large-scale massacres of Jews across Nazi occupied Europe. 
Gruesome reports on massacres of Jews throughout Nazi Europe were published from the 
beginning of 1942 in the press in London, New-York and the Yishuv – yet the accuracy of many 
of these reports were openly questioned at the time in part because they emerged predominately 
from Soviet sources and were explained away as a form of propaganda.450 From June that year, 
just several weeks after the Biltmore conference took place, reports on a Jewish death toll in the 
scale of millions were corroborated by more trustworthy sources. The Polish Government in 
Exile published the Black Paper on the Nazi occupation of Poland that reported on the activities 
of the Einsatzgruppen and gas vans and estimated that some 700,000 Jews had been 
																																																								
449 See chapters 1 and 4.   
 
450 For some of the main scholarly works on knowledge of the extermination of European Jewry in the Allied 
capitols and the Yishuv see Deborah E. Lipstadt, Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the 
Holocaust, 1933-1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Walter Laquer, The Terrible Secret: Suppression of 
the Truth About Hitler’s “Final Solution.” (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2012); Michael Fleming. Auschwitz, 
the Allies and Censorship of the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Richard Breitman and 
Allan J. Lichtman. FDR and the Jews (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Gorny, The Jewish Press and 
the Holocaust; Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David; David Engel, Facing a Holocaust: The Polish 
Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1943-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993).  
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exterminated in Poland alone.451 In August Lichtheim and Riegner sent to the leadership of the 
Jewish Agency and the World Jewish Congress memos detailing a Nazi plan to exterminate 
millions of Jews.452  
 Many of the speeches in the Biltmore conference reflected this in-between moment. Even 
before Zionist leaders had any official reports and estimates on which to base their assumptions 
on the Jewish death toll in the war, they laid out estimates according to which millions of Jews 
would ultimately perish in Europe. Weizmann, for example, suggested in his speech that as many 
as 25% of European Jewry might perish in the war.453 Goldman openly doubted the accuracy of 
some of the reports emanating from Europe – reports on the murder of 800 Jews a day in the 
Warsaw Ghetto, he observed, “must be exaggerated because, if true, then in the course of two 
years the total of half a million Jews in the Warsaw ghettos may be wiped out” – but at the same 
time acknowledged that “none of us were shocked” when Weizmann proposed that “25% may be 
‘written off’”.454 The figure of 25% that was floated at the conference needs to be understood not 
as an attempt to accurately asses the number of Jewish victims in Europe but rather as a heuristic 
concept aimed at demonstrating that even in what Zionist leaders believed at the time was the 
extreme, worst-case scenario that a quarter of all European Jews would perish in the war, the 
demographic argument of the Biltmore program – that millions of Jews would be in need of 
immigration to Palestine after the war  – still stands. For the purpose of formulating the Biltmore 
program the significant number was thus not exactly how many Jews would perish but rather 																																																								
451 Yoav Gelber, “Zionist Policy and the Fate of European Jewry, 1939-1942” Yad Vashem Studies vol. 13 (1979), p. 
188-190 
 
452 Cohen, “Confronting the Reality of the Holocaust,” 359-363.  
 
453 Chaim Weizmann, “Speech at Extraordinary Zionist Conference of the American Emergency Committee for 
Zionist Affairs,” May 9, 1942, Stenographic Protocol, the Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.  
 
454 Nahum Goldman, “Speech at Extraordinary Zionist Conference of the American Emergency Committee for 
Zionist Affairs,” Ibid.  
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whether enough would survive to enable the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine. 
After he laid out the figure of 25% Weizmann thus noted that “there will still be left enough 
force to continue the great tradition of European Jewry” and that “those who will be physically 
destroyed will be destroyed, but those who will survive will carry the torch proudly”. Goldman 
did not discuss the specific number of those he believed would perish in the war but rather the 
number of those who would survive - outside Soviet Russia, Goldman concluded, there may be 
left after the war “three or three and a half million Jews.”455 Ben-Gurion too did not discuss the 
number of expected Jewish victims in Europe in his speech at all but only spoke about his 
expectations for a large-scale postwar Jewish refugee problem in the millions.456 The fact that 
Zionist leaders offered a rough and unsubstantiated estimate of the number of expected Jewish 
victims, and focused mainly on properly estimating the number of survives, does not mean that 
they did not care deeply about the fate of Jews in Europe or were not committed to saving them. 
Rather it shows that while Zionist leaders expected a massive death toll of Jews in Europe they 
did not imagine that the toll would be so large as to influence the demographic tenets of the 
Biltmore vision. The question of Jewish death in Europe and the future of Zionism remained in 
their view two separate questions. 
 From late 1942, however, Zionist leaders had begun to realize that the Biltmore 
conference figure of 25% was not a worst-case scenario but rather a conservative estimate of the 
number of Jewish victims in Europe. As noted above, in August 1942 the first official reports 
from Lichtheim and Reigner indicating a plan to exterminate all Jews under Nazi rule had 																																																								
455 In a speech he delivered several weeks later Goldman offered specific numbers. After surveying the position of 
Jews throughout Europe he noted that “the ten millions Jews of Europe before the war will be something like seven 
million”. See Address Delivered by Nahum Goldman, Chairman, Administrative Committee of the World Jewish 
Congress, June 6, 1942, World Jewish Congress Records, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio C11 3 
(accessed as copies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archive.)  
 
456 Ben-Gurion, “Speech at Extraordinary Zionist Conference of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist 
Affairs,” May 10, 1942, Stenographic Protocol, the Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem. 
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reached Jewish leaders. In November, 82 Jewish refugee from Poland arrived in Palestine and 
corroborated the reports on the extermination in Europe in a series of powerful personal 
testimonies  – a week of mourning was declared in the Yishuv.457 In December 1942 the United 
States, Great Britain and ten other Allied states issued an official statement denouncing the 
implementation of a Nazi plan to exterminate European Jewry. Over the course of 1943 reports 
on Jewish extermination appeared with ever-greater frequency in the press in the Allied capitols 
and in the Yishuv. In August 1943, a year after Lichtheim and Riegner sent their reports on 
extermination, the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress surveyed the 
situation of Jews in Europe based on all available data and published an official estimate that 
3,000,000 Jews had been murdered in Nazi-occupied Europe.458 By the end of 1943 Zionist 
leaders had thus realized that about half a million more Jews had already been murdered than 
what just a year earlier appeared to them as the extreme estimate of 25% - and the end of the war 
was nowhere in sight.  
 Lichtheim’s letter to Goldman discussed in the introduction was the first indication of a 
shift from viewing Jewish death in the war and the political goals of Zionism as separate to 
deeply connected questions. Lichtheim’s letter was in fact written as a response to Goldman’s 
speech at the Biltmore conference and to his estimate that 25% of European Jews may be 
‘written off’. Lichtheim seems to have received Goldman’s speech with significant delay – likely 
at the beginning of September - and thus read the speech that was delivered in May through his 
new post-August consciousness based on direct knowledge of a Nazi extermination plan. 
Lichtheim summarily rejected Goldman’s “too optimistic” figure of 25%. Lichtheim proposed 
that the current “optimistic” estimate would put the number of dead Jews at 50% after the war 																																																								
457 Porat, The Blue and Yellow Stars of David, p. 82 [Hebrew edition]. 
 
458 See Chapter I.  
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and if the Nazi extermination plan expands to Hungary, Romania and Italy that figure would be 
60%-65%, that is, a surviving Jewish population in postwar Europe outside the Soviet Union of 
some 500,000 to a million.459 Such a small Jewish population, Lichtheim argued, would preclude 
the possibility of large-scale transfer of Jews to Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish 
majority. In a January 1943 speech in Geneva, Lichtheim made his views public. Lichtheim 
argued that the Jewish survivors in Europe will likely assimilate into their prewar countries after 
the war rather than seek immigration to Palestine and thus that the Jewish community in 
Palestine – like Jews in Europe – will remain a minority:  
 
“I am not one of those who believe that Palestine … will attract the remnant once the war 
is over … The destruction of the great centers of European Judaism will favor their 
assimilation in the countries to which they are attached. Relived from the threat of anti-
semitism, for the moment at least, they will NOT be inclined to emigrate. Palestine as a 
refuge for masses of hunted Jews will therefore no longer make sense: there will be no 
masses and the survivors will not be hunted. As a consequence the Jews may be relegated 
to a status of a minority in Palestine.460 
 
																																																								
459 These percentages are my calculations based on the numbers Lichtheim provided in the letter to Goldman and the 
population figures Goldman used in his speech. A few caveats regarding the numbers: Goldman over-estimated the 
size of the Jewish population in Europe by about half a million compared to those provided by the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is also not fully clear how Goldman and Lichtheim’s estimates accounted for Jews 
in Polish territory annexed by the Soviet Union as part of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.  
 
460 A transcript from this speech was published in the Zurich based paper Israelitsches Wochenblatt on January 8, 
1943 and was reprinted in a secret memo of the British Foreign office from June 22, 1943 (“David Ben-Gurion. His 
Aims and Activities,” FO 921 59 M.G 24/6 6/43/82, P.I.C Paper No. 5, Most Secret). The Foreign Office memo 
surveyed the opinion of Zionist leaders regarding the likelihood of establishing a Jewish state in light of the 
extermination of Jews in Europe. A copy of the Foreign Office paper was found in the Lichtheim file (collected by 
Shabtai Teveth), Ben-Gurion Papers, item 251869. 
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From late 1942 other Zionist leaders had begun to openly contemplate the question of 
how the scale of Jewish extermination in Europe will influence the Zionist vision of establishing 
a Jewish majority in Palestine. Just one month after Lichtheim sent his letter to Goldman, Ben-
Gurion raised this concern in a revealing comment in a speech delivered at the Fifth Convention 
of the Mapai party in which he for the first time laid out the Biltmore vision to his party base. 
“No one knows if any Jews will remain in Nazi Europe after this war,” Ben-Gurion observed, 
“perhaps every single one of them will be exterminated before the end of the war?” If all Jews 
would be exterminated, Ben-Gurion acknowledged, “there will be no aliyah [Jewish immigration 
to Palestine], and our future here will be like the future of Yemenite Jews or the Assyrians of 
Iraq or that of Jews in Germany before the rise of Hitler: we will face either physical destruction 
or spiritual destruction and degeneration.” “… But let us hope that there will be a remnant, that 
not all Jews would be exterminated. … there may be millions of survivors, let us hope there will 
be millions!”461 
Ben-Gurion’s comment reflects how drastically the estimate of the number of Jewish 
victims changed in Zionist thinking between May and October – from 25% to raising the 
possibility that all Jews in Nazi Europe may be exterminated. Still, it is remarkable that in both 
the Biltmore program speeches and in this October speech Zionist leaders used rough 
assessments of the number of victims rather than specific estimates based on actual information 
provided by the Jewish Agency and World Jewish Congress offices in Geneva. In May, as noted, 
the rough estimate was used to demonstrate that even an extreme death rate of 25% of European 
Jews would not endanger the Biltmore vision. In October the rough estimate reflected a different 
strategy – avoiding the need to grapple publicly – and perhaps even personally – with the 
implications of the genocide of the Jews on the political program Zionist leaders had officially 																																																								
461 Protocols of the Fifth Convention of Mapai in Kfar Vitkin,” October 27 1942, Ben-Gurion Papers, item 5827. 
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endorsed just several months earlier. Ben-Gurion could not avoid mentioning Jewish 
extermination in his October speech given the widespread discussions on the topic in the Yishuv 
at the time, and by mentioning the extermination of Jews he could not avoid raising the 
possibility that it would endanger the Biltmore vision of transferring millions of Jews to 
Palestine for which he sought to win the support of his party in this very speech. Ben-Gurion 
solved this conundrum by presenting such an egregious estimate of the number of Jewish victims 
so as to remove the question of extermination from the realm of actual political calculations and 
by connecting this estimate to a straw-man argument. Ben-Gurion argued that if all Jews 
perished, then there would be no immigration of Jews to Palestine and Zionism will be over. Yet 
what Ben-Gurion deliberately avoided from mentioning was that even a radically smaller death 
rate – that is, even if only half of European Jews were to be murdered in the war as Lichtheim 
argued was already the case – then the Biltmore vision, as Lichtheim insisted, would still face 
grave dangers.   
Ben-Gurion’s comments reveal an important aspect of the way Zionist leaders grappled 
with growing knowledge of the extermination of Jews – they realized early on that knowing too 
much, and spreading specific and detailed information on the extent of Jewish extermination in 
Europe, will put the wartime Zionist political program at the risk of becoming irrelevant. Bernard 
Joseph, director of the political department of the Jewish Agency, articulated this point when he 
inveighed against the publication of data “exaggerating the number of Jewish victims, for if we 
announce that millions of Jews have been slaughtered by the Nazis, we will justifiably be asked 
where the millions of Jews are, for whom we can claim that we shall provide a home in Eretz 
Yisrael after the war ends.”462 Joseph Schechtman, a New-York based Zionist Revisionist activist 
																																																								
462 Cited from Joseph’s diary in Gelber, “Zionist Policy,” p. 195. 
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and former close-aide of Jabotinsky, laid out a similar argument in a February 1943 article in the 
Revisionist paper Zionnews.  
 
“These gigantic figures on the already exterminated Jews and the prophecies that further 
millions are going to be exterminated shortly lead also to another fatal political result: to 
make pointless all Jewish postwar demands with regard to Palestine. These demands are 
based first of all upon the necessity of providing resettlement possibilities for millions of 
uprooted European Jews. In proclaiming systematically that millions of Jews have been 
already exterminated and millions more are to follow, we simply undermine the very 
ground for our national demands. If there are no more Jews, there is no need for a Jewish 
state. And it is regrettable that the Zionist or the pro-Zionist press so willingly provides 
non-Jewish circles with this kind of material.”463 
 
Schechtman ultimately accused the Jewish press of creating a psychological atmosphere in which 
Jews and outside observers “become accustomed to the idea that the bulk of European Jewry will 
be wiped out before the end of the war” and thus that “no provisions will be needed for [Jewish] 
resettlement and rehabilitation after the war.” “… [W]e should not wonder if in this 
psychological atmosphere,” Schechtman argued, “various influential circles are prepared to 
overlook Jewish needs and Jewish national aspirations while elaborating blue-prints for a new 
and better post-war world.” While Schechtman noted that “these remarks are certainly not made 
in order to urge Jewish organizations to conceal the true scope of the Jewish tragedy in Europe or 
to minimize the number of its victims” he nonetheless added that “responsible Jewish leaders and 																																																								
463 Joseph Schechtman, “More Circumspection!,” Zionews, Vol. IV  23-24, February 28 1943,. p. 18. 
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the Jewish press have to be extremely circumspect and conservative in operating with gigantic 
figures of massacred Jews.”464  
 The concluding sentence of Schechtmann’s article was contradictory – Schechtman urged 
Jewish leader to both limit the publication of knowledge on the extent of Jewish extermination in 
Europe and at the same time not to conceal the facts about the extermination. This contradiction 
reflected the way in which Schechtman grappled with a major moral dilemma at the center of 
Zionist leaders’ engagement with news on the extermination of Jews in Europe. Drawing greater 
attention in the Allied capitols to the horrific scale of Jewish extermination would help make the 
case for the urgency of acting to save Europe’s remaining Jews. But the clearer it becomes that 
Hitler had already murdered millions of Jews, as noted above, the less there would appear to be a 
need for Zionism as a solution for the fast disappearing postwar Jewish refugee problem in 
Europe. Yizhak Grunbaum, head of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency, gave voice to 
this dilemma when he observed in a January 1943 meeting of the executive of the Jewish Agency 
– to the opprobrium of many of his colleagues - that “there are two things that may be the same 
in theory but in practice are very different – saving the Jews and saving the Yishuv.”465 A May 
1943 editorial of the Tel-Aviv based Haboker expressed a similar idea, if much more subtly so as 
almost to hide the radicalism of its statement. “It is a fact that the holocaust of European Jewry, 
that great horror, that should have revealed to the enlightened world the necessity of the Zionist 
idea – has become an obstacle to Zionism.”466  
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 While Schechtman and Joseph urged Zionist leaders to remain circumspect about their 
publication of knowledge on the extermination of Jews in Europe in order to protect Zionist 
political demands from becoming irrelevant, in reality Zionist leaders – at least outside the 
Yishuv - had no influence on what information would reach daylight. More importantly, 
regardless of which perceptions of the fate of Jews in Europe took root in the Allied capitols 
during the war, there was an objective reality that was to be revealed sooner or later that no one 
could ultimately hide. In a February 1944 letter to British historian and Zionism advocate Louis 
Namier, Lichtheim expressed his consternation at the fact that Zionist leaders continue to 
officially adhere to the Biltmore program and believe that they could somehow hide “the fact” 
that the Jews needed to build the Jewish state have already been murdered with Zionist 
“propaganda.” Lichtheim’s letter to Namier is a particularly significant document for 
understanding how Zionist leaders made sense of the Holocaust as a geopolitical question 
because of the pivotal role both played in shaping demographic thinking among the Zionist 
leadership during the war. As discussed in chapters I and III, Namier, a close Weizmann-aide, 
met Edward Beneš, president of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, in December 1941 and 
learned from him about Czech plans for the expulsion of Jews after the war. Namier later drafted 
a detailed memo for Weizmann that estimated there will be some two to three millions stateless 
Jewish refugees in postwar Eastern Europe. This memo was published in March 1942 under the 
title “Exodus and Numbers” in the journal New Judea. Namier’s memo shaped Weizmann’s 
thinking on the topic and ultimately became the only “scientific” assessment that backed the 
claims of the speakers at the Biltmore conference for a Jewish refugees problem in the millions 
after the war.467 Lichtheim was startled by the fact that well into 1944 Zionist leaders kept 
officially adhering to Namier’s completely outdated demographic predictions. He wrote Namier: 																																																								
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It is not true, that two or three million Jews would need to emigrate or be evacuated from 
Europe. These false assumptions, on which the Biltmore program was based, still seem to 
be the basis on which our official politics is based. I regard that as unfortunate. We can’t 
change the facts through blatant propaganda, and a politics that is based on such a false 
calculation will end with destruction and defeat. I’m deeply afraid, that our official 
politics, that pushes aside the truth of Zionism and is based on a false assumption of a 
postwar refugee problem, will end in confusion, consternation, disappointment, and 
ultimately in a political breakdown, from which our movement will not be able to 
recover, at least not in our generation.”468  
 
In an April 1944 ‘strictly confidential’ letter to his close friend and aide and prominent 
American Zionist leader Meyer Weisgal, Weizmann – in a rare moment of candor on the fate of 
European Jewry - acknowledged too the predominance of the postwar “fact” of Jewish 
extermination over wartime perceptions of the events in Europe. In this letter Weizmann argued 
that the ‘enemies’ of Zionism already know that the “fact” of Jewish extermination works in 
their favor but remain mute on the topic and do not use it as an argument against Zionism as not 
to appear to politicize the Jewish tragedy. “Incidentally, the whole political position [i.e., the 
demand for a Jewish state] may be vitiated by the disappearance of European Jewry. The main 
argument based on pressure due to anti-Semitism,” Weizmann argued, “loses it force if only a 
very small number of Jews remain alive in Europe after this war.” “I am quite sure that our 
enemies are already reckoning on this in their own minds though they do not speak about it yet 
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because it would be very ungracious to make political capital out of such a catastrophe. But 
when everything is over, and the facts become known, they will speak for themselves. And any 
demand of ours based on the imperative necessity of transferring large number of Jews speedily 
to Palestine will then fall off the ground.”469 
Indeed, over the course of 1943 and 1944 those who Weizmann dubbed “the enemies of 
Zionism” – or at least representatives of the Allied powers who were reluctant about Zionist 
political aspirations – had begun to doubt the feasibility of the postwar Zionist vision in light of 
the extermination of Jews in Europe. A secret June 1943 paper of the British Foreign Office 
discussed Lichtheim’s views and the discord among Zionist leaders over the feasibility of 
achieving the Biltmore program. The paper observed: “The Jewish Agency in Palestine is well 
informed on conditions in Central Europe and presumably base their views upon knowledge. It is 
hard to believe that they could be so unreasonable as to discuss openly and devote much time to 
a scheme which they know in their hearts to be impossible of achievement.”470 Soviet leaders 
expressed similar doubts. In late 1944 Goldman met Konstantin Umansky, Soviet ambassador to 
Mexico (former Soviet ambassador to the United States). Umansky told Goldman that the Soviet 
and British Governments have already discussed the future of Palestine after the war and then 
approached Goldman with a question. “Let’s assume there will be a Jewish state,” Umansky 
asked, “where will you bring the Jews from? You know what is happening in Europe, if we say 
anything about it the response is that it is Soviet propaganda, but you know what is left in 
Europe.” Goldman replied by insisting that a million Jews would still remain alive in Europe 
after the war, that half a million of them will immigrate to Palestine and establish a majority and 
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that this majority “will be the beginning of the Jewish state.” Umansky dismissed these numbers 
as too general and begun to survey the number of surviving Jews and potential for Jewish 
immigration in each European country. Goldman noted that there are also Jews in the United 
States, in Yemen and in Iraq, and that if there will be a Jewish state these communities would 
immigrate to Palestine too. Umansky, a Russian Jew who presented himself to Goldman as 
sympathetic to the Zionist cause, argued that Goldman and Zionist leaders should start thinking 
seriously about Jewish communities in Latin America as future candidates for immigration to 
Palestine if they wish to establish a majority in Palestine.471 
 
“There are no more Jews – there has never been such an anti-Zionist weapon”  
The exchange between Goldman and Umansky was an example of a broader conversation that 
took place among Zionist leaders beginning in 1944. As Zionist leaders had registered the vast 
extent of Jewish destruction in Europe, and particularly following the German occupation of 
Hungary in March 1944 and the beginning of the extermination of the largest remaining Jewish 
community in Europe, they had recognized that they would have to radically revise the Biltmore 
vision to fit the new demographic realities of the postwar Jewish world. Rather than dismissing 
the vision of the Jewish state as Lichtheim proposed, Zionist leaders searched for new candidates 
for immigration to Palestine to replace the fast disappearing Jewish communities in Europe, 
revised their estimates regarding the number of postwar Jewish immigrants from around two 
million to one million and proposed extending the time-frame required for the establishment of a 
Jewish majority in Palestine from immediately after the war to several years after its conclusion.  
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Indeed, after the Nazi occupation of Hungary Weizmann for the first time confessed 
about the need to radically revise the Biltmore program – without Hungarian Jewry there was no 
scenario in which European Jews outside the Soviet Union alone could constitute a majority in 
Palestine. Weizmann’s letter to Weisgal discussed above was written three weeks after German 
forces occupied Budapest. As Weizmann put at the beginning of the letter:   
 
“The paramount question today, to my mind – what governs and will increasingly govern 
the situation – is the disappearance of the Jews of Europe. Now that Roumania472 and 
Hungary have fallen into the clutches of the Germans, and that preparations are already 
being made for the extermination of these last groups of European Jews, we shall be left 
in Europe with one huge cemetery of everything Jewish that has been built over the last 
thousand year. ….   With this [the European] community gone I see grave dangers 
looming ahead of us….” 473 
 
Weizmann acknowledged in the letter that the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine through 
the transfer of the remnant of European Jews is no longer feasible and dedicated his letter to a 
new vision – the creation of a Chalutz (pioneer) movement among American Jews to bring about 
a significant number of Jewish immigrants from the United States to Palestine. “I have been 
wondering what measures we can take by way of at least partial remedy,” Weizmann observed,  
“of course, it is not within the power of one man, or any group of men, to counteract the effects 
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of an apocalyptic catastrophe, but there are one or two things which it seems to me we might do, 
and do now.” Weizmann elaborated:  
 
“First of all, a group of young men – able men – from Palestine should go to the United 
States and draw the attention of the community to these problems. Even more important, 
in my opinion, is that steps should be taken to induce young American men to go to settle 
in Palestine as soon as ever possible – in other words, the rapid organization of a regular 
chalutz movement of sizeable dimensions, now, without waiting for the end of the war. 
… we ought to begin with children of fifteen or sixteen, like the Habonim here, and 
prepare them to go to Palestine in a year or two.”474 
 
The disappearance of European Jews, Weizmann argued, “emphasizes the importance of a 
movement in American Jewry, particularly among the young people, in favor of emigration to 
Palestine.” Weizmann noted that he has already taken steps to promote this vision and discussed 
it with Moshe Shertok, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, who said he 
would gather a group of men to go on this a mission and that the Yishuv will finance this 
operation. Weizmann concluded by dramatically emphasizing that the creation of a postwar 
pioneer and immigration movement among American Jews “is a matter of paramount importance 
which over-rides almost everything else.”475 Weizmann emphasized this point again in a 
December 1944 letter to American Supreme Court judge Felix Frankfuter. “[T]he influx of 
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young American blood is very essential [for Zionism] …” Weizmann argued, “it is perhaps the 
central problem which we will face in the postwar period.”476  
 In his address before the November 1944 World Jewish Congress War Emergency 
Conference in Atlantic city, Weizmann made a moving plea to American Jews to augment their 
historic focus on philanthropy and advocacy on behalf of Zionism with the establishment of an 
American Jewish immigrant movement. American Jewry, Weizmann declared, will bear the 
burden of reconstructing the postwar Jewish world but “money alone will not suffice.” Now, 
given that European Jewry is “decimated, improvished, physically and spiritually broken” the 
Zionist movement “shall also need the manpower of the American Jewish community.” 
Weizmann declared: 
 
“We shall need a new form of Chalutizuit from the Western shores of the Atlantic. A 
Chalutziut of sturdy young men and women who by their experience and their skill and 
by the example of their patriotism and devotion will be able to cooperate in the building 
of the Jewish Commonwealth, and thus guide and comfort the destitute remnants of 
European Jewry, who will press against the gates of Palestine to build a new life from 
themselves. It is a Chalutziut called for not, heaven forbid, by personal need or interest, 
but by a higher and greater urge – the urge to participate in the Redemption and 
Emancipation of Jewish life.”477 
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Weizmann emphasized that if American Jews do not live up to this task – the Zionist movement 
may be over: 
 
“In this grave hour of national responsibility I appeal to my fellow-Zionists of America 
and American Jewry at large, to think of the providential circumstances that has given 
them this great opportunity, perhaps the last to rescue and restore out of the wreckage, the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of our people whose only hope today is Palestine, not only 
by organizing … large national funds … but also by their personal participation. If the 
Jewish Commonwealth is to built in our day, it will come to pass only through the toil 
and sacrifice of Jews of America joined in sacred partnership with the remnants of Jewry 
who are about to regain their freedom.”478  
 
Weizmann was not alone in viewing the future of Zionism as dependent on what he termed the 
influx of ‘young American blood’. In his letter to Namier, Lichtheim too noted that “without a 
strong Zionist movement in the English speaking countries, there will be no Zionist movement 
after the war.”479 And as noted above, Shertok too sought to organize an advocacy group from 
the Yishuv that would lay the ground for future American Jewish immigration to Palestine after 
the war.  
It is not clear whether Weizmann and Shertok genuinely believed they could organize an 
American Jewish immigration movement large enough to compensate for the masses of Jews 
that had been exterminated in Europe – even if their writings do indicate they hoped they could 
bring thousands or tens of thousands of Jews from the United States. Shertok openly recognized 																																																								
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that the number of American Jewish immigrants to Palestine has been so far “almost nil” 
compared to the need of the Yishuv for them but at the same time observed that “we must prepare 
this [American Jewish] reservoir … for immigration”.480 Lichtheim too remarked that a large-
scale Jewish immigration movement form English speaking countries to Palestine is unlikely.481 
But the question of American Jewish immigration to Palestine nonetheless became central to 
Weizmann’s and Shertok’s postwar vision after 1944. There are two main reasons why they 
insisted a Chalutz movement in the United States was vital for the future of Zionism. First, both 
believed that the future of Zionism depended not only on ‘quantity’ – establishing a Jewish 
majority, but also on “quality” – brining to Palestine socialist pioneers and middle class 
professionals that will economically develop the land, and American Jews seemed to them as 
ideal candidates to replace the Polish Jewish youth and German Jewish middle class immigration 
of the 1930s. Indeed, in his letter to Frankfurter Weizmann observed that American Jews are 
needed not only because of the “devastated conditions of European Jewry, but primarily because 
of the positive and stabilizing effect American Jewish manpower can play in the expanding 
economy as well as the political equilibrium of a Jewish Palestine”.482 This emphasis on 
American Jews as “quality” immigrants was also proposed to counter, as we shall see, the vision 
of large-scale Jewish immigration from Islamic countries, which Shertok openly argued was 
“quantitatively” valuable but lacking in pioneer qualities.483  Moreover, both understood that the 
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destruction of European Jewry took away important political capital from Zionism – Zionism 
was no longer needed as a solution for the non-existent “Jewish problem ” in Europe. A demand 
by American Jews to settle in Palestine themselves, Weizmann and Shertok argued, would infuse 
Zionism with great political capital – American Jewry was to be the largest Jewish community in 
the postwar world, based in the emerging world superpower, and thus would carry significance 
in the international political arena unlike the destitute remnants of Eastern European Jews or the 
Jews of Arab countries. As Weizmann observed in his letter to Weisgall, “I do not see how they 
[the British] can possibly bar American citizens from settling in Palestine if they choose to do 
so.”484 Shertok too noted that “if American Jews demand immigration for themselves – there 
would be enormous significance for such a demand.”485 
Weizmann and Shertok’s growing focus on American Jewry came together with the 
formulation of a revised time frame for the realization of the Biltmore vision. During the 
Biltmore conference Weizmann had in fact already argued – against Ben-Gurion’s view – that 
the future Jewish state should not be established immediately after the war but rather only after 
several years of large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine. The destruction of European Jewry 
– and the realization that the establishment of a Jewish majority would require a longer process 
of immigration - further convinced Weizmann of the necessity of this approach. Shertok also 
articulated this view. In the December 1944 convention of the Assembly of Representatives, the 
parliamentary body of the Yishuv, Shertok declared that the Biltmore program did not imply the 
immediate establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine after the war but rather only a declaration 
that the establishment of a Jewish state was the ultimate goal of the Zionist movement. Several 
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observers in the Jewish press quickly noted that Shertok statement amounted to a significant 
reformulation of the Biltmore program.486 In an August 1946 article Lichtheim mocked the 
debate among Zionist leaders over the time frame for the realization of the Biltmore program as a 
meaningless theoretical discussion, an empty pilpul. At the same time as Hitler was murdering 
10,000 Jews per day, Lichtheim observed, Zionist leaders were debating whether the Jewish state 
should be established before the millions of Jews (that no longer exists) immigrate to Palestine or 
several years after.487  
Similarly to Weizmann, Ben-Gurion too was promoted to revise the Biltmore program 
after the German occupation of Hungary. As knowledge on the extermination of Jews in Europe 
became clearer over the course of 1944, and as the war continued into its fifth year and now 
encompassed the Jews of Hungary, Ben-Gurion realized that the Biltmore vision of the transfer 
of two million Jews to Palestine was no longer feasible. 
 Ben-Gurion brought up the need to reexamine the Biltmore program in a fateful June 
1944 meeting of the Zionist executive. As he noted at the beginning of the meeting, the war’s 
end is near and it is time to look carefully at “our political program” and “make it more 
concrete”. The main reason for this reexamination, Ben-Gurion argued, is “the extermination of 
6 million Jews” which “is not just a Jewish fact but a Zionist political fact.” The extermination of 
European Jewry, Ben-Gurion argued, “could completely destroy Zionism.”488 As Ben-Gurion 
powerfully put it in a subsequent meeting of the exectutive, ״there are no more Jews – there has 
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never been such a powerful anti-Zionist weapon. Everyone asks himself the question – where 
will we bring Jews to Palestine from?”489 
 Though Ben-Gurion ostensibly remained committed to the Biltmore program in the 
meeting, he laid out several significant revisions to the program. The first major revision was 
radically revising his demographic estimate of the number of postwar Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine. Ben-Gurion expressed his hope at the meeting that the fate of the remaining million 
Jews in Hungary will be better than the six million Jews he believed had already been 
exterminated in Europe. It should be noted that in 1944 Ben-Gurion estimated that more Jews 
had been murdered than had actually perished in the war – the figure of six million he invoked 
did not yet include the full number of the over half a million Jews murdered in Hungary and the 
victims of the death marches. Werner Senator, a member of the executive, criticized Ben-Gurion 
in the meeting for his pessimistic predictions. “It is painful,” Senator observed, “if those sitting 
around this table are willing to accept the number of six million Jews. We know that many had 
been murdered, but we should not rush and declare a definite number.” Ben-Gurion replied: “I 
hope we will be proven wrong.” “If Senator is right, we will all be happy … the more Jews in 
Europe the stronger Zionism will be … without Jews in Europe Zionism will face far greater 
challenges.”490 This overly pessimistic estimate of the number of Jewish victims that seems to 
have dominated the thinking of Zionist leaders in late 1944 – expecting about half a million more 
victims than had actually perished - could explain the shocking statement by Eliyahu Golomb, 
commander of the Jewish paramilitary group the Hagganah, in October 1944 that “more Jews 
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survived in Europe than we expected.”491 Based on his prediction on the scale of the 
extermination Ben-Gurion argued that the Biltmore program should now focus on brining one 
million Jews to Palestine after the war. “At first I argued for a minimum of two million Jews,” 
Ben-Gurion observed, “now that we have been exterminated I say one million.”492  
 Given the scale of destruction in Europe, one million Jewish immigrants to Palestine was 
still a very large number and Ben-Gurion sought to carefully lay out throughout 1944 and early 
1945 a specific demographic argument for how to cull this number of Jewish immigrants.  
 The first component of the plan was the transfer to Palestine 500,000 Jews from Europe 
out of the expected remnant of one to one and half million Jewish survivors outside the Soviet 
Union. When Ben-Gurion laid out early in the war his vision of transferring two million Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine he expected there would remain some three to five million Jews in 
Europe after the war. Thus, even after a large-scale Jewish transfer form Europe to Palestine, a 
considerable Jewish population would remain in Europe. By mid-1944 however Ben-Gurion 
recognized that the postwar Jewish transfer to Palestine would effectively end Jewish communal 
life in Eastern Europe. During the interwar period, and even at the beginning of the war, Ben-
Gurion supported in principle – though was never at the forefront of – the efforts of Zionist and 
other Jewish diaspora nationalist leaders to fight for Jewish minority rights and equality in East 
Central Europe.493 Yet in 1944 Ben-Gurion began to portray the fight for Jewish minority rights 
and equality as foe of Zionism - every single Jewish survivor mattered for the demographic 
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balance in Palestine, and the restoration of Jewish rights in Europe, Ben-Gurion concluded, 
might induce less Jews to immigrate.  
Ben-Gurion powerfully expressed this view in a September 1944 meeting of the Zionist 
executive. Goldman attended the meeting and proposed that the Jewish Agency send a delegation 
to a conference on Jewish rights in the postwar period that will lay out demands both for the 
restoration of Jewish rights in Europe and for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in 
Palestine (the conference took place in November 1944 as the World Jewish Congress War 
Emergency Conference also known as the Atlantic City Conference). Ben-Gurion vigorously 
opposed sending an official Zionist delegation from the Yishuv to participate in this conference. 
Joining such a conference, Ben-Gurion argued, would be a “disaster” for Zionism. The vision of 
‘Helsingfors Zionism’ that this conference promoted – fighting for both Jewish rights in Europe 
and Palestine – can no longer be endorsed by Zionists leaders after the war as it had been at the 
end of the First World War. After the last war, Ben-Gurion remarked, “we had the Balfour 
Declaration, now – we have the White Paper, then there were Jews, now – they are gone … is the 
situation comparable?” Ben-Gurion also feared that Zionist participation in a united Jewish 
demand for Jewish rights in postwar Europe could be used by the British to give Jews 
‘concessions’ in Europe and deflect Zionist demands regarding Palestine. Eliyahu Dobkin, head 
of the immigration department of the Jewish Agency, reiterated Ben-Gurion’s view in the 
meeting. “When there were 18 million Jews in the world, and 9 million of them lived in Europe,” 
he observed, “we [Zionists] could support the ‘luxury’ of Jewish rights in the diaspora” but now 
this was no longer the case.494 This meeting protocol – which to the best of my knowledge has 
not been discussed in scholarship – is a rare document that reconstructs the moment in which 
Zionist leaders openly disavowed the interwar Jewish national consensus based on a dual fight 																																																								
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for Jewish minority rights in Europe and settlement in Palestine, as explored in the previous 
chapters. This document should be read together with Robinson’s 1943 letter discussed at the 
beginning of chapter I – in which a prominent leader of diaspora nationalism argued that Jewish 
nationalism can no longer promote the twin goals of minority rights and state building in 
Palestine. These two documents are milestones in the central story of this dissertation – how 
Jewish nationalism became focused exclusively on the idea of a nation-state during the war and 
in its immediate aftermath.  
 Ben-Gurion’s view that Zionism was now in a fierce competition with Jewish equality in 
Europe also emerged out of his fear over the rise of communist regimes across Eastern Europe 
from late 1944. In December 1944 Ben-Gurion embarked on a trip to Romania and Bulgaria to 
gain a first hand impression of the political desires of Jewish survivors in Europe (he was 
eventually granted admittance only to Bulgaria).495 In September 1944 the Soviet Union 
occupied Bulgaria from the Nazis and set-up a communist regime. Ben-Gurion regarded the new 
communist regime in Bulgaria – as well as those established in Poland and Romania at around 
the same time - as dangerous for Zionism precisely because they were staunchly and vocally 
committed to complete legal equality for Jews. Ben-Gurion referred to a declaration the 
Bulgarian government issued on Jewish equality and argued that promoting Jewish rights will be 
used as a “shield” by the Soviet Union and the new communist regimes in the region to express 
their progressivism. Ben-Gurion was alarmed by reports that the Jewish youth in Bulgaria is 
excited about the new communist regime. The Soviet Union will be the ruler in Eastern Europe, 
Ben-Gurion observed, and when Zionists will try to win over Jewish hearts and minds and 
																																																								
495 Ben-Gurion’s diaries and writing from his first trip to Europe in 1944 and subsequent trip in 1946 were collected 
and published in Tuvia Frilling (editor), Visits in the Valley of Death: Ben-Gurion’s Journeys to Bulgaria, Sweden 
and the Displaced Persons Camps in Germany (Sede Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Institute, Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev, 2014) two volumes.  
	 232 
promise security and equality, the Jews in the region might respond that the Soviet Union can do 
such a better job in protecting their rights and security.496    
 The second component of the plan Ben-Gurion outlined in the meeting was the transfer of 
hundreds of thousands of Jews from Islamic countries to Palestine after the war. Between the 
wars and in the first years of the war, the Jewish communities in the Islamic countries did not 
occupy a significant place in Zionist thinking on Jewish immigration. The Zionist leadership 
focused on the ‘selective’ immigration of young Jewish socialist pioneers and believed that the 
slow and steady immigration of the Jewish population from Eastern Europe will suffice for the 
future creation of a majority. Moreover, Zionist leaders considered the Jewish communities in 
Islamic countries as culturally ‘backward’ and ‘degenerate’ and as unfit for the creation of what 
they hoped would be a new, modern and socialist European society in Palestine. Only after news 
on the extermination of European Jewry began to register with Zionist leaders from late 1942, 
did they turn to consider the large-scale immigration of Jews from the Middle East and North 
Africa as a potential ‘replacement’ for the disappearing Jewish communities in Eastern 
Europe.497 In June 1943 Dobkin gave voice to this new mindset in a meeting of Mapai central 																																																								
496 Zionist Executive Meeting, Protocol, 28.9.1944 (afternoon), CZA. 
 
497 Ben-Gurion’s vision of transferring Jews from Islamic countries to Palestine in response to the extermination of 
European Jewry – in other words, Ben-Gurion’s vision of the Jews of the East as mere demographic fodder rather 
than desirable immigrants – has been carefully discussed in the scholarship. Yet the scholarship on the topic has 
highlighted this moment mainly as part of a larger scholarly and public debate over the birth of the “Mizrahi” 
question in Israeli society. The most prominent articulation of this reading is Yehuoda Shenhav’s powerful argument 
that during the war Ben-Gurion invented the Jews of the “East” as a unified category for the purpose of immigration, 
overlooking the important differences between various Jewish communities in Islamic countries. This chapter seeks 
to place Ben-Gurion’s and Zionist leaders wartime preoccupation with the Jews of Islamic countries in a different 
context of a broader intra-Zionist debate over how to preserve the vision of the Jewish state and the idea of a Jewish 
majority in light of the extermination in Europe. Once placed in this context Ben-Gurion’s postwar immigration plan 
– which is described in scholarship as the ‘one million plan’ – no longer appears as the carefully laid out vision of 
the founding father of the Jewish state but rather as reflecting a moment of acute crisis in the history of Zionism. As 
we have seen above and in chapter 4, Ben-Gurion originally planned for two million Jews from Eastern Europe to 
immigrate to Palestine and establish a Jewish majority after the war. When he laid out the one million vision it was 
in response to his and other Zionist leader’s growing doubts over the feasibly of the Jewish state program. While the 
existing scholarship acknowledges the link between the holocaust and the turn to explore the immigration of Jews  
from Islamic countries, it does not fully reflect the important context in which the distinction between the ‘two 
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committee that decided on sending Zionist emissaries to Islamic countries. “We do not know 
how many Jews will be left in Europe after the extermination … thus the practical value of these 
three quarter to a million Jews [in the Middle East and North Africa] has risen to the level of an 
important political factor… ”498 Ben-Gurion expressed a similar idea in 1943, the fate of the 
Jews of the East has come to dominate the Zionist agenda, he observed, “because of the 
catastrophe that took place in Europe ….” In the June 1944 meeting of the Zionist executive 
discussed above, Ben-Gurion thus argued that Jewish communities in Islamic countries should 
be brought over to Palestine almost in their entirety – or at least in large enough numbers to 
reach the coveted figure of one million Jewish immigrants to Palestine after the war.499 Ben-
Gurion argued that the large-scale immigration of Jews from the East will be aided by pogroms 
and massacres he predicated would take place against them after the war – which will be carried 
out in response to Zionist settlement activities in Palestine. With the memory of reports on the 
Farhud pogrom in Iraq that saw a death toll of 180 Jews fresh in mind, Ben-Gurion argued that 
Iraqi Jewry will be “slaughtered” after the war and insisted that it was now the role of the Zionist 
movement to take responsibility for their security by preparing for their immigration.500  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
million’ and ‘one million’ plans were born. The first and still standard study of Ben-Gurion’s postwar immigration 
vision is titled ‘The One Million Plan’ – rather than the ‘Two Million Plan’  - and suggests that this plan had its 
origins in the late 1930s. This view is also reflected in Esther Meir Glitzenstein’s recent examination of the plan 
where she notes that the ‘One Million Plan’ was “expressed in the mid 1930s and fleshed out in late 1942, after the 
adoption of the Biltmore program.” See Yehouda Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, 
Religion and Ethnicity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 19-48; Dvora Hacohen, The One Million Plan: 
Ben-Gurion’s Plan for Mass Immigration, 1942-1945 (Ministry of Defense, Israel, 1994); Esther Meir Glitzenstein, 
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498 Minutes of Mapai Central Committee, July 12, 1943. Ben-Gurion Papers, item 229318. See also Meir 
Glitzenstein, Zionism in an Arab Country, p. 47.  
 




Missing form Zionist leaders’ immigration calculations was the country with the second 
largest Jewish population – the Soviet Union, home to some two million Jews in 1945.501 Zionist 
leaders all assumed that Soviet Jewry was out of the question as far as postwar immigration was 
concerned. The Soviet Union, they believed, will not allow for a mass Jewish immigration 
movement and the issue of postwar immigration from the Soviet Union was thus rarely broached 
in either public discussions of the Biltmore program or in the meetings of the Zionist executive. 
And Zionist leaders also repeatedly noted that their demographic calculations concerning 
postwar Europe refer to Jews outside the Soviet Union. Indeed, it will not be until the 1970s and 
onward that the topic of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union will come to the fore of 
Zionist politics.502 
The vision of large-scale immigration Ben-Gurion and Weizmann articulated during the 
war did not materialize in the first years after the war. Indeed, Jewish immigration to Palestine in 
the first postwar years was rather insignificant – mainly, as we shall see, as a result of two 
factors: the British government’s decision to continue the 1939 White Paper policy after the war 
and oppose large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine; and the unexpectedly small size of the 
Jewish statelessness problem. Most of the remaining Jews in postwar Eastern Europe outside the 
Soviet Union – around 600,000 in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary combined – were granted 
complete civic equality in those states in the Soviet sphere of influence. Ben-Gurion’s fears over 
the dangers of communist regime’s commitment to Jewish equality for the prospects of future 
Jewish immigration to Palestine were thus based on a correct assessment. It was implausible for 																																																								
501 See the entry on Jewish population in 1945 in the Holocaust Encyclopedia of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, based on data published in the 1945 American Jewish Yearbook. 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005687 
 
502 For a recent study on Soviet Jewish immigration movement that takes account of all of the scholarship see 
Nathan Kurz, “A Sphere above the Nations?”: The Rise and Fall of International Jewish Human Rights Politics, 
1945-1975 (Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Yale University, 2015), chapter 5.  
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Zionist leaders to make the case that those Jewish communities needed to immigrate imminently 
when their states promised to protect their equality and rights. The problem of Jewish 
statelessness in postwar Europe was ultimately in the scale of hundreds of thousands rather than 
millions as Ben-Gurion and Weizmann initially imagined would be the case. The question of 
Jewish stateless became tantamount to the fate of Jews in displaced persons camps in Germany, 
Austria and Italy which numbered around 250,000 and included Jews liberated from the camps, 
those who survived in hiding and Jews who fled pogroms in Poland, among them a large number 
of the 100,000 Jews who were repatriated to Poland from the Soviet Union after the war. The 
vision of large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine only materialized after the state of Israel 
was established in 1948 – some 670,00 Jews arrived in Palestine between 1948 and 1951, about 
half of them from Europe (mainly from displaced persons camps and Romania) and half from 
Muslim and North African countries (the majority of which immigrated form Iraq). The state of 
Israel was thus established not through the transfer of million of Jews as Ben-Gurion envisioned 
but rather with a Jewish population roughly identical to that of the Yishuv 1939. And rather than 
two millions Jewish immigrants from Europe as the Biltmore vision called for, only around 





503 On the mass immigration of Jews to Israel and the so-called “demographic revolution”, mainly between 1948 and 
1952 see Schmaltz, “Mass Immigration from Asia and North Africa,” as well as Dvora Hacohen, “Mass immigration 
and the demographic revolution in Israel,” Israel Affairs vol. 8 no. 1-2, 177-190; Hacohen, “Mass immigration and 
the Israeli political system, 1948–1953,” Studies in Zionism 8 1987, 99-113; Aviva Halamish, “Zionist Immigration 
Policy put to the Test: Historical Analysis of Israel’s Immigration Policy, 1948-1951,” Journal of Modern Jewish 
Studies, vol. 7 (2008), 119-134. The subject of the absorption of Jewish immigrants – particularly Mizrahi Jews – 
and how it intersected with ethnic and racial divisions among Jews as social inequalities has been the topic of a vast 
literature that this chapter does not deal with.  
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“The Biltmore program, if it will not be realized as a partition plan, will not be realized at 
all”  
As we have seen above, Zionist leaders adopted various strategies to adjust the Biltmore program 
to the scale of Jewish extermination in Europe: They proposed new candidates for immigration, 
called to extend the time-frame of the process of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine, and 
revised the estimate of the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Yet another significant 
strategy to establish a Jewish majority Zionist leaders considered as they grappled with the 
Jewish catastrophe was to create a state in a partitioned Palestine – thereby reducing the number 
of Jews required to ‘offset’ the country’s Arab majority.  
 The idea of partition first entered Zionist discussion in 1937, in response to the Peel 
Commission recommendations to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Ben-Gurion 
and Weizmann, alongside several other prominent Zionist leaders, enthusiastically endorsed the 
idea of partition at the time. Yet as we have seen in chapter 3, the Peel Commission’s 
recommendations were a rather short lived affair – officially tabled by the British government 
just several months after they were first proposed.504  
 When Ben-Gurion and Weizmann laid out the Biltmore program in May 1942, they 
rejected idea of partition. The Biltmore program called for the resettlement of at least two 
millions Jewish refugees in Palestine after the war – a feat that would be unfeasible, they argued, 
in just a small part of Palestine. In his October 1941 Notes of Zionist Policy, a treatise in which 
he first laid out his postwar program, Ben-Gurion thus insisted that the boundaries of the future 
Jewish state should include “at least the whole of Western Palestine”– that is, the boundaries of 
the pre-1923 Palestine mandate excluding Transjordan (without explicitly relinquishing the claim 																																																								
504 See chapter 3. 
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to Transjordan). And though Ben-Gurion observed that “we were right in our attitude toward the 
Peel Commission report” at its time, it would now be “an irreparable mistake to suggest partition 
as a way of establishing a Jewish state” given “… the magnitude of the Jewish problem, the size 
of the imminent Jewish immigration …”.505 Weizmann too rejected the vision of partition and 
articulated a new dismissive attitude toward the Peel Commission report. In a 1941 meeting with 
Lord Moyn, British minister for the Middle East, Weizmann argued that he would now agree to 
accept the Peel Commission report only if it did not include its ‘territorial aspect’ – that is, he 
would accept only those recommendations pertaining to the establishment of a Jewish state and 
the transfer of Arabs from it with the exception of the call to partition the mandate.506 
 Despite Ben-Gurion’s and Weizmann’s vigorous rejection of partition in both their 
private writings and public statements, it is hard to believe they did not recognize that the 
Biltmore program may very well lead to the establishment of a Jewish state in a partitioned 
Palestine. As we have seen in chapter 3, Ussishkin criticized Ben-Gurion’s Biltmore vision as an 
implausible political conception: transferring millions of Jews to a country in which Arabs 
constitute a majority and establishing a Jewish state could only take place either by a period of 
Jewish minority rule or by expelling the local Arab population from Palestine.507 Yet another 
option to establish a majority under such conditions Ussishkin did not raise was to partition the 
land, thereby reducing the number of Jews required to create a majority. As large-scale Arab 
transfer and Jewish minority rule were not likely to win over Allied support, partition appeared 
as the most plausible way to establish a Jewish majority.  																																																								
505 David Ben-Gurion, “Notes on Zionist Policy,” 15 October 1941, CZA Z4\31083-72. See chapter three for a 
contextualization of this document.  
 
506 “Note of Meeting Held at the Court, St. Swithin’s Lane, E.C.,” Protocol, September 9, 1941, Ben-Gurion Papers, 
Item 1751. See also chapter 3 and 4.  
 
507 See chapter 4.  
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 From late 1942 a growing movement on the Zionist left had begun to vigorously oppose 
the Biltmore program precisely on these grounds – the Biltmore vision, they argued, would 
inevitably lead to partition and should thus be rejected (At the time an ideological commitment 
to Jewish settlement across the entire land of ‘historic’ Palestine was a consensus view that 
united the Zionist left and right, mainly in opposition to Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s 
willingness in 1937 to accede to the British partition proposal.) Since Palestine was in reality a 
bi-national Arab-Jewish state with an Arab majority, opponents of the Biltmore program on the 
left argued, any attempt to bring in masses of Jews and establish a Jewish state would result in 
partition – there was no other way to offset the Arab demographic superiority in Palestine 
without instilling Jewish minority rule or expelling the Arab population. This line of reasoning 
was powerfully articulated in a January 1944 editorial in the left-wing paper Al-Hamishmar:  
 
“The inevitable outcome of the Biltmore program is partition. Why? Because the 
Biltmore program says ‘the entirety of Palestine is mine.’ But any Zionist leader who has 
any sense of reality knows that any program that is based on the notion of “all of 
Palestine is mine” will never come into being, could not come into being. The proponent 
of Biltmore - as opposed to the idea of Palestine as a common homeland for two nations - 
must recognize that he endorses the outcome - divide the land!” 
 
The same editorial in fact argued that some of the proponents of the Biltmore program –
seemingly hinting at Ben-Gurion himself – “unknowingly” support partition, because they refuse 
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to recognize that partition would be the outcome of establishing a Jewish state in a bi-national 
Arab-Jewish country.508  
Despite these criticisms, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann continued to both publicly and 
privately reject partition throughout the war. It is particularly striking that while the 
extermination of European Jewry prompted Ben-Gurion and Weizmann to publicly reassess 
many aspects of the Biltmore vision, it did not lead them to consider partition, even as they must 
have recognized that scale of Jewish death in the war strengthened the argument of left-wing 
opponents of the Biltmore program. It was one thing to except to gain Allied support for a Jewish 
state in the whole of Palestine when the Zionist movement proposed to solve an expected Jewish 
refugee problem in the millions in postwar Europe, but very different after those Jews had been 
exterminated and the Zionist movement was surveying the globe in the search of enough Jewish 
candidates for immigration in the hope of establishing a majority. Ya’akov Hazan, one of the 
leaders of the left-wing opposition to the Biltmore program, gave voice to this new calculation in 
a December 1945 editorial in Al-Hamishmar. “We are feeling in every fiber of our bones,” 
Hazan observed, “how terrible is the fate of the European Jewish diaspora.” “Now only few can 
deny,” he argued, “… that the Biltmore program, if it will not be realized as a partition plan, will 
not be realized at all.”509  
As the war reached its end however Ben-Gurion, Weizmann and other Zionist leaders 
increasingly gravitated toward the idea of partition. This change was motivated by two main 
factors. The first was the dire international situation in which the Zionist moment found itself at 
the war’s end. Indeed, the political prospects for Zionism after the war could not be further away 
																																																								
508 “In Plain Sight,” Al-Hamishmar, 07.01.1944, p.8. See also “We Must Stay Vigilant,” Al-Hamishmar 15.12.1943, 
p. 4 and Ben-Gurion’s response to these accusations “A Binational State Implies Partition,” Davar, 07.01.1944, p.6.  
 
509 Ya’akov Hazan , “In Search of our Direction,” Al-Hamishmar, 10.12.1945, p. 2.  
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from the dreams Ben-Gurion and Weizmann laid out in the Biltmore conference. Ben-Gurion 
and Weizmann hoped to find millions of Jewish refugees in postwar Europe and the British and 
American governments committed to supporting their mass immigration to Palestine. In practice 
the Jewish refugee problem was miniscule compared to Ben-Gurion and Weizmann’s original 
predictions – the postwar ‘Jewish question’ in Europe became tantamount in international 
discussions to the fate of hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees, most of whom fled from 
Eastern Europe to Displaced Persons camps in Germany. At the same time, the British 
government declared its continued commitment to the 1939 White Paper policy and to turning 
Palestine into a Palestinian state based on Arab majority rule, and was only willing to concede to 
Zionist leaders a form of provincial autonomy or Jewish ruled-cantons. And the American 
government, far from endorsing the establishment of a Jewish state, was only committed, 
following the publication of the Harrison report, to supporting the immigration of 100,000 Jews 
from DP Camps to Palestine as a humanitarian gesture. An armed insurrection by Jewish 
paramilitary groups and terrorist organizations in the Yishuv aimed at pressuring the British 
government to revise its policy ended in failure and was quashed by the British government 
during Operation Agatha in August 1946, also known in Zionist historiography as “Black 
Saturday,” with the arrests of thousands of Jewish members of these organization and mass 
confiscation of weapons.510  
																																																								
510 Scholars have convincingly argued that Zionist leaders’ postwar embrace of partition was a form of political 
compromise in the face of the diminishing prospects for Zionism in the postwar international arena. This chapter 
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context of Zionist wartime and early postwar demographic calculations – partition also emerged, I argue, because 
Zionist leaders recognized there were not enough Jews left to establish a majority in the whole of mandatory 
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a Jewish majority in Palestine and in particular as the scale of Jewish destruction became evident toward the end of 
the war and in its immediate aftermath. The discussion of the international context for the Zionist movement’s 
embrace of partition in this chapter draws significantly on the pioneering works of Joseph Heller and Michael J. 
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The sense of crisis shared by Zionist leaders at the face of fierce British opposition to 
Zionist demands was compounded by the fact Zionist leaders believed that “time was running 
out” – that unless they managed to facilitate the immigration of Jewish DP’s to Palestine 
immediately, these Jewish refugees will seek other solutions for themselves and the Great 
Powers will find new ways to alleviate the small remaining ‘Jewish problem’ in Europe either by 
reintegrating Jews into their formers countries or finding new avenues for immigration. Ben-
Gurion powerfully articulated this position in a December 1944 speech. Expecting imminent 
Allied victory in the war, Ben-Gurion argued that there was a factor of “fateful significance for 
the future of Zionism. It is the factor of time.” If the small remnant of European Jewry will not 
be transferred to Palestine immediately, he declared, they might begin to find avenues for 
immigration and resettlement elsewhere, and if that would be the case “who has any certainty 
that we will be able in the future to facilitate the immigration of the Jewish remnant in 
Europe?”511 
In August 1946, in response to this sense of crisis, the executive of the Jewish Agency 
officially endorsed partition as its proposal to the British and American governments. The 
immediate context for this decision was the question of the attitude of the Zionist movement 
toward the Morrison Grady scheme. After the British government rejected the recommendations 
of the 1946 Anglo-American Committee for the immediate admittance of 100,000 Jewish DP’s 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Cohen on the topic. See Joseph Heller, “From ‘The Black Saturday’ to the Partition Proposal: The Summer of 1946 
as a Turning Point in Zionist Policy,” Zion, 3 4 (1977), 314-361 as well as Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 
primarily chapter 7. See also Judis, Genesis. 
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to Palestine, for the cancellation of the White Paper policy and the establishment of a trusteeship 
over Palestine, it summoned a committee of British and American experts to lay out a new plan. 
The committee proposed the Morrison Grady scheme that called for the creation in Palestine of a 
British led federation with separate Jewish and Arab provincial autonomies and two autonomous 
regions under British control. In late 1946 Zionist leaders became fearful that Truman would 
throw his support behind the provincial autonomy scheme. Zionist leaders concluded that the 
only way to counter American support for this plan was by laying out a compromise alternative 
that could seem reasonable to the US government – and endorsed a partition plan that drew on 
the Morrison Grady scheme as a basis for further negotiations.  
In August 1946 the Zionist executive met in Paris to officially formulate its position on 
the matter. This meeting took place in atmosphere of great despair regarding the future of 
Zionism and Jews after the war. Zionist leaders met just days after the British military 
crackdown on the Yishuv in Palestine that effectively quashed the Jewish armed opposition. 
August 1946 was also the peak of the flight of Jews from Poland to DP camps in Germany, 
prompted by a series of pogroms and outbreak of anti-Jewish violence. At the same time, Jewish 
organization took part in the Paris Conference, in an effort to secure new collective rights for 
Jews in postwar Europe.512 Zionist leaders understood that unless they managed to bring these 
Jews to Palestine others solutions will be found for them, potentially through the restoration of 
Jewish rights and property and compensations – matters that were discussed at the same time at 
the Paris Conference. In a series of meetings of the Zionist executive Goldman led the effort to 
convince Zionist leaders of the urgency of endorsing a partition proposal right away. The 
American government and the liberal public in the United States, he argued, is growing tired of 																																																								
512 See chapter I.  
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Zionist aspiration, and the Zionist movement should thus come up with a plan the American 
government could support, otherwise “we are to come out of this period of Zionist history as a 
defeated movement.” 513 Moreover, Goldman insisted, unless the Jews in the DP camps will be 
transferred to Palestine immediately, the Zionist movement may never find the necessary man-
power for the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine. “I am not optimistic about the reserves 
of man-power in the Jewish world. We have lost over six million Jews in Europe, the main 
source of our man-power resources for Palestine.” “Unless there is Fascism and pogroms in 
America,” Goldman observed, “large masses of Jews will not go from there to Palestine. From 
the million and a half Jews left in Europe, at least half will be able to settle down in their 
countries. They will not leave, they will not lead a very dignified and prosperous life, but they 
will manage to exist.” Goldman elaborated on this demographic assessment and laid out a dire 
scenario for the future of Zionism if it does not manage to immediately gain political concessions 
in Palestine: 
 
“If the half or three-quarters of European Jews who want passionately to go today to 
Palestine, who cannot exist in Europe, have to wait years and years, they will find other 
territories and will be lost to Palestine. The pressure of the Jewish problem has been 
greatly lessend since this war because of Hitler’s annihilation of the Jews. If Palestine 
remains closed for a number of years, the Zionist morale of the D.Ps ‘s must sink. It has 
already begun to sink in the last few months, and other countries will be found for them. 
President Truman wants honestly to get 100,000 visas for Jewish D.Ps for America. … 
Brazil is ready to take in a number of Jews. The British Dominions will have to do 
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something. With the doors to Palestine closed, the United Nations will have to solve the 
problem of the DPs by finding other territories. Therefore, we need fast large-scale 
immigration …” 
 
This analysis prompted Goldman to conclude that the Zionist movement ought to embrace a 
partition proposal – in other words, drop the Biltmore vocabulary and lay out to the Allies the 
minimum political program to which they will accede. “For years we have postponed discussion 
of this issue….  I have always warned that the time will come when we will have to decide 
without notice, and this is the moment.” “I felt for years that partition of Palestine is the only 
way out,” he added, “Biltmore is no realistic policy, because we have no Jewish majority, and we 
cannot wait until we have the majority to get the state.” Overall, Goldman proposed that the 
Zionist executive accept the Morrison Grady proposal as a basis for negotiations so long as 
several amendments to the plan are accepted – the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates for 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, Jewish control over immigration to the Jewish province, an 
improvement in the area of the allotted Jewish province – to roughly correspond to the 1937 Peel 
Commission proposal with the addition of the Negev, and a statement by the British government 
that the cantonization plan is the first step toward a future Jewish state. The executive voted to 
approve Goldman’s proposal (Ben-Gurion abstained and remained overall silent in the meeting, 
knowing full well that the Goldman’s proposal would win a comfortable majority but not willing 
to be officially affiliated with support for partition).514 Goldman promptly left on a mission to 
Washington, DC, in which he presented to Truman the new position of the Zionist executive.  
 																																																								




The endorsement of partition by the Zionist executive in August 1946 did not lead directly to the 
eventual partition of Palestine in 1948. The British government ultimately tabled the Morrison 
Grady plan and transferred the question of Palestine to the United Nations, which appointed a 
special committee (UNSCOP), that in turn devised a new partition proposal, far more favorable 
to Zionist aspiration than the Morrison Grady plan. In this sense partition as a solution to the 
Palestine question was imposed by the international community on the Jewish and Arab 
communities from above - and the history of partition in Palestine must be seen as part of a 
broader postwar embrace of partition as a solution to inter-ethnic conflict in decolonizing 
territories, exemplified most prominently in the case 1947 partition of India.515 Still, the 
endorsement of partition by the Zionist executive in 1946 remains a significant moment for 
understanding how radically the Biltmore vision and Zionist political thought transformed during 
the war and in its immediate aftermath as Zionist leaders grappled with the geopolitical 
implications of the extermination of European Jewry. Rather than a postwar Jewish state in the 
whole of Palestine with a Jewish majority established through the transfer of millions of Eastern 
European Jewish refugees, in 1946 Zionist leaders articulated for the first time a new, post-
Holocaust vision of Jewish statehood – a small state in a partitioned Palestine that was to be 
established through the transfer of several hundreds of thousands of refugees from the small 																																																								
515 Scholars are increasingly examining the political and intellectual links between partition in India and Palestine in 
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Jewish remnant in Europe. This new vision not only spelled the end of the dream of the Biltmore 
program, but also of the various visions of binationalism, Jewish-Arab parity and extensive Arab 
autonomy which, as we have seen in previous chapters, Zionist leaders from Brit Shalom through 
Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky vigorously promoted between the wars.516 These Jewish-Arab 
power-sharing visions by and large rested on the assumption that Jews would ultimately 
demographically match, preferably greatly outnumber, the Arab population in Palestine through 
gradual immigration. By 1946 however, facing the radically transformed demographic realities 
of the postwar Jewish world, Zionist leaders recognized that they faced only two alternatives – a 










This dissertation examined the transformation of Jewish nationalism during the Second World 
War and in its immediate aftermath alongside the ethnic revolution in Europe. The five chapters 
in this dissertation all explored the ways in which Jewish leaders and thinkers re-imagined the 
future of Jewish nationalism as they observed the violent process of ethnic cleansing and the 
Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Europe, and the growth of support among the Allies for population 
transfers of minorities in postwar Europe. As this dissertation has shown, recovering the rich 
reaction of Jewish leaders to these developments is essential for explaining a key transformation 
in the history of Jewish nationalism - the decline of visions of Jewish autonomy and minority 
rights in Eastern Europe, and the emergence of the Jewish ethnic nation-state as the dominant 
form of Jewish national expression. The disappearance of minorities from the multiethnic 
landscape of East Central Europe between 1939-1946 convinced Jewish leaders there was no 
future for Jewish nationalism in the region. And the consolidation of the ethnic nation-state as 
the political norm across the region prompted Zionist leaders to imagine Palestine as a Jewish 
ethnic nation-state, a vision that, as we have seen, Zionist leaders considered as politically 
unrealizable between the wars.  
 One of the main goals of this dissertation is to restore contingency to the history of 
Jewish nationalism. Scholars have already shown in detail that the vision of the Jewish nation-
state was only one path, and by no means the main one, among a variety of Jewish diaspora 
nationalist, autonomist and minority rights visions promoted from the late 19th century and 
throughout the interwar years. This dissertation explored why these various diaspora nationalist 
paths were abandoned, and why the Jewish nation-state emerged as the road eventually taken 
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during the war and in its immediate aftermath. But this dissertation also sought to highlight how 
the idea of a Jewish nation-state itself was not a fixed vision but constantly transformed from the 
1920s and through the early postwar years. In the 1920s Zionist leaders expected it would take 
several decades of a favorable Jewish immigration rate for Jews to only equal the numbers Arabs 
in Palestine. They thus envisioned a state based on extensive Jewish and Arab autonomies, a 
dream version of the state of nationalities Jews were clamoring for in Eastern Europe. During the 
1930s, prominent Zionist leaders feared that the British would prevent Jews from becoming a 
majority in Palestine and advocated for various visions of a Jewish-Arab state in Palestine based 
on political equality – ‘parity’- between both national groups. After the outbreak of war, 
expecting millions of stateless Jews in postwar Europe, Zionist leaders for the first time 
embraced the vision of a Jewish ethnic nation-state – they believed an opportunity emerged to 
establish a Jewish majority in Palestine larger than they had ever before anticipated was possible. 
Yet from late 1942, as Zionist leaders increasingly learned about the extent of Jewish 
extermination in Europe, they were forced to re-imagine the future state once again. By 1946 
Zionist leaders concluded that if a Jewish state is to emerge at all, it would have to be a small 
state with a Jewish majority created not by ‘offsetting’ the Arab demographic superiority but by 
partitioning Palestine. The Jewish state vision that triumphed after the war was thus not simply a 
fixed political path that took center stage as Jewish diaspora nationalism faded, but itself a 
product of the radically changed demographic reality of the postwar Jewish world and the new 
ethnic landscape that emerged in Eastern Europe after the war.  
 While this dissertation has shown why the vision of the Jewish nation-state ultimately 
triumphed during the war, it is important to conclude with a few comments that qualify the 
narrative of the victory of Zionism after the war. For one, it should be emphasized that Zionism 
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did not succeed because it if found a ‘solution’ to the Jewish question in Eastern Europe as it 
purported to do during the interwar period and the early years of the war. Indeed, Zionism 
triumphed at the moment in which the ‘Jewish question’ in Eastern Europe largely disappeared. 
While from the 1920s and until the early 1940s Zionist leaders envisioned a Jewish problem of 
millions in need of future immigration from Europe to Palestine, by the end of the war the 
‘Jewish problem’ became tantamount in the international imagination to the fate only some 
250,000 Jews who lingered in displaced persons camp. The main reason for the disappearance of 
the Jewish question was the extermination of European Jewry. But the establishment of 
communist and pro-Soviet regime across Eastern Europe after the war also significantly reduced 
the scale of the ‘Jewish problem’ in Eastern Europe. Zionist demographic predications from the 
1920s onward were based on the assumption that Eastern European Jews were undesirable 
citizens in their home states who enjoy only tentative equality and thus that a significant number, 
particularly among the young, will seek immigration avenues in the future. The new regimes 
established after the war across the region however promised complete legal equality for the 
Jews. During the war Zionist leaders looked to Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria as sites for 
future Jewish immigration to Palestine – but after the war those states promised the 600,000 
Jewish survivors who remained in them full equality. Moreover, while Poland was the site of 
massive Jewish flight to the DP camps in face of the eruption of anti-Jewish local violence after 
the war, the postwar Polish regime also vouched for Jewish equality and was in fact the only 
country in postwar Eastern Europe in which a short-lived experiment in Jewish national 
autonomy took place in the Silesian border region.517 From 1944 Ben-Gurion expressed his 
repeated alarm at the prospects of a new era of Jewish of legal equality in postwar Eastern 																																																								
517 Françoise S. Ouzan and Manfred Gerstenfeld (eds.), Postwar Jewish Displacement and Rebirth, 1945-1967 
(London: Brill, 2014), 63-75 and Hugo Service, Germans to Poles: Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing 
after the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), mainly chapter 8. 
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Europe – only few Jews remained alive after the war, he argued, and Zionism would now have to 
compete with regimes who at least ostensibly, and for a variety of ideological and public 
relations reasons, are committed to keeping the Jews in their states rather than promoting their 
‘evacuation’ as had been the case before the war. Salo Baron was also deeply impressed by the 
new era of Jewish equality across Eastern Europe. In his essay on the 1946 Paris Conference, 
Baron in fact noted that while Jewish observers were disappointed by the lack of guarantees for 
Jewish collective rights in the new states in the region, they overlooked a major historical 
development – for the first time the Great Powers did not need to force Eastern European states 
to grant Jews equality, such as had been the case in the 1878 Congress of Berlin or the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference. Jewish legal equality, Baron declared, was now beyond dispute, a 
political fact across Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, and historians of the future, he 
insisted, thus may very well describe 1946 as the beginning of a new era of Jewish equality and 
emancipation.518  
 The story of the triumph of Zionism after the war needs to be qualified also in terms of 
demographics. When the state of Israel was established in 1948, the Jewish population in 
Palestine numbered 600,000 – not significantly different from the size of the Jewish population 
in the Yishuv on the eve of the Second World War. This number was still smaller than the 
number of Jews in Western Europe after the war – there were slightly over 650,000 Jews in 
Great Britain and France combined. And smaller than the number of Jews in North African and 
Islamic countries, which numbered around one million after the war. The Jewish population in 
Palestine amounted to just over a quarter of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union after the 
war, which numbered around two million. And Jewish Palestine was a small community 																																																								
518 Salo. W. Baron, “Final Stages of Jewish Emancipation,” Unpublished essay written in late 1946/early 1947, Salo 
W. Baron Papers, Stanford University Libraries, Department of Special Collections and University Archives, 
M0580, Box 386. 
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compared to the major demographic center of postwar Jewish life – the United States, home to 
some 4.5-5 million Jews during the 1940s. Indeed, any account of the triumph of Zionism after 
the war should note the demographic fact that Palestine was the third largest country in terms of 
the size of the Jewish population after the war, and the fifth or sixth largest center of Jewish life 
based on common concepts used to regionally divide Jews at the time.519  
 The final way in which the story of the triumph of Zionism after the war needs to be 
qualified is by noting that Zionism did not actually triumph immediately after the war. In 1945 
the British government reaffirmed its commitment to the 1939 White Paper Policy that 
envisioned Palestine as a future independent state with an Arab majority and a Jewish minority. 
The British government opposed large-scale Jewish immigration schemes to Palestine after the 
war and even sought to hinder plans aimed at the ‘humanitarian’ immigration of 100,000 Jewish 
refugees, as advocated for by the United States government. The British government was only 
willing to support various forms of cantonization in Palestine that would effectively imply 
Jewish autonomy in a limited area but exclude the possibility of Jews ever establishing a 
majority. Truman’s administration also opposed the vision of a Jewish state and large-scale 
Jewish immigration, and endorsed limited immigration of Jewish refugees and a bi-national 
Jewish-Arab state in Palestine. The postwar political opposition of Britain to Zionist aspirations 
in Palestine was a continuation of a policy the British government invariably developed during 
the 1930s. As we have seen, during the 1930s prominent Zionist leaders became convinced that 
the British were reneging on the promise of the Balfour declaration and increasingly embracing 
the vision of the establishment of a majority Arab state in Palestine, a policy course that had been 
officially adopted in the 1939 White Paper Policy. This history of the political weakness of the 																																																								
519 See the entry on Jewish population in 1945 in the Holocaust Encyclopedia of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, based on data published in the 1945 American Jewish Yearbook. 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005687 
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Zionist movement should force historians of Zionism not to write its history as that of a state-in-
the-making, or of a carefully planned settler colonial project, but rather as that of a movement 
that in all likelihood was to become a ‘road not taken’. The eventual emergence of a Jewish state 
was thus not primarily a product of a long history of Zionist colonization and settlement 
spanning from the 1920s to 1948, but rather the product of the radically changed international 
situation of late 1940s – the disintegration of the British Empire and the newfound Soviet 
support for Jewish statehood, exemplified in the Soviet Union’s support for the partition plan in 
the November 1947 United Nations vote and, far more significantly, by providing weapons 
through Czechoslovakia and facilitating Israel’s military victory in the war of 1948.  
 Though, as we have seen in this study, the idea of a Jewish nation-state in Palestine came 
to replace the vision of Jewish autonomy in Eastern Europe, the ideals of minority rights and 
autonomy remain an integral part of Israeli public discourse to this day. One of the main 
examples of the persistence of these visions is to be found in the growing public fascination in 
Israel with the memory and legacy of Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Though Jabotinsky had been 
marginalized in the first decades of the state by Israel’s successive Labor party leaders, in the 
past few decades, primarily following the establishment of Mencahem Begin’s first Likud 
government and subsequent Likud administrations, Jabotinsky had been increasingly canonized 
in Israel as one of Zionism’s founding fathers. 520 In 2005 the Likud government passed the 
																																																								
520 Jabotinsky’s path to the center of the Israeli political consensus has been a tortuous one. After the establishment 
of the State of Israel and throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Ben-Gurion and the Mapai ruling party refused to 
transfer Jabotinsky’s remains for burial in Israel. The efforts of Mapai to exclude Jabotinsky from the Zionist 
pantheon reflected their hostility to the Herut party, the self-declared heir of the Revisionist Movement. In the 1930s 
Ben-Gurion referred to Jabotinsky as “Vladimir Hitler” and after the establishment of the state refused to call Herut 
premier Menachem Begin by name. Only in 1964, when Levi Eshkol replaced Ben-Gurion as prime minister, did the 
government agree to reinter Jabotinsky in mount Herzl alongside Theodor Herzl and other prominent Zionist 
leaders. After the Likud party rose to power in 1977, Begin promoted an image of Jabotinsky as one of Zionism’s 
founding fathers – even though Jabotinsky had arguably played only a marginal role in the process of establishing 
the state. The Jabotinsky Begin envisioned however was not the liberal he is portrayed as these days, “Jabotinsky’s 
legacy is not that of a political doctrine” Begin declared, but primarily a spiritual leader who instilled in Jews self-
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“Jabotinsky Law,” modeled after the Herzl Law, that designated an official national day 
dedicated to the memory of Jabotinsky in which a national ceremony will take place and schools 
and the military will discuss his legacy.521 What is remarkable about the legacy of Jabotinsky in 
Israel is that Jabotinsky is remembered not so much for his right-wing politics – his staunch 
militarism and rejection of territorial compromise, but rather for his commitment in the interwar 
period to a future state in Palestine based on extensive Jewish and Arab autonomy and equality. 
After his reelection in 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu greatly promoted the memory of Jabotinsky 
and cultivated an image of Jabotinsky as a proponent of “liberal nationalism” – le’umiut liberalit 
- committed to democracy, the rule of law and equality for minorities. Jabotinsky’s most 
committed disciple is Israel’s president Reuven Rivlin. Rivlin advocates for the resurrection of a 
political vision remarkably similar to the one Jabotinsky had advocated for in the 1930s – the 
establishment of a single state, spanning present-day Israel and the West Bank, with a Jewish 
majority and extensive autonomy and equality for the Arab minority. Shortly after taking office, 
Rivlin paid the first official visit by an Israeli president to the Kfar Qasim memorial ceremony, 
an event commemorating the massacre of 43 Arab citizens by the Israeli military in 1956. 																																																																																																																																																																																		
pride, a national consciousness and who inspired the Etzel to revolt against the British. For an institutional account 
of the canonization of Jabotinsky as the founding father of Herut party from the establishment of the state until his 
burial in Israel see Ofira Gruweis Kvalsky, ‘The Vindicated and the Persecuted: the Mythology and Symbols of the 
Herut Movement, 1948-1965 (Sedeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2015), 183-242 [in Hebrew]. The debates 
over Jabotinsky’s reinterment in Israel reflected a larger obsession in Zionist history with transferring the remains of 
prominent Zionist leaders from the “galut” to Palestine. Mirroring this tradition, Jabotinsky insisted in his will that 
only a sovereign Jewish state would be allowed to decide if to transfer his remains for burial in Palestine. For a 
study of the cultural fixation in Zionist history with reinterment in a sovereign Jewish state see Doron Bar, Ideology 
and Landscape: Reinterment of Renowned Jews in the Land of Israel, 1904-1967 (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2016), 
particularly pages 121-156 on Jabotinsky.  
 
521 Ze’ev Jabotinsky Law (2005), The Knesset (Israeli parliament), 
http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Occasion/Documents/JabotLaw.pdf. After the passage of this law Jabotinsky 
became the first Zionist leader who did not serve as a prime minister or president of Israel to be granted an official 
national memorial day. The situation changed several months later when the Knesset passed the Rehavam Ze'evi 
Law to commemorate the legacy of Ze’evi, a radical right-wing leader and a vocal supporter of Arab transfer. The 
two laws were discussed simultaneously and the opposition of several right wing leaders to the Rehavam Ze'evi Law 
reflected the growing rift on the Israeli right. See, for example, the discussion on the proposed Rehavam Ze'evi Law 
during the vote on the Jabotinsky Law Knesset Protocols, March 23, 2005. 
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Responding to claims that the massacre was part of a government plot to expel Arab citizens, 
Rivlin invoked his ideological mentor to assure Arab citizens that “as Jabotinsky said, I swear we 
will never try to orce anyone out of our country.”522
 
In the most unlikely turn of events, even 
prominent Labor leader Isaac Herzog – a party whose most famous leader Ben-Gurion once 
referred to Jabotinsky as ‘Vladimir Hitler’ – had begun championing Jabotinsky’s legacy. In the 
2016 Jabotinsky Day ceremony in the Knesset, Herzog lambasted Netanyahu for deviating from 
Jabotinsky’s legacy by impugning the legitimacy of the vote of the Arab minority in the recent 
elections. As Herzog declared, “we need many more Jabotinskys who understand that in the 
Land of Israel there will always remain two nations ... we need more Jabotinskys in his own 
political camp, who will not incite against the Arab minority, who will not violate their equality 
of rights and who will not try to expel or oppress them.”523 The growing centrality of 
Jabotinsky’s views on minority rights in Israel’s public discourse is a reminder that even as the 																																																								
522 “President Rivlin addresses Kfar Qasim memorial ceremony,” Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 26, 
2014, accessed on February 19 at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/President-Rivlin-addresses-Kafr-
Qasim-memorial-ceremony-26-Oct-2014.aspx. See also Haaretz editorial on Rivlin’s statements Haaretz Editorial, 
“President Rivlin’s courageous Statements are Worthy of Praise,” Haaretz, October 28, 2014 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/1.623112. On Rivlin’s admiration for Jabotinsky see also Lahav Harkov, 




523 See Knesset (Israeli parliament) protocol (video), 08/03/2016, 
http://online.knesset.gov.il/eprotocol/PLAYER/ProtocolEPlayer.aspx?ProtocolID=55151&DateTor=03/08/2016. 
The appropriation of Jabotinsky by the Zionist left is also apparent in Hillel Halkin’s recent biography of Jabotinsky. 
Jabotinsky, who adamantly opposed any proposal to partition Palestine and rejected the possibility of political 
compromise with the Arabs, is described by Halkin as a supporter of the peace process and the two state solution. 
Halkin’s biography concludes with an imaginary conversation between Halkin and Jabotinsky that takes place in 
2014, in which Jabotinsky urges Israelis to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. “Reach the best deal that you 
can,” the resurrected Jabotinsky tells Halkin when asked if Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders, “I had the 
reputation of a zealot, but I was the least ideological of all Zionists.” Hillel Halkin, Jabotinsky: A Life (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), p. 229. Similarly, A.B Yehoshua – a novelist who is one of the cultural symbols of the 
historic Israeli left – has also sought to re-imagine Jabotinsky as part of the concept of Israeli statism, mamlachtiyut. 
Yehoshua published a recent play based on a real series of meetings between Jabotinsky’s and Ben-Gurion in 
London in 1934. The main theme of the play is that despite the hostility and differences between them, Ben-Gurion 
and Jabotinsky ultimately shared a very similar worldview. This play could be read as aimed at expanding the 
traditionally left-wing Zionist cultural pantheon by including in it the hero of the Israeli right, though at the price of 
obscuring and assimilating the differences between the Israeli left and right. See A.B Yeshoshua, The Two Walked 
Together (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Ha-Meuchad, 2012).   
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ethnic nation-state displaced the vision of Jewish autonomy during and after the Second World 
War, the multiethnic Eastern European legacy of minority rights continues to shape the debates 
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